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
 
International investment and related disputes are on the rise. With 
national courts generally unavailable and difficulties resolving disputes 
through diplomacy, investment treaties give investors a right to seek 
redress and arbitrate directly with states. The costs of these investment 
treaty arbitrations—including the costs of lawyers for both sides, as well 
as administrative and tribunal expenses—are arguably substantial. This 
Article offers empirical research indicating that even partial costs could 
represent more than 10% of an average award. The data set from the pre-
2007 population suggested a lack of certainty about total costs, which 
parties had ultimate liability for costs, and the justification for those cost 
decisions. Although there were signs of balance and a preference for 
parties to be responsible for their own costs, there was neither a universal 
approach to cost allocation nor a reliable relationship between cost shifts 
and losing. Awards typically lacked citation to legal authority and 
provided minimal rationale, and the justifications for cost decisions 
exhibited broad variation. Small pockets of coherence existed. Tribunals 
typically decided costs only in the final award; and as the amount 
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investors claimed increased, tribunal costs also increased. Such a 
combination of variability and convergence can disrupt the value of 
arbitration for investors and states. In light of the data, but recognizing 
the need for additional research to replicate and expand upon the initial 
findings, this Article recommends states consider implementing measures 
that encourage arbitrators to consider specific factors when making cost 
decisions, obligate investors to particularize their claimed damages at an 
early stage, and facilitate the use of other Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) strategies. Establishing such procedural safeguards can aid the 
legitimacy of a dispute resolution mechanism with critical implications for 
the international political economy. 
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The number of investment treaty arbitrations has nearly quintupled.
1
 
Billions of dollars—by virtue of cases like the 2002 Argentine currency 
crisis
2
 or the Yukos Oil debacle
3—are at stake. With global supply chains, 
massive investment flows,
4
 and a network of 2600 treaties,
5
 governments 
 
 
 1. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), IIA ISSUES 
NOTE NO. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 2–3 (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20103_en.pdf; see 
also UNCTAD, IIA MONITOR NO. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Rev1, LATEST 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 2–4 (2009), available at http://www. 
unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf [hereinafter 2009 IIA MONITOR] (describing the increase 
in claims and asserting there were 317 known disputes at the end of 2008); UNCTAD, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES: A 
REVIEW 1, 3–5 (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD, ISDS]; Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating 
Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, 
Evaluating Claims] (describing the increase in claims). 
 2. Luke Eric Peterson, Round-Up: Where Things Stand with Argentina and its Many Investment 
Treaty Arbitrations, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (2008), http://www.iareporter. com/Archive/IAR-12-17-
08.pdf. 
 3. Alex Spence, Former Yukos Owners Begin $50bn Claim Against Russia, TIMES (London), 
Nov. 17, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5172520.ece; see also Press 
Release, Gold Reserve Inc., Gold Reserve Inc. Submits $1.928 Billion Arbitration Claim to World 
Bank‘s ICSID (Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201009 
28005541/en/Gold-Reserve-Submits-1.928-Billion-Arbitration-Claim (articulating claim for nearly 
US$2 billion for a dispute under the Canada-Venezuela investment treaty).  
 4. See UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/3, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS ON GLOBAL FDI FLOWS (2009) (discussing foreign investment 
flows); see also Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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are at risk for treaty arbitration when their regulatory measures, like 
legislation to redress global economic crises, adversely impact foreign 
investment.
6
 Investment treaty arbitration has largely, but not exclusively, 
been a welcome advance. For foreign investors affected by government 
conduct, treaty arbitration offers a direct opportunity to sue states and 
receive damages, whereas alternative venues such as national courts are 
unavailable or undesirable.
7
 Meanwhile, states have an opportunity to 
protect their investors abroad, vindicate their policy choices, and receive 
the benefit of increased investment arguably flowing from their investment 
treaties.
8
 Nevertheless, there is a latent problem with investment treaty 
arbitration, namely, ambiguity about arbitration costs. The scope for cost 
liability includes: (1) the expenses of both parties‘ lawyers, (2) the costs of 
the tribunal and expenses related to administration, and (3) which party 
will bear these two expenses given the possibility of cost shifting.
9
 The 
scope of cost liability may contribute to concerns about the international 
investment regime.
10
 The lack of certainty and predictability about total 
 
 
Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 730–41 (2009) (discussing 
global supply chains, particularly as regards China); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart 
Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916–17, 926–
41 (2007) (discussing the incorporation of environmental obligations into contracts that are part of the 
global supply chain). 
 5. See UNCTAD, IIA MONITOR NO. 3, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8, RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (2008–JUNE 2009), at 2–6 (2009), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/eng/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf (discussing the treaty network).  
 6. See Luke Eric Peterson, Whither the New Financial Crisis Claims?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG 
(Feb. 5, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/02/05/whither-the-new-financial-crisis-
claims/ (―[I]t is entirely possible that the cataclysmic events of the last few months—including the 
sometimes haphazard crisis-management by governments—might give rise to treaty-claims against 
states.‖).  
 7. National courts may be unavailable, given sovereign immunity, or undesirable, given 
problems with the enforceability of judgments or concerns related to the integrity of domestic rule-of-
law institutions. Espousal requires lobbying an investor‘s home state to act on its behalf before the 
International Court of Justice and will not result in an award payable to the investor. Diplomacy can be 
untenable as it politicizes commercial disputes and can result in inaction. Susan D. Franck, The 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through 
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1536–38 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy 
Crisis]. 
 8. See Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty 
Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT‘L L. 767, 793 n.116 (2008) [hereinafter Franck, Empiricism] 
(gathering sources debating the benefits of investment treaties). See generally THE EFFECT OF 
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION 
TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (suggesting that 
treaties signal to investors that investments will be protected under international law but also 
suggesting the effect on foreign investment is debatable). 
 9. See infra Part I.C (defining ―cost,‖ including the Tribunal‘s Costs and Expenses and Parties‘ 
Legal Costs and Expenses); infra Part II.A, C (exploring the law applicable to costs and cost shifting). 
 10. Other variables may contribute to the current discontent. See, e.g., Ilija Mitrev Penuliski, A 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/1
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costs, which party will have liability for which costs, and the justification 
for those cost decisions diminishes the effectiveness of investment treaty 
arbitration.
11
  
In Eureko v. Poland,
12
 for example, a Dutch investor sued the Republic 
of Poland under a bilateral investment treaty for problems with the 
US$1.34 billion insurance privatization.
13
 The arbitration made headlines 
in the international financial news
14
 and featured an internationally 
prominent tribunal.
15
 The eighty-six-page award held Poland liable and 
required Poland to pay the fees of the tribunal and Eureko‘s lawyers. The 
arbitrators‘ full decision on costs was contained in two sentences: 
―Claimant has prevailed. Consequently, its costs and those of the Tribunal 
shall be borne by the Respondent.‖16 The controlling treaty language 
prohibited this approach.
17
 While the legal error makes it an arguable 
outlier and a subsequent decision redressed this error,
18
 data nevertheless 
 
 
Dispute Systems Design Diagnosis of ICSID, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
507–08 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (suggesting that there are concerns of ―favoring capital-
exporting countries, lacking legal consistency, regulating types of government conduct which states 
have not agreed to submit to review, being opaque, and lacking legitimacy due to conflicts of interest 
among individuals who provide dispute resolution services‖). 
 11. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1895, 1942–44, 1954 (2010) (suggesting that arbitrators in investment treaty disputes 
―bear the primary responsibility for lending certainty and predictability to investment transactions‖ and 
that ―a more ‗legitimate‘ body of law‖ can promote the integrity of arbitration).  
 12. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005), 
reprinted in 12 ICSID REP. 335 (2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko-
PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf. 
 13. Arbitration Scorecard 2007: Top 50 Treaty Disputes, AM. LAW., June 13, 2007, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1181639136817#.  
 14. See, e.g., Jan Cienski, Poland in Deal with Eureko over Stake in PZU, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2009, at 11; Marek Strzelecki & Marynia Kruk, Poland and Eureko Settle Dispute, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
5, 2009, at C6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125469684214462753.html.  
 15. The tribunal included Stephen Schwebel (former president of the International Court of 
Justice) and Yves Fortier (former president of the London Court of International Arbitration, member 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Canadian representative to the United Nations, 
and president of the Security Council). Eureko, supra note 12, at II. 
 16. Id. ¶ 261. 
 17. See Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland on 
encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments, Neth.-Pol., art. 12(9), Sept. 24, 1996, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_poland.pdf (―Each Party 
shall bear the cost of the arbitrator appointed by itself and its representation. The cost of the chairman 
as well as the other costs will be borne in equal parts by the Parties.‖); see also id. art. 8(2) (mandating 
investor-state arbitration pursuant to Article 12(3–9)). 
 18. See infra note 307 (discussing the retraction of aspects of the Eureko award). The case may 
also be an outlier as the test of the relevant treaty specifically addressing the treatment of costs. While 
the author is unaware of empirical research that descriptively assesses whether and how IIAs address 
the costs of dispute resolution, doctrinal legal research suggested that addressing costs expressly in the 
text of treaties was somewhat unusual, but it was normal to include arbitration rules that impliedly 
addressed costs. See infra Part III.C. See generally Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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suggests that Eureko‘s failure to cite any legal authority and the reliance 
on a single rationale was typical.
19
 
Investment arbitration costs are called ―a hot issue‖20 and ―the sting in 
the tail.‖21 Concerns about the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration, 
and incoherency in areas such as costs, may cause states to reevaluate the 
value of investment treaties. The United States
22
 and Norway
23
 are 
reconsidering their model treaties. Meanwhile, Russia withdrew from the 
Energy Charter Treaty,
24
 and Ecuador
25
 and Bolivia
26
 withdrew from the 
 
 
Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 
INT‘L STUD. 1 (2010) (analyzing different dispute resolution delegations in investment treaties).  
 19. See infra Part III.D. 
 20. Walid Ben Hamida, Cost Issues in Investor-State Arbitration Decisions Rendered Against the 
Investor: A Synthetic Table, in TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 2 (2005), available at 
http://www. transnational-dispute-management.com. 
 21. Klaus Reichert & James Hope, Costs—The Sting in the Tail, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 30, 30 
(2006); see also Chiara Giorgetti, Costs and Their Apportionment in International Investment 
Arbitration, INT‘L DISP. Q., Fall 2009, at 6, available at http://www.whitecase.com/idq/fall_2009_4/ 
(―The extent and eventual apportionment of arbitration costs constitute important considerations when 
parties explore the possibility of resolving a dispute through international investment arbitration.‖). 
 22. Hearing on Investment Protections in U.S. Trade and Investment Agreements Before 
Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings/transcript.aspx?NewsID=10394; House Looks To Finish 
Supplemental As Senate Begins Credit Card Debate, CONG. DAILY, May 8, 2009, available at 2009 
WLNR 8967848. 
 23. Luke Eric Peterson, Norway Proposes Significant Reforms to its Investment Treaty Practices, 
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_mar27_2008.pdf; 
Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Proposed Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INVESTMENT 
TREATY NEWS, June 8, 2009, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/06/08/ 
norway-shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty.aspx.  
 24. Emmanuel Gaillard, Letter, Russia Cannot Walk Away from its Legal Obligations, FIN. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at 6; Alison Ross, Russia withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty, GLOBAL 
ARB. REV., Aug. 7, 2009, available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/18495/ 
russia-withdraws-energy-charter-treaty/.  
 25. See News Release, ICSID, Ecuador‘s Notification under Article 25(4) of the ICSID 
Convention (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType 
=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&p
ageName=Announcement9 (providing Ecuador‘s decision to withdraw from ICSID on disputes related 
to oil, gas and minerals); News Release, ICSID, Ecuador Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the 
ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Annou
ncements&pageName=Announcement20 (―[T]he World Bank received a written notice of 
denunciation of the [ICSID Convention] from the Republic of Ecuador.‖); see also Ecuador Says 
Won’t Extend U.S. Investment Treaty, REUTERS, May 6, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/politics 
News/idUSN062642352 0070507 (discussing how Ecuadorian Foreign Affairs Minister stated that the 
U.S.-Ecuador treaty ―‗has caused our country a lot of problems‘‖ and that ―‗this treaty doesn‘t 
represent our national interests‘‖). 
 26. News Release, ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention 
(May 16, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/Announcement3.html.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/1
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World Bank‘s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).
27
  
Better information about investment arbitration costs is necessary. 
Claims that costs are ―no small matter‖28 or may range from US$1–21 
million
29
 require analysis. Objections that arbitrators ―give cursory 
attention to fixing arbitration costs‖30 require assessment of what 
justifications tribunals do offer for cost decisions, particularly in the 
context of investment arbitration. Critiques that cost decisions are 
―arbitrary‖31 or ―unpredictable‖32 necessitate analysis of what variables (if 
any) are reliably linked to cost decisions. While research in this Article is 
neither a predictive nor causal model of future outcomes, cost information 
has the power to (1) aid parties in understanding their arbitration risks and 
managing their investment treaty disputes,
33
 including using Alternative 
 
 
 27. See also Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty 
Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 457, 495 
n.197 (2009) (―In the end of April 2007 the leaders of Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua have agreed 
to withdraw from the ICSID mechanism.‖). 
 28. Noah D. Rubins, The Allocation of Costs and Attorney’s Fees in Investor-State Arbitration, 
18 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 109, 124 (2003) [hereinafter Rubins, Allocation of Costs].  
 29. See infra notes 74–81, 215–16 (providing examples of total cost awards). 
 30. Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, Assessing Costs in International Arbitration, 
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 2010, at 2; see also infra notes 235–36 (critiquing the absence of costs 
justification). 
 31. See infra notes 237–38 (critiquing costs awards as arbitrary and unpredictable). 
 32. Lester Nurick, Costs in International Arbitration, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 57 
(1992); see also Ank A. Santens, Costs in International Arbitration: A Plea for a Debate on Early 
Guidance by the Arbitral Tribunal on the Principles it Will Apply when Deciding on Costs, KLUWER 
ARB. BLOG (June 10, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/06/10/costs-in-international-
arbitration-–-a-plea-for-a-debate-on-early-guidance-by-the-arbitral-tribunal-on-the-principles-it-will-apply-
when-deciding-on-costs/ (―Whereas the outcome on costs is often almost as important as the outcome 
on the merits, this is an area where uncertainty reigns.‖).  
 33. Commentators suggest that costs influence parties‘ decisions to bring claims. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 584–93 (6th ed. 2003); John J. Donohue III, Opting for the 
British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Case Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1093, 1095–96, 1116–18 (1991); Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective Compliance: 
Cost-Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 653, 654–55 
(2006) [hereinafter Schill, Cost-Shifting]. See generally THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, 
FED. JUD. CENTER, IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL 
CIVIL LITIGATION 9 (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/ 
$file/costciv3.pdf [hereinafter WILLGING & LEE, WORDS] (referring to remarks by an employment 
lawyer that ―she had potential clients who could not afford to pay the fee for filing a case in federal 
court. She could not represent such clients because they would not be able to pay for other discovery 
expenses.‖). The generalization to investment arbitration is unclear given the lack of data related to 
cost assessments and decisions to arbitrate. Although appealing, it presumes that investors are rational 
actors, costs of ITA are reasonably predictable, and costs affect decisions to bring claims. This may 
not be the case. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008). But see Ian A. Laird, NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 223, 228–29 (2001) (suggesting investors consider 
―real risk that such an investor would be obliged to pay the substantial costs‖ of treaty arbitration).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Dispute Resolution (ADR)
34
 to facilitate settlement;
35
 (2) guide tribunals 
seeking descriptive data about costs;
36
 (3) permit states to design better 
investment treaties in light of their normative policy choices;
37
 and (4) 
inform the debate about the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration.
38
  
Despite the need for reliable information on investment treaty costs, 
empirical analysis is just beginning.
39
 This Article is the first empirical 
analysis of investment arbitration costs that recommends potential reforms 
based upon available data and appropriate norms. Part I of the Article 
provides a background on investment agreements, treaty arbitration, and 
costs. Part II explores the doctrinal and normative bases for cost shifting 
 
 
 34. UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_ 
en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, ADR I]; UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and 
Alternatives to Arbitration II (Sept. 3, 2010) (working draft) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD, ADR II]. 
 35. Information gaps undermine the value of interest-based dispute resolution methods that 
require assessments about best and worst alternatives to negotiated agreements. See generally ROGER 
FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT 
GIVING IN (1991); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM 
CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION (1991). The uncertainty creates challenges for distributive 
negotiation and understanding the zones of possible agreement. See generally ROBERT MNOOKIN ET 
AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); MICHAEL 
WATKINS & SUSAN ROSEGRANT, BREAKTHROUGH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: HOW GREAT 
NEGOTIATORS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD‘S TOUGHEST POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTS 26–35 (2001). 
 36. Tembec, for example, referred to information about a contemporary trend in investment 
arbitration to justify its cost decision. Tembec v. United States, Joint Order on the Costs of Arbitration 
and for the Termination of Certain Arbitral Proceedings, ¶ 139 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Consolidation Trib. 
2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/90177.pdf. Data suggested that 
reference to stare decisis was unusual. Infra note 283. Arbitral tribunals are not the only adjudicators 
interested in arbitration costs; national courts may likewise be interested. See Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm 
Trading Co. v. Mayne Pharma Inc., 560 F.3d 935, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the cost 
implications of arbitration and citing the scholarship of Dean John Gotanda: ―‗[i]n international 
commercial arbitrations, the fees of the arbitral tribunal can be considerable‘‖ (alteration in original)). 
 37. This presumes the use of rational cost benefit analysis. Cognitive biases and heuristics may 
prevent stakeholders from engaging in informed or rational decisions. See generally ARIELY, supra 
note 33 (discussing reaction to information in predictably irrational patterns). See also Zachary Elkins 
et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 265, 279–82 (considering the utility of investment treaties via a cost/benefit matrix); Gus Van 
Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 
17 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 121, 124 (2006) [hereinafter Global Administrative Law] (―[T]he wider costs and 
benefits of investment treaties for states, have been the subject of some debate . . . .‖).  
 38. See, e.g., GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); 
Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future 
of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT‘L L. 953, 956–57 (2007). 
 39. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 70 (calling for expanded empirical research on 
costs); John Y. Gotanda, Attorneys’ Fees Agonistes: The Implications of Inconsistency in the Awarding 
of Fees and Costs in International Arbitrations 10 (Villanova Univ. School of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 2010–01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491755 
[hereinafter Gotanda, Fees]. 
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and its application to investment treaty arbitration. Part III describes the 
methodology, hypotheses, and results of the research.  
The results suggested that cost was a key risk in investment treaty 
arbitration. Even limited data suggested that reported costs represented 
more than 10% of an average award (i.e., over US$1.2 million). As the 
data only measured the portion of one party‘s legal fees that was shifted 
(and tribunal costs where it was available), it necessarily omitted the full 
scope of both parties‘ legal costs; net costs could have been much larger 
and therefore a more substantial aspect of the amount awarded.
40
 
Regarding allocation of the risk of liability for arbitration costs, the data 
showed that costs exhibited a degree of incoherence buttressed by small 
pockets of coherence. There was no universal approach for how tribunals 
addressed costs; although tribunals most frequently required parties to 
share tribunal and administrative costs equally and absorb their own legal 
fees, there were a mix of approaches and outcomes.  
Yet within the variance, the overall experiences of investors and states 
were relatively equivalent, with (1) parties often responsible for equal 
costs, or (2) rough parity between investors and states when tribunals did 
shift costs. There was, however, a lack of justification for these results. 
Although guidance or decisions on costs could be made at earlier phases, 
such as in preliminary questions,
41
 tribunals typically waited until the end 
to make decisions. This meant that information, which was possibly vital 
to strategic settlement opportunities, was unavailable to the parties. When 
tribunals did make decisions, they did not regularly cite to any legal 
authority (i.e., citing less than one authority on average) and used minimal 
justifications (i.e., one to two on average) to justify the result. Where 
tribunals offered reasons, justifications diverged across categories. 
Although the literature suggests cost decisions are often based upon a pure 
―loser-pays‖ approach or a desire to punish inappropriate behavior, these 
were not the most frequent rationales; and there was no reliable statistical 
 
 
 40. See, e.g., Giorgetti, supra note 21 (―The cost of counsel and associated expenses represent 
the most substantial expense in international arbitration. A recent Report by the Commission on 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce found that legal costs amounted to an average 
of 82 percent of the total arbitration costs. This finding can be used as a proxy for a discussion of costs 
in investment arbitration as well.‖ (footnote omitted)). This Article does not address the issues of 
optimal settlement rates or the optimal fee structures of tribunals or parties‘ legal fees. Future research 
might develop these points. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 388 (1986) 
(suggesting that there is an optimal settlement rate). 
 41. See infra notes 336, 358 (discussing opportunities to raise preliminary questions). 
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relationship between losing and cost shifting, either for parties‘ own legal 
fees or the tribunal and related administrative costs.
42
  
There were other key commonalities. Tribunals were most likely to 
rationalize
43
 their decisions using the parties‘ relative success and 
equitable considerations. They were unlikely to base their decisions 
expressly on concerns related to the public interest, party equality, stare 
decisis, or settlement efforts. A few remaining areas exhibited a degree of 
coherence. There was a link between an award‘s cost decisions, whereby if 
tribunals shifted attorney‘s fees onto another party, the same party was 
also liable for more than 50% of tribunal fees. Finally, there was a reliable 
relationship between the amounts investors claimed and the tribunal‘s total 
costs. If investors made low damage claims, tribunal costs were low; if 
damage claims were high, tribunal costs were high. As international 
arbitration has no equivalent to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
requiring good-faith pleadings, the relationship has implications for using 
cost shifting in arbitration—perhaps even in domestic litigation44—to 
create incentives that promote efficient and fair dispute resolution. 
Overall, while there were pockets of rough coherence and parity, the larger 
picture suggests that costs exhibited a degree of uncertainty. The question 
 
 
 42. See infra notes 294, 312. 
 43. For the purposes of this Article, the terms ―rationalize‖ or ―rationalization‖ primarily refer to 
the processes of explaining, justifying, and streamlining the reasoning of the adjudicative outcomes in 
the cost decisions of investment treaty arbitration awards. These explanations may, in turn, benefit 
from a more economics-based approach to ―rationalization‖ that is focused upon transitioning 
preexisting ad hoc systems into ones based upon sets of published and predictable rules.  
 44. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1925, 
1953–56, 1972 (2009) (discussing the impact of fee shifting on litigation and analyzing the role of 
settlement); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545, 567–68 
(2004) (discussing the demand curve for litigation and considering the impact of alternative dispute 
resolution methods); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public 
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 554–59 (2009) (proposing cost shifting in litigation to promote 
freedom for parties to adopt procedural laws in public adjudication); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting 
the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 159 (1984) (―[T]he possibility 
of a fee shift against individual litigants relying on their own resources might well result in a greater 
tendency to settle claims . . . .‖); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA 
L. REV. 72 (1983) (describing litigation as investment and analyzing the implications of investing time 
and money into dispute resolution); see also EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. 
CENTER, LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf (conducting a quantitative analysis of costs and finding 
that variables related to higher monetary stakes, longer processing times, case complexity, electronic 
discovery, summary judgment, and representation by large law firms, among others, were associated 
with higher litigation costs); WILLGING & LEE, WORDS, supra note 33 (describing interviews and 
potential variables affecting the efficacy of civil procedure in the federal courts in light of concerns 
related to costs and administrative efficiency). 
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is whether that is a desirable normative output from a system of justice for 
international economic law. 
In light of these findings and the limitations inherent in the data, 
measures, and empirical models, Part IV argues that the system could 
nevertheless benefit from targeted modification. In an effort to promote 
norms of predictability, fairness, and efficiency, the Article recommends 
(1) addressing costs at an early stage; (2) encouraging tribunals to make 
transparent cost decisions with dollar values, legal authorities, and 
rationales; (3) articulating rules that offer arbitrators an express set of 
factors to use when making cost decisions; (4) implementing a pleading 
system that requires claimants to particularize their claimed damages; and 
(5) considering the use of legal expense insurance to defray arbitration 
risk. This Article concludes that, based upon the current evidence, 
investment treaty arbitration arguably remains a useful tool for resolving 
investment disputes, but issues of cost, should they continue in their 
present state, could create difficulties for the effective use of investment 
arbitration. Focused attention to matters of cost—by parties, arbitrators, 
policy makers, and scholars—is a desirable outcome for improving the 
legitimacy of treaty-based dispute resolution during a time of transition in 
the international economic framework.  
I. A PRIMER ON IIAS, ITA, AND RELATED COSTS 
A. International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
An international investment agreement (IIA) is a treaty made between 
two or more governments that safeguards investments made by qualifying 
investors in the territory of other signatories.
45
 Countries might sign a 
regional trade agreement, such as the Dominican Republic-Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).
46
 The theoretical 
justification for these agreements is that, on balance, the benefits flowing 
from signing IIAs—including increased investment flows, signaling that a 
 
 
 45. Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 161, 171 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Dispute Systems Design].  
 46. Multilateral agreements, like DR-CAFTA and NAFTA, provide investment protection on a 
multilateral basis, and perhaps in conjunction with other international economic law rights. Dominican 
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-
central-america-fta/final-text [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Can.-Mex. ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605; see also Antonio R. Parra, Provisions 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 287 (1997).  
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state is willing to provide a stable investment regime (whether based on 
international law, domestic regulation, or a hybrid), partitioning aspects of 
domestic policy space, and providing protection to its own outward bound 
investors
47—outweigh the costs and related risks of creating international 
economic law obligations.
48
 
As a doctrinal matter, IIAs grant reciprocal investment rights, both 
procedural and substantive, to private investors from the signatory 
countries. Substantively, governments guarantee investors certain 
treatment, such as freedom from unlawful expropriation, freedom from 
discrimination, and the right to fair and equitable treatment.
49
 
Procedurally, an IIA permits investors who believe their substantive rights 
have been violated to seek direct redress against the host state through the 
treaty‘s dispute resolution mechanism. The objective is to move 
politicized forms of dispute resolution toward a neutral and rule-based 
forum.
50
 Investors then have an opportunity to engage in non-adjudicative 
dispute resolution, and, if necessary, to resolve disputes finally through an 
enforceable arbitration proceeding.
51
  
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) 
Some investment conflicts involve overtly political elements.
52
 Other 
treaty disputes appear more private, such as the revocation of a banking 
 
 
 47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (outlining benefits related to IIAs). 
 48. See generally Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and 
Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 507 (2009) (analyzing IIAs under 
contract theory given factors related to uncertainty, information asymmetry, and optimization of joint 
benefits). 
 49. UNCTAD, ISDS, supra note 1, at 31–47; Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at 
172.  
 50. HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA‘S CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
5–6 (1999); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the 
International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 193, 196 (2001); Catherine A. 
Rogers, The Arrival of the ―Have-Nots‖ in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 356–57 (2007) 
[hereinafter Rogers, Have-Nots]; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute 
Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 697, 717 (1999).  
 51. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at 172–73, 192–94; W. Michael Reisman, 
International Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. 
L.J. 185 (2009). 
 52. See, e.g., Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/6, Award (Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ZimbabweAward.pdf 
(deciding claim against Zimbabwe for repossession of land from white farmers); Canadian Cattlemen 
for Fair Trade v. United States, Award on Jurisdiction (NAFTA/UNCITRAL 2008), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CCFT-USAAward_001.pdf (deciding whether Canadian ranchers 
could sue the U.S. for restrictions put in place related to concerns about Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (i.e., Mad Cow disease)). 
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license or a breach of contract.
53
 A cause of action under an IIA generally 
involves (1) a foreign investor asserting that a host state violated the treaty 
and damaged the investment, and (2) if the dispute is not otherwise 
resolved, the investor seeking redress by requiring the state to arbitrate. 
While treaties vary, investors can generally elect to arbitrate before: (1) an 
ad hoc tribunal organized under the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, (2) the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and (3) a tribunal organized 
through the World Bank‘s ICSID.54  
Arbitration mechanics are relatively straightforward. After complying 
with jurisdictional prerequisites, an investor initiates arbitration by 
submitting an arbitration request to its selected forum.
55
 Then, the process 
of selecting a tribunal begins. Typically, panels of three arbitrators resolve 
investment disputes
56
 in an impartial manner.
57
 Parties then marshal their 
facts and legal arguments to address different phases of the dispute, 
namely, jurisdiction, merits, quantum, and costs. The investor must first 
establish that it meets the jurisdictional thresholds, namely, that there is a 
qualifying investor and investment brought under a qualifying treaty 
within a proper time frame. If this is not established, the case terminates. 
Otherwise, the dispute continues. The merits phase involves a tribunal‘s 
determination of whether the respondent breached the treaty‘s substantive 
obligations. If there is no substantive breach, the case terminates; 
otherwise, the dispute continues. At the quantum phase, the parties 
establish the value of the substantive treaty breach. Decisions related to 
costs can occur at any or all of these substantive phases, and tribunals 
 
 
 53. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at 185–86; Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra 
note 1, at 10. 
 54. Parra, supra note 46, at 288. But see Agreement Between the Government of the People‘s 
Republic of China and the Government of Ghana Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments art. 10, Oct. 12, 1989, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/ 
dite/iia/docs/bits/china_ghana.pdf (providing that certain investment disputes are subject to ad hoc 
arbitration, SCC is the default appointing authority, and the tribunal can use either SCC or ICSID rules 
―as guidance‖). Another prevalent arbitral institution is the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC). Aaken, supra note 48, at 3. 
 55. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45. But see Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the 
BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVEST. & 
TRADE 231, 234 (2004) (suggesting that, irrespective of whether the substantive prerequisites are 
established, investors may proceed with arbitration). 
 56. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 124 (1995); 
Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 77. 
 57. Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal, 9 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 45, 
52–53 (1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: 
Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 59, 65 (1995); Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International 
Arbitrator: Five Factors to Consider, 17 MEALEY‘S INT‘L ARB. REP. NO. 10, 2, 3 (2002).  
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sometimes render a separate substantive award to assess and allocate 
arbitration costs. The final award is enforceable worldwide.
58
 
C. Costs of ITA 
For the purposes of this section, the Article defines costs broadly, but 
then particularizes ―costs‖ for the remainder of the Article as a more 
narrow fiscal measure to conduct empirical analyses. It then discusses the 
critical nature of ITA costs and explains what is currently known about the 
more narrow fiscal costs of ITA.  
1. Defining Costs 
As a general matter, costs related to investment treaty disputes can take 
many forms.
59
 Social costs involve unrest or other social considerations 
that arise as a result of the sensitive issues sometimes involved in ITA.
60
 
Political costs involve the value of sacrificing aspects of sovereignty,
61
 the 
 
 
 58. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at 193–94. There is doctrinal variation. 
ICSID Convention arbitrations issue one final ―award‖; earlier decisions are not awards for 
enforcement purposes. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524, 541 [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention]. But see Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1547–57 (comparing enforcement 
under ICSID and New York Conventions). 
 59. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, 
Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 138, 145–46 (2007) (―The potential costs 
of an investor-State arbitration are basically threefold. First, as indicated above, a host country faces 
the risk of having to pay awards that, in relation to its budget and financial resources, may prove 
extremely burdensome. Second, the host country must bear the substantial costs, both direct and 
indirect, of conducting the arbitration itself. Third, the ‗policy cost‘ of investor-State arbitration is that 
a substantial award to the investor may require the host country to repeal or modify measures that were 
implemented for the public good.‖); see also Jennifer A. Heindl, Toward A History of NAFTA’s 
Chapter Eleven, 24 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 672, 686 (2006) (referring to the ―political and financial 
costs‖ of ITA); Abba Kolo, Tax ―Veto‖ as a Special Jurisdictional and Substantive Issue in Investor-
State Arbitration: Need for Reassessment?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‘L L. REV. 475, 478, 492 (2009) 
(considering political and economic costs of tax-related investment disputes). 
 60. Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia provoked riots, deaths, a state of emergency, and ITA. See 
generally OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA (2004). 
Argentina‘s currency crisis created public upheaval. Mary Helen Mourra, Privatization of Water 
Management in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE 
CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 83, 88–89 (Thomas E. Carbanneau & Mary H. Mourra eds., 2008); 
Alan Ciblis, ICSID Bleeds Argentina, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, July 1, 2005, http://www.multi 
nationalmonitor.org/mm2005/072005/front.html; see also David Collins, Reliance Remedies at the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 29 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 195, 211–12 
(2009) (discussing the social costs of awards). 
 61. The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement does not permit ITA and instead requires all 
investment conflict to be resolved in national courts, suggesting a concern about affronting national 
courts. William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: 
Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1 
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need to raise domestic taxes,
62
 or the procurement of international aid.
63
 
There are also economic costs, including opportunity costs from sinking 
resources (whether commercial or governmental) into ITA,
64
 reputational 
costs that may impact the credit rating of sovereign debt,
65
 and 
transactional costs related to paying lawyers, arbitrators, institutions, and 
their related expenses. The last set of dispute resolution costs are fiscal, 
tangible, and presumably easier to quantify. Although arguably not the 
most normatively important aspect of ―cost‖ to measure, and although 
other variables are worthy of operationalizing to assess net costs, these 
fiscal elements are a tangible place to start and worthy of analysis.
66
  
As regards the quantifiable fiscal costs, there are several variables that 
contribute to the scope of fiscal exposure in investment treaty arbitration.
67
 
 
 
(2006). Pakistan has refused to sign an IIA with the United States. Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & 
Damon Vis-Dunbar, Reflections on Pakistan’s Investment-treaty Program after 50 Years: An 
Interview with the former Attorney General of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan, INVESTMENT TREATY 
NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/03/16/pakistans-
standstill-in-investment-treaty-making-an-interview-with-the-former-attorney-general-of-pakistan-mak 
hdoom-ali-khan.aspx; see also Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 435, 436–37 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development] (discussing 
reactions to allegations that ITA is unfair or improperly infringes upon sovereignty); La ALBA Quiere 
Crear un Tribunal de Arbitraje Paralelo al Ciadi, HOY BOLIVIA, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.hoy 
bolivia.com/Noticia.php?IdEdicion=519&IdSeccion=3&IdNoticia=21205 (discussing denunciation of 
ICSID and advocating ALBA‘s creation of a parallel regional arbitration institution). 
 62. Luke Eric Peterson, Czech Republic Hit with Massive Compensation Bill in Investment 
Treaty Dispute, INVEST. L. & SUSTAINABLE DEV. WKLY. NEWS BULL. (Mar. 21, 2003), http://www. 
iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_investsd_march_2003.pdf (―[O]ne proposal mooted by some officials is 
for an increase in value-added tax on goods and services which would see all taxpayers absorbing the 
cost of the investment treaty arbitration.‖). 
 63. See Susan D. Franck, International Decisions, Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. 
Republic of Ecuador, 99 AM. J. INT‘L L. 675, 681 (2005) (discussing the implications of foreign aid to 
Ecuador after the adverse award in Occidental).  
 64. Don Peters, Can We Talk? Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private Transborder 
Commercial Disputes in the Americas, 41 VAND. J. TRANAT‘L L. 1251, 1259–60 (2008) 
(―[Arbitration] diverts time, money, and energy to ancillary procedural quarrels . . . . [S]ubstantial time 
and money is often spent selecting arbitrators and wrangling about information gathering.‖ (footnote 
omitted)); Salacuse, Is There a Better Way?, supra note 59, at 142 (referring to ―indirect costs such as 
the time of the government officials and corporate executives devoted to preparing and participating 
in‖ arbitration). 
 65. See Salacuse, supra note 59, at 146; see also Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 682 
(suggesting there are costs related to state compliance with international legal obligations). Reputation 
costs may also have economic implications, such as investors‘ decisions about the utility of investing, 
future investors‘ assessment of the pricing of investment risk, and the price premium later investors 
may extract. 
 66. See infra notes 68–73.  
 67. The overall dispute resolution risk calculus is likely a function of: (1) amount claimed, (2) 
amount likely to be awarded, (3) amount actually awarded, (4) amount of interest on any award, (5) 
TCE, (6) PLC, and (7) tribunal allocation of TCE and PLC. See Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 
1, at 57–70 (discussing various arbitration risks); see also J. Gillis Wetter & Charl Priem, Costs and 
Their Allocation in International Commercial Arbitrations, 2 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 249, 253–54 
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For the purposes of the remainder of this Article, the relevant variables 
relate to (1) amounts claimed, (2) damages awarded, (3) tribunal costs and 
related administrative expenses for conducting the arbitration (TCE),
68
 (4) 
the parties‘ own legal costs and expenses for their lawyers and related 
expenses (PLC),
69
 and (5) tribunal decisions allocating TCE and PLC to 
affect the parties‘ ultimate fiscal liability.70 As these different cost 
elements can involve different legal rules,
71
 this research demarcates 
between TCE and PLC decisions.
72
  
 
 
(1991) (mentioning interest as a cost). Interest impacts liability and would be worthy of a separate, 
future analysis to assess the scope of net fiscal risk. 
 68. Arbitration is an ad hoc, non-publicly funded process requiring payment of fees and expenses 
of arbitrators, administrative charges of any arbitral institution, costs associated with renting facilities, 
fees of transcription services, interpreters, and other costs. Micha Bühler, Awarding Costs in 
International Commercial Arbitration: an Overview, 22 ASA BULL. 249, 249 (2004); see MAURO 
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW & PRACTICE 812–14 (2d ed. 2001); see 
also FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 684–85 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999). TCE consists of administrative charges, arbitrators‘ 
fees, arbitrators‘ expenses (hotel, typists, etc.), expert costs (retained by tribunal), secretaries‘ costs 
(retained by tribunal), and other costs that may occur for the tribunal or its work. Salacuse, supra note 
59, at 142 (defining costs in connection with the charges of the arbitral tribunal and institution); Wetter 
& Priem, supra note 67, at 253–54 (same). 
 69. PLC consists of administrative costs (research, legal, processing, witnesses, etc.), outside 
legal costs, and costs in connection with resolving the dispute. See Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 
254; see also Salacuse, supra note 59, at 142 (defining costs related to parties‘ legal costs and 
expenses in connection with preparation and conduct of the arbitration). While some countries permit 
shifting of PLC, other jurisdictions may prohibit it. John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and 
Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1, 9–10 (1999) 
[hereinafter Gotanda, Awarding Costs]. National law may be irrelevant for cost shifting. Infra notes 
136–39. 
 70. Other commentators demarcate TCE and PLC. Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30; see 
Bühler, supra note 68, at 250; see also Eric Gottwald, Leveling The Playing Field: Is It Time For A 
Legal Assistance Center For Developing Nations In Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT‘L 
L. REV. 237, 250–51 (2007) (identifying various costs associated with ITA). 
 71. See U.N. Comm‘n Int‘l Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 
40(1)–(2), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf [hereinafter 1976 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] (providing that procedural costs are ―borne by the unsuccessful party,‖ 
but, for legal costs, the tribunal is ―free to determine which party shall bear such costs or may 
apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable‖). 
 72. The distinction permits stakeholders to differentiate among cost elements. Different 
elements—and their allocation—may reflect different normative objectives. Costs may have different 
magnitudes. Predicting cost liability enables parties to assess the benefit of arbitration. If ―the worst 
thing a client can ever be is surprised,‖ precision permits better management of stakeholder 
expectations, encourages realistic views about possible outcomes, and minimizes outcries of unfair 
surprise at the end of the process. Susan D. Franck, Considering Recalibration of International 
Investment Agreements: Empirical Insights, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: 
EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS (José E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant eds., forthcoming 2011) 
(referring to observations by Sherry Williams). 
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2. Why Costs Matter 
Commentators sometimes make observations about ITA costs that are 
not based upon evidence from systematic reserach, which presumably 
mimic an intuitive understanding based upon personal experience.
73
 There 
are at least five major reasons to take cost allocation seriously and offer 
careful, systematic analyses. 
First, there is significant financial exposure at stake given the risk of 
being liable for TCE, PLC, or both. Commentators observe that costs in 
international arbitration could be enormous, possibly in the millions of 
dollars.
74
 UNCTAD suggests that ―costs involved in investor-State 
arbitration have skyrocketed in recent years.‖75 UNCTAD then cites cases 
where the net result involved (1) a losing investor having to pay 
approximately US$12.7 million in costs,
76
 (2) a losing state having to pay 
US$9 million in costs,
77
 (3) a losing state being required to pay US$7.7 
million in costs,
78
 and (4) a losing state being required to pay US$10.1 
 
 
 73. That even includes the present author. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1592 
(―International arbitration tribunals are not shy about making costs orders. Cost sanctions can be 
applied either during a case or after an award to discourage vexatious [arbitration].‖ (footnote 
omitted)); see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State 
Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 7, 10 n.8 (2005) (observing that 
NAFTA tribunals ―have been disinclined, for various reasons, to award costs‖); Jonathan L. Frank & 
Julie Bédard, Electronic Discovery in International Arbitration: Where Neither the IBA Rules nor U.S. 
Litigation Principles are Enough, 62 DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 68 (2008) (―In international arbitration, the 
rule is not ‗each party bears its own costs.‘ The arbitral tribunal generally will make a discretionary 
determination of the allocation of arbitration costs. It could allow the winning party to recover, and 
require the losing party to bear the costs of arbitration in whole or in part . . . .‖); Stephen W. Schill, 
Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International 
Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT‘L L. 1, 46 (2009) [hereinafter Schill, Enabling Private Ordering] 
(―[W]hat seems fully sufficient to serve as a filter for access to investment treaty arbitration is the cost 
risk connected to potential claims. Only when a dispute is sufficiently economically valuable will an 
investor chose to initiate arbitration and incur the cost risk. This should effectively bar trivial disputes 
from investment treaty arbitration.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 74. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2–3 (stating, ―It is not uncommon for such 
costs to run into the millions of dollars, sometimes even exceeding the amount in dispute‖ and 
describing possibly unrepresentative cost allocations of US$14.5 million, US$5 million, and US$8.1 
billion); see also infra notes 212–16 (providing anecdotal data about the scope of costs). 
 75. UNCTAD, ADR I, supra note 34, at 16–18 (emphasis in original). 
 76. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶¶ 310, 
312, 322–24 (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf, 
(identifying investor PLC as around US$4.7 million, respondent PLC was allocated at US$7 million, 
and TCE was nearly US$1 million). 
 77. Casado v. Republic of Chile, ICSID ARB/98/2, ¶¶ 723–24, 730–31 (May 8, 2008), available 
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PeyLAUDO.pdf (explaining that Chile‘s PLC was approximately 
US$4.3 million, finding investor‘s reasonable PLC to be paid by Chile was US$2 million, and 
allocating 75% (approximately US$3 million) of TCE to Chile). 
 78. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 543 (Oct. 
2, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf (―Respondent shall 
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million in costs.
79
 It failed, however, to refer to other cases around the 
same time frame, such as Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada, where the 
tribunal only cost around US$1 million, and the parties split those fees 
evenly and internalized their own legal fees.
80
 Other unpublished research 
from UNCTAD for the legal fees in ITA for a limited group of states (i.e., 
a limited sample with arguable case selection bias) provided limited data 
that also suggested legal fees were not trivial. One country had ITA 
disputes where its legal fees were in the order of US$2.5 million and 
US$1.95 million; another country had estimates of its own PLC in the 
order of US$1 million for a dispute; and a third state experienced PLC in 
the order of US$1.2 million, US$1 million, and US$12 million.
81
  
Meanwhile, Professor Peters asserts, ―several transborder investment 
arbitrations conducted pursuant to NAFTA and bilateral investment 
treaties required four years to conclude and cost millions of U.S. dollars‖ 
and explains that these ―direct costs of international arbitration are often 
significant and sometimes wind up exceeding actual amounts gained.‖82 It 
is one thing to spend millions of dollars in legal fees, but it is another to 
learn that one is also required to pay the award, pay for one‘s own lawyers, 
pay for the entirety of the tribunal‘s costs, and then pay for its opponent‘s 
lawyers.  
 
 
pay to the Claimants the sum of US$7,623,693 in full satisfaction of both Claimants‘ claims for costs 
and expenses of this arbitration.‖). 
 79. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶¶ 604–05, 611–12, 
631 (June 1, 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WaguihElieGeorgeSiag-Awardand 
DissentingOpinion_002.pdf (investors‘ PLC of US$6 million, respondent‘s PLC around US$3.5 
million, and approximate TCE of US$600,000). 
 80. Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada (NAFTA Ch. 11 Consolidation Trib. 2010), at 107, 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MerrillAward.pdf.  
 81. UNCTAD, Inciativa de un Centro de Asesoría Legal Sobre Derecho Internacional en 
Inversión y Controversias Invesionista-Estado (May 26–27, 2009) (on file with author). It is unclear, 
however, how the data are collected and how replicable the results are. Meanwhile, there is a critical 
case selection bias as the data only focus on the lawyer fees of respondent states; this does not consider 
the lawyers‘ fees of investors, which may be of a different magnitude. While an interesting starting 
place, the research requires systemic analysis and replication. Moreover, it is not clear whether these 
same fees were ultimately borne by the state or whether they were paid (in part or in total) by the 
investor. Likewise, it is not clear whether the state may have also been responsible for the PLC of the 
investor. None of the data appeared to address costs related to TCE. 
 82. Peters, supra note 64, at 1260, 1285; see also Luke Eric Peterson & Nick Gallus, 
International Investment Treaty Protection of Not-for-Profit Organizations, 10 INT‘L J. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT L. 47, 72 (2007) (―[E]ach of the three arbitration tribunal members will charge hundreds of 
dollars an hour for their time. BIT disputes often last several years, in which time, lawyer, arbitrator 
and institution fees can amount to several million dollars. Losing claimants are sometimes ordered to 
pay the entire fees of the winning respondent state. Even ‗victorious‘ claimants are not always 
awarded their legal costs, which may diminish the attraction of arbitration over smaller claims.‖ 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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Second, managing costs and related expectations can affect 
stakeholders‘ satisfaction with ITA and aid in the consideration of the net 
benefit of entering into an IIA. Offering greater guidance about likely cost 
outcomes helps prepare stakeholders and permits them to manage their 
expectations and resources more effectively than in the absence of data. 
Without proper planning, parties may find themselves in a worse position 
than anticipated. ―Such uncertainty is clearly undesirable in terms of 
foreseeability and legal certainty and compromises the calculability of risk 
and potential liability for an investor who decides to bring an action under 
an international investment treaty.‖83 A loss on the merits of a dispute may 
be upsetting, but parties consent to the theoretical possibility of a ―loss‖ 
when they choose arbitration as their adjudicative form of dispute 
resolution. Cost shifting, by contrast, could be more unanticipated. Parties 
could complain that they should have made an advance agreement on 
costs, yet this approach appears rare.
84
 As states may not have been fully 
cognizant of their potential arbitration risks at the time an IIA was 
signed,
85
 they may likewise not have anticipated the complete scope of 
arbitration costs and related risk. Such informational deficits may in part 
explain why, up to now, parties have not opted to address cost allocation 
ex ante. This research, with all its limitations, provides stakeholders with 
an opportunity to re-assess that choice on the basis of data.  
Third, being able to assess arbitration costs reliably could permit 
stakeholders to weigh the value of arbitration during the entire life cycle of 
the dispute resolution process. Costs could be leveraged to influence the 
parties‘ incentive structures.86 In effect, costs could streamline arbitration 
 
 
 83. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 656. 
 84. See id. at 658 n.28 (―Only occasionally do bilateral investment treaties expressly address the 
allocation of costs in investor-State disputes. . . . Even more uncommon are arrangements between the 
foreign investor and the host State prior or subsequent to the initiation of an investment treaty 
dispute.‖ (emphasis added)). The author is unaware of empirical research on precisely this point. 
 85. See Jose E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 17, 26 (2009) 
(suggesting that some argue ―like consumers hoodwinked by an unscrupulous car dealer, that what it 
actually accomplished through conclusion of a BIT is greater exposure to unexpected financial 
liabilities‖).  
 86. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of 
the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 775, 820 
n.329 (2008) (―[H]igh costs and risks associated with initiating an investment arbitration . . . [prevent] 
a ‗race to the courthouse.‘‖); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An 
Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1381, 1400–01 
(2003) [hereinafter Coe, Taking Stock] (discussing NAFTA settlements, the presence of entities with 
―adequate funding contemplate a vigorous, protracted campaign‖ and tribunals having ―exhibited a 
disinclination to award costs‖); Salacuse, supra note 59, at 165 (―One way for arbitrators to dissuade 
such frivolous cases is to allocate all or a substantial portion of the arbitration costs to such claimants 
if they lose their case.‖); William Schreiber, Realizing the Right to Water in International Investment 
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efficiency by creating incentives for party decisions to initiate or defend 
claims, bring particular motions, and engage in delay tactics.  
Fourth, costs may have a disparate effect on economically 
disadvantaged stakeholders. Smaller investors may not be able to access 
justice in the same manner if the cost of bringing claims makes it 
economically untenable.
87
 Likewise, countries with limited resources may 
end up having to allocate scarce public funds to shoulder arbitration 
costs.
88
 Professor Salacuse discusses the particular cost for the developing 
world and explains, ―the costs of an investor-State arbitration . . . may 
prove to be a significant burden for developing countries.‖89 Economically 
disadvantaged stakeholders may therefore need more information about 
what to expect from adjudication and how to plan for costs related to ITA 
in order to promote equality of arms and basic access to justice.
90
  
Fifth, the legitimacy of dispute resolution depends on creating a system 
that is seen to—and actually does—provide a level playing field that 
permits stakeholders to understand their risk and make economic, legal, 
and political plans accordingly. A process that appears arbitrary or 
unpredictable
91
 may generate concerns and sustainability issues.
92
 Yet a 
 
 
Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach to BIT Obligations, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 431, 473 (2008) (―If 
more judgments are to be released penalizing claimants to such an extent, it may be possible to avert 
further arbitration threats from investors as their penalty for losing such a case may be more damaging 
than the possible outcome.‖). 
 87. See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 86, at 1401 (describing arbitration‘s ―elite‖ nature); 
Lindsay C. Nash & Adam McBeth, Crushed by an Anvil: A Case Study on Responsibility for Human 
Rights in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 167, 174 (2008) (―Initial requests for 
arbitration cost U.S. $ 25,000, which is far from the total costs of the proceeding, and forecloses 
claims from most private individuals and many poorer governments.‖). 
 88. Not all countries permit contingent fee arrangements, particularly where a client may be a 
government. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis 
of Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 29–30 
(2002) (citing JOHN H. MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, 
AND EAST ASIA 1026 (1994)); see also Briefing: Third Party Litigation Funding, INT‘L DISPS. 
(Simmons & Simmons, London), May 6, 2008, at 4–5, http://www.elexica.com/download.aspx?area 
=crms&resource=IntDisputes052008.pdf (describing funding lawsuits on a conditional basis in the 
U.S., England, Germany, France, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Hong Kong). 
 89. Salacuse, supra note 59, at 142; see Hena Schommer, Environmental Standards in U.S. Free 
Trade Agreements: Lessons from Chapter 11, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL‘Y 36, 36 (2007) 
(―[Mexico] had to cover the costs and expend resources for two years to defend itself . . . . The 
potential expenditure of resources in international arbitration could prove to be a burden to developing 
countries.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also LUKE ERIC PETERSON, ALL ROADS LEAD OUT OF ROME: 
DIVERGENT PATHS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 18 (2002), 
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_nautilus.pdf (―[S]ubstantial costs make 
contestation of an arbitral claim an unattractive option for poorer developing countries.‖).  
 90. Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under Investment Treaties: 
Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 47, 86–87 (2005) 
[hereinafter Franck, Bright Future]; see also infra note 255. 
 91. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 21–22 (discussing three maritime arbitration 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/1
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lack of uniformity in the outcome of cost decisions need not destroy 
legitimacy if there are respectable reasons for the divergence. Should IIAs 
and their dispute resolution provisions form part of an effort to promote 
rule-of-law institutions, there will be challenges where otherwise 
―reasonable‖ or other cost allocations are made without justification.93  
If stakeholders deem the overall costs
94
 of ITA to be too high, a range 
of responses is possible. Countries may abandon arbitration altogether, 
mandate other forms of dispute resolution (perhaps as a precursor to 
arbitration or as an alternative), use arbitration strategically in conjunction 
with other processes, return to international diplomacy, or reject the 
creation of IIAs.
95
 Assessing the costs and benefits of ITA, the arguable de 
 
 
decisions, one shifting all costs to the loser, one shifting some costs to the loser, and the last deciding 
each bore its own costs). 
 92. See Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 
213, 221 (2001) (―Arbitrations that have broad and far-reaching public policy implications tend to 
draw attention from media and nongovernmental organizations. Maintaining a shroud of 
confidentiality over proceedings and documentation simply draws intense criticism and does harm to 
the legitimacy of the process.‖); Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment 
Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT‘L L. 301, 
324 (2004) (―A lack of transparency leads to ‗a legal morass that complicates court proceedings . . . 
[lending to the] random and arbitrary nature of court decisions.‘‖ (alterations in original) (quoting 
Rudolf Hommes, Institutional Reliability and Development, in JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM 
IN LATIN AMERICA 48 (E. Jarquin & F. Carillo eds., 1998)); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1308 (2006) (―[T]he right of public 
access seems self-evident in the context of WTO proceedings and investor-state arbitration, where 
transparency is important to the institutions‘ perceived legitimacy.‖). 
 93. See Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 119 (discussing 1976 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules). It may be possible, however, that the decision to not offer any reasoning or to offer 
minimal reasons is an effort to retain tribunal net discretion over an award. For example, if tribunals 
engage in compromise adjudicative outcomes in the substantive phase of the case, tribunals may 
implicitly be using their discretion as regards costs (and possibly interest) to permit some kind of 
strategic decisions or negotiated log-rolling related to the net outcome of the dispute. See, e.g., LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (discussing Epstein and Knight‘s 
research and independently looking at assessing consistency of judicial behavior); Frank B. Cross & 
Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1437, 1446–47, 1485–91 (2001); David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment 
Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 Nw. J. INT‘L. L. & BUS. 383, 403–
04 (2010) (referring to scholarship by Epstein and Knight to consider the strategic aspects of 
adjudication); Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity 
in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 369–71 (2008) 
(considering the affects of tribunal homogeneity and compromise decisions by the ―median Justice‖). 
This theory, however, would benefit from thoughtful empirical study—perhaps in the context of a 
survey instrument or series of case studies. 
 94. ―Overall costs‖ incorporates hard, fiscal costs like PLC and TCE, but may include other 
aspects. Supra notes 47–48, 60–65.  
 95. These options were considered during the United States‘ review of its model investment 
treaty. ADVISORY COMM. ON INT‘L ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING THE MODEL BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY 9–14, 16–17 (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/ 
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facto dispute resolution mechanism, is critical. A richer understanding of 
―bargaining in the shadow of arbitration‖96 can aid effective management 
of investment treaty conflict and aid negotiation of dispute resolution 
terms in international economic agreements. 
3. Existing Data on ITA 
The growing empirical literature on ITA makes several points. First, 
governments can (and did) win investment disputes. Governments were 
more likely than investors (57.7% versus 38.5%) to win cases and have no 
damages awarded for alleged treaty breaches.
97
 Second, the average 
amount awarded (approximately US$10 million) was a fraction of what 
investors typically requested (approximately US$343 million).
98
 In other 
words, investors lost more than they won; and when investors did win, 
they usually received less than claimed. Dispute resolution risk is about 
more than outcome and damages. PLC and TCE are key variables, as they 
reflect the cost of obtaining a beneficial outcome at both the outset
99
 and 
 
 
131098.htm; see also GUS VAN HARTEN ET AL., PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT REGIME (2010), http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/documents/Public%20 
Statement.pdf (critiquing the IIA and ITA systems). 
 96. See, e.g., Mark L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early 
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 158 (2000); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 
(1979); Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 449 (2008).  
 97. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 49. There is other research that mirrors the 
general pattern of this research but uses different data and methodology. See Linda A. Ahee & Richard 
E. Walck, ICSID Arbitration in 2009, TRANSNAT‘L DISP. MAN. (2010), http://www.gfa-llc.com/ 
images/tdm_2010_-article006.pdf (―Claimants were successful in less than one‐half of the matters that 
went to an award‖); see also UNCTAD, IIA ISSUES NOTE NO. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3, 
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/ docs//webdiaeia20103_en.pdf (―[B]y the end of 2009, 164 cases had been 
brought to conclusion. Out of these, 38 per cent were decided in favour of the State (62) and 29 per 
cent in favour of the investor (47), while 34 per cent (55) cases were settled.‖); Daphna Kapeliuk, The 
Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 47, 81 (2010) (suggesting that for an analysis focused on ―elite‖ arbitrators, tribunals denied 
recovery to claims in 60.5% of the cases, and only 7% of investors were awarded 100% of amounts 
claimed).  
 98. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 57–62; see also Susan D. Franck, International 
Investment Arbitration: Winning, Losing and Why, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 7 (June 15, 2009), 
http://vcc.columbia.edu/documents/SusanFranckPerspective-Final.pdf.  
 99. Ben Hamida, supra note 20; see also Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 654 (―[T]he 
decision to arbitrate will depend on a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the potential 
outcome of the arbitration and the damages the investor expects to recover, as well as the risks and 
liabilities incurred by engaging in investor–State arbitration. An important aspect of this cost-benefit 
analysis is the allocation of the costs of arbitration, both the costs of the proceedings in the strict sense, 
like the arbitrators‘ fees, and the costs of legal representation.‖). 
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the end of a case.
100
 Yet, there is little empirical analysis on point.
101
  
II. DOCTRINAL AND POLICY BASES FOR SHIFTING COSTS 
Understanding the doctrinal landscape of ITA costs is vital. This 
section explores historical issues, policy, and underlying doctrine.  
A. Normative Baselines of Cost Shifting 
Norms in international dispute resolution come from various places, 
such as international conventions, national laws, institutional rules, and 
international practices. International arbitration costs trace their roots to 
norms from Roman, U.S., and Swedish law.
102
 
The first normative approach traces its roots to Roman law.
103
 The 
―loser-pays‖ rule—also known as ―costs follow the event‖—requires 
losers to compensate winners for their costs.
104
 Various civil law 
jurisdictions use this principle in court litigation and arbitration.
105
 In 
 
 
 100. Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30.  
 101. See Franck, Development, supra note 61; Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1; see also 
Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. 
INT‘L L. 301 (2008) (comparing interpretive modalities of ITA tribunals with other international 
adjudicative bodies). ICSID and UNCTAD express concerns about costs. UNCTAD, 2009 IIA 
MONITOR, supra note 1, at 11–12; UNCTAD, ISDS, supra note 1, at 8–12; Press Release, UNCTAD, 
UNCTAD Reviews Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases and Draws Implications for Developing 
Countries (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6967& 
intItemID=1634&lang=1 (identifying the cost of ITA as an area of concern); see also Anoosha 
Boralessa, The Limitations of Party Autonomy in ICSID Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 253, 
292–93 (2004) (discussing the benefits of hiring elite law firms, but explaining that ―[a] barrier to 
hiring such law firms is the cost: in the law firms‘ defense it should be pointed out that investment 
arbitration requires an enormous amount of time and work by the team of attorneys on the case to 
succeed‖); Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, The Role of ADR in Investor–State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID 
Experience, 34 NEWS FROM ICSID, no. 2, 2005 at 12, 14; Roberto Dañino, Making the Most of 
International Investment Agreements: A Common Agenda, TRADE OBSERVATORY (Dec. 12, 2005), 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?refID=78365 (An ―issue of concern has been the 
growing cost of arbitration. This is particularly true for the low-income countries, and for a few small 
companies, which cannot afford being represented by the most experienced and sophisticated law 
firms in the field, as claimants usually are.‖). 
 102. The rules emanating from the doctrine have independent significance beyond pure national 
rules, but rather come to represent paradigmatic normative approaches in their own right. 
 103. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 5; Werner Pfennigstorf, The European 
Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 40–42 (1984). 
 104. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 654. Even in the ―costs follow the event‖ rule, there 
are various rules and exceptions in national jurisdictions that follow this rule. Bühler, supra note 68, at 
252; see Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 6–7 (quoting France‘s and Germany‘s civil 
codes).  
 105. Pfennigsorf, supra note 103, at 44 (―[M]ost European countries (1) regard the objective fact 
of defeat as sufficient ground for imposing the costs on the losing party, without requiring any 
evidence of fault or bad faith, and (2) include in the costs to be reimbursed to the winner by the loser 
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England, although costs were initially not available at common law,
106
 this 
changed
107
 and courts of equity permitted judges
108
 and arbitrators
109
 to 
shift costs.
110
 Jurisdictions following this approach
111
 strive to (1) 
indemnify successful parties; (2) discourage frivolous actions, defenses, or 
motions; and (3) put parties who have been wronged in the position that 
they would have been in if the wrong had not been committed.
112
 
A second norm reflects a ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach. Under the so-
called ―American rule,‖113 parties bear their own costs for adjudication 
irrespective of the outcome.
114
 Although there may be supplementary, non-
preempted state law,
115
 U.S. law generally presumes there is no cost 
shifting unless expressly permitted by contract, statute, or arbitration 
rules.
116
 Even the ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach has exceptions117 and 
 
 
not only court fees and related costs but also the attorney fees and other expenses incurred by the 
winner.‖). 
 106. The Bailiffs and Burgesses of the Corp. of Burford v. Lenthall, (1743) 26 Eng. Rep. 731, 732 
(holding that common law courts have no inherent jurisdiction to order costs but holding courts of 
equity did, and proceeding to make a costs award on that basis).  
 107. Arthur L. Goodheart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851–55 (1929) (discussing the history of 
attorney‘s fees in England). 
 108. Andrews v. Barnes, [1888] 39 Ch. Div. 133 at 138 (Eng.). In 1875, the English court rules 
provided express discretion to determine amounts awarded to litigants, including attorney‘s fees. John 
F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1993). 
 109. Mordue v. Palmer, [1870] 6 Ch. App. 22 at 32 (Eng.) (―[W]hen a reference as to costs is 
made by a Court of Equity, the Court gives the arbitrator jurisdiction to award costs as between 
solicitor and client if he shall think fit.‖). 
 110. In many common law jurisdictions, authority to order costs in litigation only rises to orders 
that shift the full legal costs of representation in those cases of misconduct, fraud, or corruption. Murry 
L. Smith, Costs in International Commercial Arbitration, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 30, 31 (2001) [hereinafter 
Smith, Costs].  
 111. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 6 (―Most jurisdictions allocate costs and fees 
in litigation according to the principle that costs follow the event.‖). 
 112. Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 30.  
 113. Other jurisdictions use this method. Infra note 128 (describing China and Japan). 
 114. Bühler, supra note 68, at 250; see also Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 10 
(―[T]he parties in litigation must generally bear their own expenses, including attorneys‘ fees.‖); 
Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 109–10 (describing the ―costs follow the event‖ and 
―American rule‖ approaches). 
 115. While some states may prohibit shifting of PLC-related expenses (i.e. attorney‘s fees) in the 
context of domestic arbitration, they may permit it in the context of international arbitration. See 
Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 12. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.318 (West 
2009) (―(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the costs of an arbitration shall be at the discretion 
of the arbitral tribunal. (b) In making an order for costs, the arbitral tribunal may include as costs any 
of the following: (1) The fees and expenses of the arbitrators and expert witnesses. (2) Legal fees and 
expenses. (3) Any administration fees of the institution supervising the arbitration, if any. (4) Any 
other expenses incurred in connection with the arbitral proceedings.‖), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
569.21(b) (2009) (permitting arbitrators to award ―reasonable expenses of arbitration‖ and allowing 
―reasonable attorneys‘ fees‖ in limited circumstances). 
 116. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 123:01 (1999); Bühler, supra note 
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gives courts discretion, in extreme circumstances, to shift costs where 
there is bad faith during the adjudication.
118
 The policy choice helps 
provide access to justice given three key concerns.
119
 First, where 
litigation is uncertain, it is unfair to penalize the loser if there was a good-
faith basis for bringing or defending a lawsuit.
120
 Second, there is a desire 
to not unjustly discourage the poor from vindicating their rights and 
defending their conduct.
121
 Third, seeking administrative convenience, 
detailed proceedings related to cost would create an unnecessary burden 
on adjudicative administration.
122
  
Lars Welamson, a Swedish academic who later became a judge on the 
Swedish Supreme Court, championed the third normative approach, where 
parties pay for costs on the basis of relative success and conduct. This 
approach allocates costs  
on a sliding scale proportionate to the assessment by the court of 
claims made by the parties; the introduction of such a rule would 
provide both parties with an incentive to make the claims/offers as 
 
 
68, at 257; Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 280–82; see also Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch 
Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 583 (3d Cir. 2005) (permitting recovery of attorneys‘ fees where 
permitted by party agreement); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 
425, 453 (1988) (explaining that the Uniform Arbitration Act permits an award of costs but does not 
permit shifting without contractual authorization).  
 117. See e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730, 755–57 (D. Colo. 1982) (listing statutory 
exceptions to the American Rule); see also Vargo, supra note 108, at 1578–90 (discussing exceptions). 
 118. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat‘l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009); Todd 
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 1991); WMA Sec. Inc. v. 
Wynn, 105 F. Supp. 2d 833, 839–40 (S.D. Ohio 2000); see also Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 
69, at 13; John W. Hinchey & Thomas V. Burch, An Arbitrator’s Authority to Award Attorney Fees for 
Bad-Faith Arbitration, 60 DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2005, at 10–17; Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, 
at 282–86. 
 119. See Vargo, supra note 108, at 1575–87 (providing various exceptions to the pay-as-you-go 
approach); see also Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme 
Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 297–98, 298 n.22 (1990) (discussing the 
importance of access to justice and citing authorities about the lack of access to justice when parties 
are denied access to courts by excessive attorneys‘ fees, particularly when compared to the value of the 
underlying claim). 
 120. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc‘y, 421 U.S. 240, 249–50 (1975) (In Arcambel, ―the inclusion of attorneys‘ fees as 
damages was overturned on the ground that ‗[t]he general practice of the United States is in oposition 
(sic) to it.‘‖ (footnote omitted) (alteration in original)); Vargo, supra note 108, at 1575–78 (describing 
the evolution of the American Rule). 
 121. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also 
Vargo, supra note 108, at 1593–96, 1634–35 (arguing that the ultimate justification for the American 
Rule is access to justice). 
 122. Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 83 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872)); 
Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 11. 
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realistic as possible and thus would be the best conceivable method 
by which to promote settlement on reasonable terms.
123
 
In an effort to allocate costs on the basis of certain factors (i.e. ―factor-
dependent‖), the more in parity the amounts claimed and awarded are, the 
more likely that the claimant will receive full compensation for its costs. 
This gives parties incentives to make precise damage arguments,
124
 while 
opening the doors to meritorious claims, preventing inflation of damages, 
and providing compensation where dispute resolution strategies were 
efficacious.  
These different approaches are grounded in rules, tradition, and policy. 
Despite suggestions that the Roman (i.e., ―loser-pays‖) approach is 
universal
125
 or ―axiomatic,‖126 this claim is disputed;127 or it is at least 
worthy of empirical verification. The reality is that there are multiple 
acceptable methodologies for addressing costs.
128
 As existing scholarship 
has not empirically confirmed whether a particular practice is uniform, the 
 
 
 123. Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 274; Lars Welamson, Principer om rattegangskostnader 
under debatt, in FESTSKRIFT TILL OLIVECRONA 684–709 (1964); Lars Welamson, Svensk rattspraxis: 
Civil-och straffprocessratt 1980–1987, 74 SVENSK JURISTTIDNING 497, 531 (1989). After Professor 
Welamson joined the Swedish Supreme Court, the Swedish court system adopted this approach to 
costs. Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 274–75. 
 124. But see Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 275 (suggesting a complex approach that may 
require ―[c]omputer models . . . to properly master the intricacies of the system‖).  
 125. See Bühler, supra note 68, at 259 (―Some recently published arbitral decisions hold that 
‗according to general principles‘ or ‗in accordance with basic procedural principles followed in 
arbitration‘, (sic) the costs of arbitration should be borne by the party which loses arbitration.‖); see 
also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 
176, art. 25 (2004) [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES] (―25.1. The winning party ordinarily 
should be awarded all or a substantial portion of its reasonable costs. ‗Costs‘ include court filing-fees, 
fees paid to officials such as court stenographers, expenses such as expert-witness fees, and lawyers‘ 
fees. 25.2. Exceptionally, the court may withhold or limit costs to the winning party when there is clear 
justification for doing so.‖); JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 654 (2003) (suggesting there is an emerging trend for tribunals to order losing parties to 
bear TCE and PLC). 
 126. Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 109; see Marc J. Goldstein, Some Thoughts 
About Costs in International Arbitration, INT‘L ARB. NEWS, Summer 2003, 16, 18 (―International 
arbitral practice generally follows the principle that, as a first approximation, costs should ‗follow the 
event,‘ . . . . This may now be said (with some trepidation) to be a general principle of international 
law.‖); Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 32; see also FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 68, at 686. 
 127. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 815. 
 128. The ―loser-pays‖ rule is followed by common and civil law jurisdictions. The ―American 
rule‖ (i.e., ―pay-as-you-go‖) is applied in countries like the U.S., Japan, and China, which are major 
economies that it would be unwise to ignore or minimize. ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 
125, at 67; Bühler, supra note 68, at 250. There is also a robust economic literature that considers that 
the utility of following either a ―loser-pays‖ or ―pay-as-you-go‖ approach is most appropriate. See, 
e.g., Clinton F. Beckner III & Avery Katz, The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting When Legal 
Standards are Uncertain, 15 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 205, 205 (1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/1
  
 
 
 
 
2011] RATIONALIZING COSTS 795 
 
 
 
 
possibility of variance must be acknowledged. To the extent that this 
variability is written into ITA, it is perhaps unsurprising that variation in 
doctrinal foundation may create variation in arbitration cost decisions. 
This variation may, in turn, create difficulties in forecasting cost outcomes 
and underscore the critique that cost decisions may seem unpredictable.
129
 
B. Shared Policy Considerations for Cost Shifting 
Despite these different doctrinal approaches, it is critical to remember 
that there is nevertheless a commonality both in approach and policy. The 
―loser-pays,‖ ―pay-as-you-go,‖ and ―factor-dependent‖ paradigms tend to 
follow a standard approach by establishing presumptive rules with 
exceptions and room for discretion to foster policy objectives.
130
 What 
they also have in common is the objective of creating incentives for 
appropriate party behavior while incorporating systematic concerns of 
justice.
131
 Although the balance weighs differently in different doctrinal 
approaches, the goal is to promote party welfare in light of the overall 
public benefit. In the context of ITA, this involves encouraging desirable 
behavior (i.e., admissions and settlement opportunities),
132
 discouraging 
waste (i.e., tactical delays or bad-faith arguments),
133
 and minimizing 
 
 
 129. See Bühler, supra note 68, at 249 (―[A]rbitral precedent [exists] to support nearly any 
approach a tribunal may wish to apply to its cost decision. Even cost awards rendered under the same 
arbitration rules sometimes vary fundamentally without any apparent reason. The bottom line is that it 
is often impossible to predict with any satisfactory degree of certainty how the costs will be 
awarded.‖). 
 130. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 660, 662–63 (―In recent decades, the American rule . . . has come under 
increasing questioning and criticism. At the same time, the rule has been riddled with ever more 
numerous exceptions.‖). 
 131. Rowe discusses: (1) ―fairness‖ considerations arising from a ―loser-pays‖ approach, (2) an 
indemnity approach to provide ―full compensation for legal injury‖, and (3) ―punitive emphasis‖ to 
deter or punish misconduct rather than to compensate. Id. at 653–61; see also Bühler, supra note 68, at 
251 (discussing the value of providing compensation—i.e., ―full value‖ for cost shifts); Gotanda, 
Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 5–6 (explaining the value of indemnifying the winning party to 
provide full compensation for the legal wrong); Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 33 (―The party who is 
put to the cost of prosecuting a claim should be able to recoup those costs and likewise a party that is 
put to the cost of defending a claim which is not meritorious should be made whole by an award of full 
indemnity costs‖). By not punishing good-faith, well-managed, or well-intended arbitration claims, the 
public benefits by not inhibiting critical claims, ensuring equality of arms, and promoting access to 
justice while minimizing the administrative burdens. Pfennigsorf, supra note 103, at 61–64; Rowe, 
supra note 130, at 662, 675.  
 132. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 5–6; see also Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 
330 (explaining that shifting costs permits successful parties to regain expenses incurred in pursuit of 
their properly brought legal claims and defenses). 
 133. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 5–6; Pfennigstorf, supra note 103, at 41–43. 
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inefficient management of procedural issues (i.e., timetables and 
evidence).  
C. The Law of Cost Shifting 
Given the variance in normative approaches, some suggest that there is 
―no general practice as to the treatment of costs‖ in international 
arbitration.
134
 This section explores the applicable law of costs.  
Arbitral tribunals can and should be considering applicable law. The 
key is to understand the panoply of legal sources for costs. This section 
addresses key sources implicating cost allocation in ITA, including: (1) 
express party agreement, (2) institutional rules, (3) national law on 
arbitration,
135
 (4) rules from international courts and tribunals, and (5) 
practices (i.e., customs and usage of trade). These sources matter as 
different choices of law modalities could result in different applicable laws 
and outcomes.
136
 As some tribunals have ―routinely award[ed] [costs and] 
attorneys‘ fees, usually without discussing questions of applicable law,‖137 
it begs a fundamental question about conflict of laws—namely, what law 
is applicable to costs.  
Where not made clear through international law, there is likely to be 
confusion about the law applicable to costs. Dean Gotanda‘s seminal work 
observes that different laws may apply to different applicable law 
issues,
138
 and arbitrators may need to undertake a complex choice-of-law 
 
 
 134. Bühler, supra note 68, at 250; ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 406 (3d ed. 1999). 
 135. FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra 
note 68, at 685–86. The Second Circuit held the FAA governs the issue of whether attorneys‘ fees can 
be awarded and the arbitrators‘ power. PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996); 
William M. Howard, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in Connection with Arbitration, 60 A.L.R. 5TH 669 
(1998); see also Peter Schlechtriem, Attorney’s Fees as Part of Recoverable Damages, 14 PACE INT‘L 
L. REV. 205, 207 (2002) (―If the proceedings are governed by an (arbitral) procedural law which gives 
the court or tribunal the power to grant reimbursement for costs of litigation and the pursuit of a claim 
according to its own discretion, these same principles should govern its deliberations.‖). But see Schill, 
Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 657–58 (arguing that uncertainty comes from discretion in arbitration 
rules). 
 136. ICSID Convention is a self-contained, exclusive forum that requires consideration of parties‘ 
agreement and treaty rules. ICSID Convention, supra note 58, art. 42. ITA under other doctrinal 
regimes (for example, ICSID-Additional Facility cases, ad hoc, or ICC arbitrations under the New 
York Convention) have a different approach on applicable law. But see Smith, Costs, supra note 110, 
at 31 (―In most cases the lex arbitri does not restrict the award of legal fees and often expressly 
authorizes indemnity for costs in the nature of legal fees.‖). 
 137. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 17–18 (second alteration in original) (quoting 
GARY B. BORN, INT‘L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 626 (1994)). 
 138. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 15–17 (identifying the conflict issues in 
costs and potential substantive and procedural elements); Veijo Heiskanen, Forbidding Dépeçage: 
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analysis to determine the governing law.
139
 For international commercial 
arbitration, these difficulties can mean costs are awarded ―‗usually without 
discussing questions of applicable law.‘‖140 To the extent that ITA is a 
rule–of-law institution, arbitrators should (1) cite to legal authority, (2) 
explain their legal reasoning, and (3) have reliable links between legal 
reasoning and cost outcome. It is currently an open question whether these 
normative aspirations are empirically accurate descriptive statements.  
1. Party Agreement 
Parties generally can agree on cost issues and allocation.
141
 Given 
international arbitration‘s focus on party autonomy, tribunals and courts 
tend to enforce the party agreement.
142
 Parties have various opportunities 
to agree on cost allocation. Parties might agree in advance about cost 
allocation through an express contract, reference to institutional rules with 
 
 
Law Governing Investment Treaty Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‘L L. REV. 367, 375–76 (2009) 
(describing different types of applicable law in arbitration). 
 139. The first concern will be what choice-of-law rules apply. The next challenge is whether costs 
are substantive or procedural, provided that characterization is relevant under the choice-of-law 
method. Next, issues of how to assess the proper law may require consideration of the law of the 
arbitral seat, arbitrators‘ home countries, country of enforcement, or location of institutions with 
supervisory authority. See OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 34–35 (1994); Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 16–18; Ole 
Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, 2 ARB. INT‘L 104, 107 (1986); Peter Nygh, 
Choice of Forum and Laws in International Commercial Arbitration, FORUM INTERNATIONALE, no. 
24, 1997, at 13; Jaffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further 
Substance/Procedure Problems under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 394–95, 399–401, 
442 (1988); Michael Pryles, Choice of Law Issues in International Arbitration, 63 ARB. 200 (1997). 
But see Nurick, supra note 32, at 58 (declining to consider applicable law); Wetter & Preim, supra 
note 67, at 333 (―[U]niversally, the allowability of costs and their allocation is regarded as a matter of 
procedural law . . . .‖). 
 140. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 18 (quoting GARY B. BORN, INT‘L COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 626 (1994)). 
 141. This may depend on the institutional rules and substantive law applicable to the arbitration. 
In Ireland, parties ―are free to agree on how the costs of the international commercial arbitration are to 
be allocated and on the costs that are recoverable.‖ Klaus Reichert, Ireland’s New International 
Commercial Arbitration Law, 11 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 379, 382 (2000). The national arbitration laws 
of other countries, which might apply as the place of arbitration or provide the lex arbitri, may place 
limitations on parties‘ capacity to agree on costs. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, §§ 60–61, sch. 
1 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/section/60 (permitting tribunals to 
make cost awards but providing that party agreements on costs can only be made after a dispute has 
arisen and making that rule mandatory); Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 14–15; Vargo, 
supra note 108, at 1578.  
 142. There may be reasons to disregard party choice. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat‘l 
Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2009); Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of Law Versus Party 
Autonomy in International Arbitration, 14 J. INT‘L ARB., Dec. 1997, at 23–24, 40; Gotanda, Awarding 
Costs, supra note 69, at 30.  
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cost guidelines, or rules provided in an IIA‘s offer to arbitrate.143 The 
treaty in Eureko provided that each party ―shall bear the cost of the 
arbitrator appointed by itself and its representation. The cost of the 
chairman as well as the other costs will be borne in equal parts by the 
Parties.‖144 To provide a degree of predictability, express agreements offer 
a clear mandate and cap tribunal discretion. 
The empirical reality of how often parties agree to costs in advance is 
uncertain, and agreement may be a rare phenomenon.
145
 While parties can 
be intractable and unable to agree on costs, agreement is a theoretical 
option. In Lemire v. Ukraine, the award embodying the settlement 
agreement made each party responsible for its own costs.
146
 Without an 
express choice, tribunals must consult the applicable arbitration rules to 
assess how the rules supplement (or supplant) the otherwise applicable 
law. 
2. Institutional Rules 
Guidance on how costs must or may be allocated also comes from 
institutional rules. This might be done through express incorporation in a 
treaty. The 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), for 
example, permits tribunals to award ―costs and attorneys‘ fees in 
accordance with this Treaty and the applicable arbitration rules.‖147 Cost 
rules may also become implied terms of the parties‘ agreement,148 to 
provide guidance to parties and arbitrators about addressing costs.
149
 Yet 
 
 
 143. See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 
232, 236–41, 250–51, 255–66 (1995) (arguing that IIAs are offers to arbitrate—irrespective of privity 
and a direct contractual relationship—that nevertheless permit qualifying investors to pursue direct 
action against states). 
 144. Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland on 
encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments, Neth-Pol., Sept. 7, 1992, 2240 U.N.T.S. 387, 
399, 400. 
 145. Bühler, supra note 68, at 253. 
 146. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/1, Award Embodying Settlement 
Agreement (Sept. 18, 2000), reprinted in 15 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 530, 537, 541 (2000), 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemire-Award.pdf. 
 147. Model Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of [Country] Concerning the Encouraged and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 34(1), Nov. 
2004, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT]. As the U.S. is in the midst of considering changes to its Model BIT, it may be useful to 
consider cost provisions in greater detail. 
 148. Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and 
Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT‘L & COMP.L. 1, 49 (2000) (explaining how 
institutional rules can become implied terms of arbitration agreements).  
 149. See Bühler, supra note at 68, at 254 (―If the parties have adopted a certain set of arbitration 
rules, it must be assumed that such reference includes the provisions therein relating to the 
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rules diverge on treatment of costs.
150
 For ICSID Convention cases, the 
Convention, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, and the Financial Regulations 
govern costs.
151
 Originally, the draft ICSID Convention provided parties 
(1) would cover their own PLC and (2) bear TCE equally.
152
 As enacted, 
the distinction was less precise and tribunals have general discretion to 
assess costs. Article 61 provides:  
(2) In the case of arbitration proceedings the Tribunal shall, except 
as the parties otherwise agree, assess the expenses incurred by the 
parties in connection with the proceedings, and shall decide how 
and by whom those expenses, the fees and expenses of the members 
of the Tribunal and the charges for the use of the facilities of the 
Centre shall be paid.
153
  
Rather than only addressing costs at the end, the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
permit tribunals to be proactive. Arbitration Rule 20 permits tribunals to 
consult the parties as to ―the manner in which the cost of the proceeding is 
to be apportioned.‖154 Although tribunals can assess costs and 
proportionate allocation
155
 ―at any stage of the proceeding,‖ final awards 
must contain any decision regarding costs.
156
 The ICSID Rules do not 
 
 
determination and allocation of costs.‖); see also Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int‘l Corp., 322 F.3d 
115, 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding arbitrability of attorney‘s fees and costs must be decided by an 
arbitrator, because the parties agreed that ―[a]ll disputes . . . concerning or arising out of this 
Agreement shall be referred to arbitration to the [ICC],‖ and ICC rules required an arbitrator to make 
the initial determination of arbitrability).  
 150. Some rules do not distinguish between PLC and TCE; others do not expressly permit party 
autonomy; others vary in what standards tribunals use to decide costs. See infra notes 153, 158, 161–
63, 165–69 and accompanying text. 
 151. ICSID Convention, supra note 58. The ICSID Financial Regulations refer to ―direct costs of 
individual proceedings,‖ which involve the fees and expenses of arbitrators. ICSID, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 15, compiled in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, at 62 (2006), available 
at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_ English-final.pdf. 
 152. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 112 (2001); see also 
Nurick, supra note 32, at 59–60 (―[T]here was extensive debate on the subject of costs . . . . All 
[propoals] were rejected in favor of giving the tribunal discretion in cost allocation . . . .‖). 
 153. ICSID Convention, supra note 58, art. 61; ICSID, FINANCIAL REGULATION 14, compiled in 
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, at 60 (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. Article 61(2) arguably demarcates: (1) 
expenses incurred by parties, (2) tribunal expenses, and (3) ICSID‘s charges. SCHREUER, supra note 
152, at 1222–23; see also LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 93 (2004). 
 154. ICSID, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, Rule 20(1)(j), compiled in 
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, at 99 (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES]. 
 155. Id. art. 28(1). 
 156. Id. art. 27(2). 
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provide standards that guide tribunals about how to exercise their 
authority.
157
 ICSID‘s Additional Facility Rules have a similar approach.158 
The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, generally used for ad hoc 
arbitration, provide specific rules about compensable costs.
159
 In any 
award, regardless of the phase of the case, the 1976 Rules permit an award 
on costs.
160
 They demarcate costs related to TCE
161
 as well as the ―costs 
for legal representation and assistance of the successful party.‖162 The 
1976 UNCITRAL Rules provide tribunals guided discretion about how to 
allocate TCE by using a ―loser-pays‖ approach that takes into account ―the 
circumstances of the case.‖163 The recent 2010 revisions to the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have a similar demarcation in different 
types of costs, namely, the costs of the tribunal and institution as well as 
the parties‘ own legal fees.164 PLC decisions, in contrast, offer tribunals 
more discretion to consider ―the circumstances‖ and reasonableness.165  
 
 
 157. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 23. 
 158. The Additional Facility Rules require tribunals to consult the parties on cost allocation and 
provide cost decisions in the award but do not provide standards for cost allocation. ICSID, 
ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, at 58, 67, 69 (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
staticfiles/Facility/AFR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID/AF RULES]. ICSID fact-finding and 
conciliation rules require that fees from third-party neutrals and ICSID be ―borne equally by the 
parties‖ and make each party responsible for ―any other expenses it incurs.‖ ICSID/AF RULES 22, 42. 
 159. 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 71. 
 160. See id. arts. 32, 38 (providing the tribunal authority ―to make interim, interlocutory, or partial 
awards‖ and stating that the tribunal ―shall fix the costs of arbitration in its award‖). The 2010 rules 
express that the tribunal ―shall in the final award or, if it deems appropriate, in any other award, 
determine any amount that a party may have to pay to another party as a result of the decision on 
allocation of costs.‖ U.N. Comm‘n Int‘l Trade [UNCITRAL], Arbitration Rules, art. 42(2) (2010), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/revised/arb-rules-revised-
2010-e.pdf [hereinafter 2010 UNCITRAL Rules]. 
 161. 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 71, art. 38 (―The term ‗costs‘ includes only: (a) The fees 
of the arbitral tribunal to be stated separately as to each arbitrator and to be fixed by the tribunal itself 
in accordance with article 39; (b) The travel and other expenses incurred by the arbitrators; (c) The 
costs of expert advice and of other assistance required by the arbitral tribunal; (d) The travel and other 
expenses of witnesses to the extent such expenses are approved by the arbitral tribunal; . . . [and] (f) 
Any fees and expenses of the appointing authority as well as the expenses of the Secretary-General of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.‖). 
 162. Id. art. 38 (―(e) The costs for legal representation and assistance of the successful party if 
such costs were claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal 
determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable.‖). 
 163. Id. art. 40(1). 
 164. 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 160, arts. 40–41.  
 165. 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 71, art. 40(2). The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules are 
somewhat similar and require costs ―shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party‖ and that the 
tribunal can apportion costs as it determines is ―reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of 
the case.‖ 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 160, art. 42. They also, however, require separate 
accountings for arbitrators, reasonableness for arbitrator fees, and arbitrators ―inform[ing] the parties 
as to how it proposes to determine its fees and expenses.‖ Id. art. 41. 
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The SCC makes clear demarcations between TCE and PLC,
166
 permits 
parties to retain autonomy about how costs are apportioned, and provides 
tribunals with limited guidance on allocating costs. For the last element, 
SCC Rules permit the tribunal to decide TCE and PLC ―having regard to 
the outcome of the case and other relevant circumstances.‖167 The SCC 
neither particularizes how to exercise discretion nor suggests 
circumstances relevant to cost decisions. Other major arbitral institutions, 
like the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)
168
 and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
169
 have somewhat similar 
approaches.  
3. National Laws  
Recognizing that there is no international convention on the treatment 
of costs in investment treaty arbitration,
170
 the next key source is national 
law.
171
 National laws can grant arbitrators authority to address 
international arbitration costs
172
 and run the gamut of cost approaches. One 
 
 
 166. Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), Arbitration Rules, art. 43 (2007), available at 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/2/21686/2007_arbitration_rules_eng.pdf [hereinafter SCC 
Rules] (providing that ―Costs of the Arbitration‖ include tribunal and institutional fees and describing 
separate rules for party costs, which can include ―any reasonable costs incurred by another party, 
including costs for legal representation‖). 
 167. Id. arts. 43(5), 44. 
 168. Although the LCIA has highly detailed cost rules, none of the cases in the data set used them. 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Arbitration Rules, art. 28.2–28.4 (1998), available 
at http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Rules.aspx [hereinafter LCIA 
Rules].  
 169. Similar to ICSID, the ICC fails to clarify how tribunals should exercise their discretion. 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Rules of Arbitration (1998), available at http://www. 
iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf [hereinafter ICC Rules]; W. 
LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 91–96 (3d ed. 
2000) (―Rules authorize the arbitral tribunal to decide that ‗costs follow the event‘ [but] they do not 
compel this solution‖); see also ICC Rules, supra, art. 31; Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, 
at 112 (suggesting the ICC approach to costs ―do[es] not differ substantially‖ from ICSID).  
 170. The ICSID Convention is the only exception, but ICSID Convention cost-shifting rules only 
apply via party agreement through consent where: (1) states assent to ICSID-Convention arbitration, 
and (2) investors elect this form.  
 171. This national law may apply by virtue of: (1) the place of arbitration (i.e. lex arbitri 
applicable to the arbitration), or (2) the law that may form part of the substantive law applicable to the 
agreement to arbitration. If these are different, the applicable law is a complex question beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 172. See, e.g., John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Damages under the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods: A Matter of Interpretation, 37 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 95, 132 n.168 (2005) 
(collecting the law of various countries on issues of cost shifting in international commercial 
arbitration); Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 5–8. A comprehensive comparative assessment of 
national law is beyond the scope of this Article, yet it is prudent to offer a flavor of the orientation as, 
where it applies, national law can affect cost decisions when: (1) providing supplementary provisions 
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option is silence on costs, exemplified by the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration.
173
 Another option is unfettered 
discretion. Neither Swiss Private International Law nor the French New 
Code of Civil Procedure guides or restrains arbitrators‘ approach to 
costs.
174
 Some countries, like Germany
175
 and England,
176
 give more 
guidance but tend to prefer a ―loser-pays‖ approach. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the U.S. and Japan
177
 follow the ―pay-your-own-way‖ 
model.  
4. International Case Law 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice suggests other relevant 
authority on costs,
178
 including decisions of international judicial bodies.
179
 
 
 
where the parties‘ arbitration agreement or arbitration rules (if any) are silent on costs, (2) arbitrators 
consult the parties‘ home jurisdictions to consider party expectations, and (3) the law of the place of 
arbitration that may trump party agreement as in Reliastar. See Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC 
Nat‘l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding, despite party agreement to split costs, to shift 
costs to sanction bad-faith behavior); Bühler, supra note 68, at 256 (describing the role of party 
expectation from national law). 
 173. The 1985 Model Law did not address costs, perhaps given normative variations. UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17/Annex I (June 21, 1985), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf; see also 
UNCITRAL First Working Group Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/460, ¶¶ 106–13 (Apr. 6, 1999) 
(suggesting costs were an inappropriate subject for the Model Law); PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 356–57 
(2d ed. 2005) (―[W]ide support was expressed for the view that costs should not be dealt with in the 
text. . . . [I]t was preferred that the issue be left to the individual states.‖). The 2006 Model Law did not 
address assessment or apportionment of PLC or TCE. UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, art. 17G, U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.V.4 (2008). 
 174. Bühler, supra note 68, at 253–54.  
 175. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 1, 1998, b. X, c. VI, ZPO, § 1057(1) 
(Ger.), translated in Georges R. Delaume, Germany: Act on the Reform of the Law Relating to Arbitral 
Proceedings, 37 I.L.M. 790 (1998) (giving tribunals discretion to allocate costs but requiring them to 
―take into account consideration of the circumstances of the case, in particular the outcome‖); see also 
Guido Santiago Tawil & Rafael Mariano Manovil, Argentina, 2005 INT‘L COMP. LEGAL GUIDE TO: 
INT‘L ARB. 40, 43, available at http://www.bomchil.com/cas/articulos/2005-01-01-IntlArbitration.pdf 
(describing the Argentine approach to costs as ―arbitrators may award fees and costs . . . . The general 
principle is that the winning party is entitled to recover its fees and costs as regulated in the law, which 
basically provides for fees as a percentage of the award.‖). 
 176. The English Arbitration Act gives tribunals the power to award costs ―on the general 
principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the 
circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs.‖ English Arbitration 
Act, 1996, § 61(2), c. 23, sch. 1 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/ 
section/60.  
 177. See supra note 128. 
 178. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1946, 59 Stat. 1055, 8 
U.N.T.S. 993.  
 179. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1611–12 nn.434–37. 
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This Article focuses on two international law entities with developed case 
law, namely the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) and the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). 
IUSCT‘s mandate to resolve disputes related to investors and states has 
drawn upon the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules (in a slightly modified form) to 
resolve disputes
180
 and address costs and cost shifting.
181
 As Iran and the 
U.S. pay TCE, the key cost issues relate to PLC and limited administrative 
expenses.
182
 The rules presume that the unsuccessful party, in principle, 
will bear administrative costs, but the tribunal will ―tak[e] into account the 
circumstances of the case‖ to determine what apportionment is 
reasonable.
183
 Irrespective of the rules‘ default preference for the ―loser-
pays‖ approach, part of the IUSCT‘s calculation of reasonableness also 
involves party conduct. The IUSCT has shifted costs to make winners pay, 
particularly in cases involving process abuse or misuse. While this Article 
does not provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the IUSCT,
184
 
IUSCT has focused upon inhibiting dilatory tactics, promoting compliance 
with tribunal decisions, or avoiding inappropriate conduct.
185
 The net 
 
 
 180. ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER & MURRAY SMITH, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 50–51 (2d ed. 1991) (describing history of the IUSCT); 
Background Information, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.org/background-
english.html (last visited on Feb. 27, 2011).  
 181. See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 16–20, 760–62 (1998) (referring to modified use of UNCITRAL Rules for costs). 
 182. Article 38(c) refers to the costs for ―legal representation and assistance‖ to the extent that 
they are ―reasonable.‖ Articles 38(a),(b) refer to administrative costs—for experts and other 
witnesses—requested by the tribunal. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Tribunal Rules of Procedure art. 38, 
May 3, 1983, available at http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-rules.pdf.  
 183. Id. art. 40. 
 184. An article analyzing one year of tribunal cost decisions (n=41) found that only ten awards 
adjusted costs and ―[m]ost often, no analysis is offered to explain the award or denial of costs.‖ 
Nurick, supra note 32, at 65. 
 185. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 818. Reasonable costs might depend upon party 
behavior, the amount at stake, and the degree of success. In Behring, a failure to respond to tribunal 
orders justified an award of US$60,000. Behring Int‘l Inc. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran Air Force et al., 27 
IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 218 (1991). In Sylvania, where an investor prevailed on a central contract 
claim against Iran but lost on other contract issues, the Tribunal required Iran to pay Sylvania‘s 
―reasonable‖ US$50,000 in legal fees given that the case ―involve[d] factual and legal issues that 
[we]re neither of extreme nor of quite ordinary complexity in comparison to other cases before the 
Tribunal.‖ Sylvania Technical Sys., Inc. v. Iran, 8 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 298, 323–24 (1985). 
Judge Holtzman articulated specific factors to guide cost assessments: (1) whether costs were claimed; 
(2) whether lawyers were necessary in light of the issues of fact and law at stake and existing 
international practice; (3) whether costs were reasonable given the time spent, case complexity, and 
from where the lawyers originated; and (4) the circumstances of the case, including relative success. 
Id. at 329, 332–36 (asserting reasonable costs were US$265,000); see also Nurick, supra note 32, at 
66–68. 
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effect suggests that, as a practical matter, the IUSCT employs a ―factor-
dependent‖ approach. 
The ICJ approach is less about discretion and more about precision. 
The rule itself is concise: ―Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each 
party shall bear its own costs.‖186 For litigation among states, the rule 
appears to prefer the ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach, although tribunals 
retain a degree of discretion. The ICJ could exercise this discretion to 
foster policy goals such as seeking indemnification of parties where states 
have acted wrongfully.
187
  
5. Sources of Soft Law and Practice 
Sources of law may also be relevant to cost analyses, such as the 
commentary of academics, international practice, and other arbitral 
awards.
188
 Commentators offer guidance via scholarship related to 
international commercial arbitration,
189
 ICSID arbitration,
190
 and investor-
state arbitration.
191 
As the research was not designed to investigate ITA 
disputes and costs on a holistic basis, it is a useful starting point for future 
inquiry. Nevertheless, for the targeted objective of studying ITA costs, 
given concerns of external validity, it is useful to identify methodological 
limitations related to: (1) under-inclusivity,
192
 (2) over-inclusivity,
193
 (3) 
temporal gaps,
194
 (4) failure to explain methodology,
195
 and (5) sample 
 
 
 186. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 178, art. 64. 
 187. Draft Articles on State Responsibility art. 42(1), Rep. of the Int‘l Law Comm‘n, 48th Sess., 
May 6–July 26, 1996, at 63, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996), 
reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1; see also The 
Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgement, 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) (―[A]s 
far as possible, [reparation must] wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if the act had not been committed.‖). 
 188. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1611–12 nn.434–42 (discussing standards 
promulgated by the ICJ and possible application to treaty arbitration). 
 189. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69.  
 190. Nurick, supra note 32.  
 191. Ben Hamida, supra note 20; Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28. 
 192. Professor Ben Hamida‘s analysis is underinclusive and focuses only on awards rendered 
against the investor rather than those against the investor and the state. Ben Hamida, supra note 20; 
see also MEG N. KINNEAR ET AL., INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO 
NAFTA, art. 1135 (2006) (looking systematically at cost awards for NAFTA arbitrations—not ITA 
generally). 
 193. See Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 112–24 (providing overinclusive analysis 
that includes cases arising under investment treaties as well as investor-state disputes from traditional 
commercial agreements); see also Nurick, supra note 32, at 58 (same); UNCTAD, ISDS, supra note 1, 
at 3–9 (failing to offer methodology and referring to a US$824 million case, CSOB v. Slovak Republic, 
when the compensation was not based upon breach of an IIA).   
 194. Nurick, supra note 32, at 60–64 (referring to eight different ICSID cases—MINE, LETCO, 
Klöckner, Amco, Benvenuti, AGIP, AAPL, and SOABI—but only AAPL arose under an investment 
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bias.
196
 The last aspect is noteworthy as cognitive biases
197
 create a 
possibility of inadvertently selecting unrepresentative samples or examples 
that do not reflect plausible counternarratives.
198
 Using data and 
hypotheses directed toward ITA, this research attempts to address 
methodological differences and explore the treatment of cost in ITA.  
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Costs in ITA do not appear to be completely rationalized. It is not clear 
that cost decisions follow a predictable pattern, rely on legal authority, or 
use consistent rationales. There has been no empirical research about how 
and why tribunals in ITA make cost determinations. War stories and 
 
 
treaty).  
 195. Compare Ben Hamida, supra note 20 (failing to explain data selection process and to define 
certain terms), and Goldstein, supra note 126, at 10 nn.21–25 (discussing an ―informal survey‖ 
without disclosing methodology), and Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30 (failing to provide 
underlying data or methodology), and Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 673 (failing to identify 
the sample and unit of analysis), with Franck, Empiricism, supra note 8, at 786–88 (gathering sources 
to articulate good social science practices).  
 196. See Bühler, supra note 68, at 261 (using potentially unrepresentative sample); Tai-Heng 
Cheng & Robert Trisotto, Reasons and Reasoning in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT‘L L. REV. 409, 427–29 (2009) (using Metalclad to analyze ITA costs); Goldstein, supra 
note 126, at 5, 10 nn.21–25 (describing ―an overall sense that law and practice are moving in the 
direction of more generous awards of legal costs to deserving prevailing parties,‖ citing two cases and 
no counter-points); Salacuse, supra note 59, at 142–43 (failing to explain sample selection); Schill, 
Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 659 (stating that tribunal reasoning on costs is scarce and only citing 
Metalclad).  
 197. Cognitive biases include: (1) confirmation bias, namely, the tendency to search for and 
interpret information in a way that confirms one‘s perceptions; (2) expectation bias, namely, 
publishing information that agrees with expected outcomes and downgrading data that appear in 
conflict with one‘s expectations; (3) selective perception, namely, the tendency for expectations to 
affect perceptions; (4) the projection bias, namely, the tendency to assume unconsciously that others 
share similar thoughts, beliefs, or positions; and (5) blind spot bias, namely, the tendency to not 
compensate for one‘s own cognitive biases. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION MAKING (1993); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of 
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Justin Kruger & 
David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own 
Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1121 (1999); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: 
A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: 
The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1459, 1468–81 (2006). 
 198. See Peterson & Gallus, supra note 82, at 72 (stating, without comprehensive data, that ―BIT 
disputes often last several years, in which time, lawyer, arbitrator and institutional fees can amount to 
several million dollars‖ but offering a useful baseline for future empirical analysis (footnote omitted)); 
Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 30 (―An informal survey indicates that many North American 
arbitrators are overly influenced by litigation precedents and only award full legal fees and other party 
expenses on rare occasions. At the same time, there is anecdotal evidence that some of the most 
experienced international arbitrators from the United States commonly award legal fees . . . .‖). 
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related generalizations are insufficient, as it can be unclear whether these 
instances are representative of the larger whole. Moreover, 
uncontextualized examples do not permit parties to anticipate where, 
when, why, and how tribunals will use and apply their authority to shift 
costs. The information void prevents parties from accurately calculating 
dispute resolution risk. This gap adversely affects parties‘ capacity to 
make informed decisions about how to conduct their dispute resolution 
process, which might involve basic choices such as the decision to initiate 
arbitration, raise particular arguments, or engage in other forms of dispute 
resolution. The aim of this research is to begin providing systematic 
information of the international practice to promote appropriate doctrinal 
and normative choices about the use of investment treaty arbitration.  
A. Methodology 
This research used existing archival data collected according to 
previously described methods
199
 to explore PLC and TCE. The data came 
from the population of 102 investment treaty awards from 82 different 
cases that were publicly available before June 1, 2006. As identified in 
previous literature and this Article, there are inevitable limitations that 
derive from the data collection process.
200
  
Nevertheless, using this data—which is the only data set known to the 
author that describes the process of data selection, coding, and inter-coder 
reliability assessments
201—the objective of this quantitative research was 
to assess hypotheses about cost amounts, cost allocations, justifications for 
cost determinations, and other associated costs variables. The research 
explores three questions using a combination of descriptive and 
associative modalities. First, the research considers whether there is one 
uniform approach for cost determinations. It then explores the actual 
decisions, dollar amounts involved in PLC and TCE awards, and 
percentage of shifts for PLC and TCE. It also explores whether a shift of 
either PLC or TCE is reliably associated with winning an ITA dispute. 
Second, the research considers the extent of the justification for cost 
decisions by exploring (1) whether there is any rationalization for the 
decision, (2) what legal authority (if any) is used to justify the decision, 
 
 
 199. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 24, 52; see also Codebook [hereinafter 
Codebook]. The largest sub-segment of the data set was from ICSID awards (n=60), whereas there 
were also awards from the SCC (n=5) and ad hoc awards (n=17). Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra 
note 1, at 38–41. 
 200. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1; infra notes 327–33. 
 201. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 16–23. 
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and (3) what rationale (if any) is relied upon to explain the decision. Third, 
the research assesses links to cost variables and considers whether there 
were reliable links between (1) PLC and TCE outcomes, (2) amounts 
claimed and TCE, and (3) amounts awarded and TCE. 
B. Scope of Cost Decisions 
Out of the 102 total awards in the pre-2007 population analyzed, eighty 
awards involved some analysis of PLC, TCE, or possibly both types of 
costs.
202
 Out of the 102 awards, there were fifty nonfinal awards, and of 
those nonfinal awards, nineteen were silent on the issue of costs, twenty-
six reserved cost decisions for the future, and five made substantive cost 
determinations. Out of the 102 awards, there were fifty-two final awards, 
and of those awards, three lacked decisions on costs, and forty-nine made 
substantive cost decisions. See Table 1. 
TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF TREATMENT OF COSTS IN ARBITRATION 
AWARDS AND AWARD FINALITY 
Treatment of Costs 
Award Finality 
No Costs 
Reference 
Cost Decision 
Reserved 
Substantive 
Decision Made   Total 
Nonfinal Award 19 26  5 50 
Final Award  3  0 49 52 
Total 22 26 54 102 
 
 
 
 202. Of the eighty awards, approximately fifty contained TCE decisions, and a subset (n=17) 
quantified TCE. Of the same eighty awards, fifty-four contained PLC decisions, and a subset (n=11) 
quantified PLC shift. Id. at 68–69. Of the original 102 awards, the remaining twenty-two did not refer 
to, reserve, or make a substantive determination of costs. See Codebook at 10 (defining ―Treatment of 
Costs‖).  
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Although tribunals made substantive cost determinations in nonfinal 
awards, they did so in a limited number of cases.
203
 The lack of substantive 
cost decisions in the nonfinal awards was striking. While there may be 
practical reasons for failing to issue a cost decision at an early stage,
204
 
tribunals were not doctrinally prohibited from making cost determinations 
before a final award.  
The provision of early cost decisions could, however, provide useful 
guidance to the parties about the ultimate cost implications, insights for 
ongoing settlement opportunities, and feedback for modulating parties‘ 
tactical choices during arbitration. This might include, for example, a 
statement that certain activities—such as success on aspects of a claim, 
deleterious tactics, or ―best practices‖ for lawyer conduct—may result in 
particular consequences. Likewise, it might involve clarifying whether, in 
accordance with the applicable law, the tribunal will follow a ―loser-pays,‖ 
―pay-your-own-way,‖ or ―factor-dependent‖ model.205 By providing 
advance guidance to parties about the possible pay-off matrix for their 
behavior, although it would not guarantee constructive conduct, tribunals 
could create incentives for productive and efficient party activity. The gap 
suggests that arbitral tribunals may be missing a critical opportunity to 
provide incentives to encourage appropriate behavior during the dispute 
resolution process, give parties information for their dispute resolution risk 
calculus, manage expectations, and enhance legitimacy by being clear 
about when, where, why, and how they will exercise their adjudicative 
discretion.  
 
 
 203. The nonfinal awards were Wena, UPS, Eureko, Ethyl, and CME. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of 
Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005), reprinted in 12 ICSID REP. 335 
(2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf; 
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award (Sept. 13, 2001), reprinted in 9 ICSID 
REP. 121 (2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf; United 
Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (NAFTA Ch. 11 Consolidation Trib. 
2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/UPS-Jurisdiction.pdf; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award on Merits (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 
(2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Wena-2000-final.pdf; Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 
Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998), available at 
http://Ita.law.uvic.ca/ documents/Ethyl0Award.pdf. 
 204. Tribunals may find it easier to assess costs in the final award because the parties‘ and 
tribunal‘s costs are fixed and the tribunal has fulfilled its obligations of impartiality.  
 205. The tribunal may not, for example, know who the ―loser‖ is or be able to estimate the parties‘ 
―relative success‖ until the final determination. Nevertheless, tribunals might offer guidance to 
parties—even in a jurisdictional award—regarding how behavior, success, or other factors (either 
related to the jurisdiction or other phases) may affect the ultimate treatment of costs. Given the 
doctrinal ambiguity and discretion, advance notice can promote incremental management of party 
expectation and related behavior. 
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C. Hypothesis 1: Descriptive Scope of Cost Decisions 
1. Substantive Outcomes of PLC and TCE 
One of the controversial areas in the literature is whether there is a 
―traditional‖ approach to cost shifting and, if so, what format that 
approach follows.
206
 As ITA is a hybrid of public international law 
disputes (where two states litigate on the basis of the ―pay-your-own-way‖ 
approach) and commercial arbitration involving private parties (arguably 
following a ―loser-pays‖ or ―factor-dependent‖ approach), the research 
hypothesis was that tribunals would vary in how they addressed costs.  
Overall, the data supported the hypothesis that tribunals diverged in 
their approach to costs. There were seven different theoretical 
permutations for allocating PLC and TCE, and tribunals used nearly every 
one. While there was no one uniform approach to cost allocation in the 
pre-2007 data set, certain themes emerged suggesting some systemic 
balance in cost awards.  
First, the majority of awards did not involve either a shift in PLC costs 
or a deviation from the baseline that parties equally shared TCE (n=33). 
This generally occurred irrespective of which party ultimately won. 
Second, there were equivalent numbers of cases shifting both PLC and 
TCE to claimants (n=6) or respondents (n=6). Third, in those few cases 
where tribunals only shifted TCE, the claimants and respondents were 
successful in reasonably equal measure. See Table 2. 
 
 
 206. See supra notes 103–28. 
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TABLE 2: AWARDS MAKING COST DECISIONS ON PLC AND TCE AS A 
FUNCTION OF THE ULTIMATE WINNER (N=52) 
 
Cost Decisions  
Number of 
Awards 
Ultimate Winner: 
Substantive Result 
Claimant Pays PLC Shift 
  and more than 50% of TCE 
6 
Respondent wins=5 
Nonfinal awards=1
207
 
Respondent Pays PLC Shift 
  and more than 50% of TCE 
    6
208
 
Claimant wins=4 
Nonfinal awards=2
209
 
No PLC Shift 
  and TCE Shared Equally 
33 
Claimant wins=12 
Respondent wins=19 
Settlements=2 
No PLC Shift 
  but Claimant pays more than 50% of  TCE 
  2 Respondent wins=2 
No PLC Shift 
  but Respondent pays more than 50% of TCE 
  4 
Claimant wins=3 
Respondent wins=1 
Claimant Pays PLC Shift  
  and TCE shared Equally 
  0 Not Applicable 
Respondent Pays PLC Shift 
  and TCE shared Equally 
  1 Claimant wins=1 
 
 
 
 207. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada was a jurisdictional award that did not involve a final determination of 
the merits of the treaty claim but did provide a determination on costs. Ethyl Corp., 38 I.L.M. at 708. 
 208. Wena Hotels v. Egypt was coded as only involving a PLC decision in an award with a 
Claimant win, but is referred to here as a case involving both PLC and TCE decisions for the sake of 
convenience. Wena Hotels Ltd., 41 I.L.M. at 896. 
 209. The two ―nonfinal‖ awards both involved a determination on the merits in favor of the 
claimant that the respondent had breached the relevant IIA; but as there was not yet a damage award to 
specify the degree of loss, the claims were ongoing and could not be coded as an ―Ultimate Win.‖ See 
Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005), reprinted 
in 12 ICSID REP. 335 (2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko-PartialAward 
andDissenting Opinion.pdf; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award (Sept. 13, 
2001), reprinted in 9 ICSID REP. 121 (2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001 
PartialAward.pdf; infra note 294 (defining that variable). 
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The initial analyses from the pre-2007 data contradicted certain 
existing academic commentary
210
 about the existence of a ―traditional‖ or 
―universal‖ approach to ITA costs. There was variation in the population, 
and the variation was not applied in an asymmetric manner. This suggests 
that stakeholders should be aware that there is more than one way in which 
tribunals can and will allocate costs. It also suggests that, while the ―pay-
your-own-way‖ baseline was dominant, future analysis should consider 
whether additional data exhibits enhanced variation and suggests a 
different baseline (i.e., a ―loser-pays‖ or ―factor-dependent‖ approach).211  
2. TCE and PLC in Dollar Values 
There are various suggestions about the scope of costs and their 
purported allocations in some international arbitrations. Some suggest that 
because there are ―large amounts of money involved,‖212 costs are 
―prohibitive‖ or ―practically limit[] access‖ unless investors are ―very 
wealthy humans or [] multinational enterprises.‖213 At a recent conference, 
Professor Philippe Sands observed that legal costs arising in investment 
arbitration ―can be jaw dropping in terms of amount, having regard to the 
nature and scope of the issues and proceedings involved.‖214 Dean 
 
 
 210. See supra notes 125–26. 
 211. Although this analysis is based on pre-2007 data, later data does not appear to be markedly 
different from this baseline. See Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 1, 12–14 (describing similar 
permutations in cost awards from 2008–2009 where the ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach dominates); 
David Smith, Note, Shifting Sands: Cost-and-Fee Allocation in International Investment Arbitration, 
51 VA. J. INT‘L L. 749, 755–56 (2010) [hereinafter Smith, Shifting Sands] (replicating aspects of this 
research with 2008–2009 data from cost decisions in final awards and revealing similar results, 
particularly with regard to some variability in cost shifting but with a majority of cases resulting in no 
shift of costs). But see Uzma Balkiss Sulaiman, New ICSID Award States Rule on Costs ―May be 
Changing,‖ GLOBAL ARB. REV., Oct. 16, 2009 (―[I]nvestment tribunals are indeed looking at the 
question of costs more seriously, and perhaps using a loser-pays rule more often . . . .‖); see also EDF 
(Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award and Dissenting Opinion (Oct. 8, 2009), 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EDFAwardandDissent.pdf (finding for the majority that a 
―loser-pays‖ approach is ―growing [in] application to investment arbitration‖ and having the dissent 
articulate that ―some recent ICSID cases have shown a certain tendency to move in the direction of 
commercial arbitration in assessing costs, though it is too soon to know whether a different approach 
may be taking hold‖ and preferring the ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach). 
 212. Nurick, supra note 32, at 57. 
 213. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 37, at 138; see also Gottwald, supra note 70, at 274 
(―Due to a lack of relevant legal expertise within their own government ministries, many developing 
nations are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms at a cost of millions per year. 
Meanwhile, those who cannot afford outside counsel face scattered, incomplete sources of precedent 
and have nowhere to turn for affordable legal assistance.‖ (footnote omitted)); cf. REED ET AL., supra 
note 153, at 91–93 (suggesting, at ICSID, the costs of TCE are low, but PLC is high). 
 214. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Keynote Address at University of Sydney Law School International 
Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration Conference, Conflict and Conflicts: Challenges and Prospects 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
812 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:769 
 
 
 
 
Gotanda meanwhile refers to cases with total costs (i.e., complete 
information on PLC and TCE) in the order of US$21 million and US$19 
million.
215
 In another instance, commentators suggested US$1.35 million 
in arbitrator fees denied access to justice ―because investors must pay half 
of the cost of an investment arbitration, and the cost is prohibitive . . . [and 
this] practically limits access to those investors who have a significant 
monetary interest in the outcome of a dispute.‖216  
The data suggests that, although not inconsequential, tribunal costs 
were not necessarily exorbitant. The average TCE was US$581,333. The 
minimum was US$31,088 and maximum was US$1,500,000 (n=17; 
SD=512,553). TCE was paid, on average, in reasonably equivalent 
amounts by investors (US$289,753) and states (US$291,580).
217
 Paying 
approximately US$600,000 for a tribunal is different from paying a 
minimal filing fee of under US$500 in a national court
218
 but may 
arguably be cheaper since (1) defenses of sovereign immunity may be 
available in national courts but not treaty arbitration, (2) there may be 
concerns with the independence and integrity of the judiciary, and (3) 
enforcement of arbitration awards is doctrinally streamlined as compared 
to court judgments.  
The average PLC shift was in the order of US$655,407. The minimum 
was US$22,200 and the maximum was US$2,989,424 (n=11; 
SD=873,178).
219
 This meant, beyond a party‘s own legal expenses and the 
risk of losing a case, parties arguably risked an additional US$1.2 million 
(i.e., possibly paying for 100% of the tribunal and a portion of the other 
 
 
for Investment Treaty Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/events/ 
2010/Feb/ITAbrochure_Feb10_for_WEB.pdf.  
 215. Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 5; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Award, ¶¶ 310–12 (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Plama 
BulgariaAward.pdf; see also Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2–3 (―It is not uncommon for 
such [commercial arbitration] costs to run into millions of dollars, sometimes even exceeding the 
amount in dispute.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 216. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 37, at 138 (footnotes omitted); see supra note 81 
(discussing unpublished UNCTAD data related to the possible scope of costs for certain states).  
 217. For Claimant‘s TCE, the standard deviation was 371,382; and for Respondent‘s TCE, the 
standard deviation was 305,618. 
 218. The filing fee in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York is 
US$350. Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 3; Representing Yourself in Federal Court, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrules_prose.php?prose=fees (last visited Mar. 6, 
2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006). 
 219. The data was limited given the standard deviation and size of the pre-2007 then-known 
population. One hypothesis is that PLC amounts against investors was higher as states were required to 
engage in greater effort to particularize their costs in affidavits as there were not hourly bills since 
government lawyers may not have been paid by the hour. This may not hold true if private law firms 
represented states. See also infra notes 224–34 (discussing limitations of data). 
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side‘s lawyers). Considering that this is more than 10% of the average 
amount awarded, these costs were not irrelevant, particularly when 
compared to the US$194,000 average costs for just one side‘s PLC in U.S. 
domestic antitrust litigation.
220
 The combined costs—namely, paying for 
both a tribunal and one‘s own legal fees, particularly as this is the most 
prevalent baseline—may prove troubling. It suggests that where attorney‘s 
fees and tribunal costs exceed the possible damages (i.e., for smaller 
investments), those fiscal costs may deter investors with legitimate claims 
of international law violations from arbitrating their claims. In other 
words, cost decisions can be critical to assessing the utility of arbitration 
and its efficacy in promoting access to justice and the rule of law.  
3. Percentage of PLC and TCE Allocation 
Although some have suggested PLC awards in international 
commercial arbitration are 1/3 of party costs,
221
 the data did not support 
that hypothesis in investment arbitration. For awards where PLC shifts 
(n=8) were available, there were a range of shifts. None of the awards 
reflected a 33% shift. Rather, three awards contained a 100% shift, 
whereas the remaining awards shifted PLC 80%, 76%, 75%, 15.4%, and 
13.5%. While there was missing data, the existing data showed a broad 
range of PLC shifts, which suggests an approach more consistent with the 
―factor-dependent‖ approach. See Table 3. 
TCE allocations also varied. The largest number of awards (n=34) was 
concentrated on a 50%/50% split of costs, which was consistent with the 
―pay-your-own-way‖ approach. A small cluster contained a 100%/0% split 
in favor of the claimant TCE (n=4) and similar 100%/–0% split in favor of 
the respondent (n=4). There is a degree of balance for whether investors or 
states paid more than 50% of the TCE. Respondents contributed more than 
50% to TCE in only nine awards, and investors contributed more than 
50% in six awards. See Table 3. 
 
 
 220. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 
74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1012–14 (1986) (collecting data and finding average settlements were 
US$1,244,000, but a party‘s mean costs were US$194,000 (median=US$59,000) in 1984 dollars); see 
also Robert T. Duffy, Awards of Costs to Taxpayers: A Reform Proposal for Section 7430, 48 TAX 
LAW. 937, 944–45 (1995) (finding tax litigation costs between 1982 and 1992 averaged US$220,000 
annually or US$6,300 per award). 
 221. Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 292–93. 
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TABLE 3: PERCENTAGES OF COST SHIFTING FOR PLC AND TCE FOR THE 
TOTAL NUMBER OF AWARDS (N=102) 
Cost Issue Frequency 
Valid Percent of Awards 
with Available Data 
Percentage of PLC Shift (n=8)
222
 
  
13.5% 
15.4% 
  75% 
  76% 
  80% 
100% 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 3 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
37.5 
Percentage of Claimant 
Responsibility for TCE (n=50)
223
 
  
   0% 
 27% 
 33% 
 40% 
 42% 
 45% 
 50% 
 67% 
 75% 
 90% 
100% 
  4 
  1 
  1 
  1  
  1 
  1 
34  
  1 
  1 
  1 
  4 
  8.0 
  2.0 
  2.0 
  2.0 
  2.0 
  2.0 
68.0                  
  2.0 
  2.0 
  2.0 
  8.0 
   
It would be remiss not to observe that the data related to quantified 
dollar values and percentages were based upon a small subset of the 
overall data set. Out of the 102 awards in the eighty-two different cases in 
the dataset,
224
 twenty-one awards (in twenty different cases) offered 
express quantification for one or more of the following: (1) percentage of a 
PLC shift, (2) dollar value of the PLC shift, (3) dollar value of claimant 
TCE contribution, and (4) dollar value of respondent TCE contribution.
225
 
 
 
 222. In ninety-four awards, this data was unavailable. 
 223. In fifty-two awards, this data was unavailable. This data reflected the claimant percentage of 
responsibility; the respondent‘s percentage was the reverse (100%–Claimant%). 
 224. This set of 102 awards includes final (n=52) and nonfinal cases (n=50).  
 225. This subset (n=21) also includes eight awards addressing the percentage shift of PLC, eleven 
awards providing the amount of PLC shifted, and seventeen awards providing the amount of TCE to 
be paid by both the investor and state. Because certain awards contained multiple, but not all of these 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/1
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Only five cases had awards with full details for all four variables.
226
 Given 
the missing data within the existing data set, inferences should be made 
with caution, and any normative recommendations based upon the results 
must recognize the inherent limitations and need for replication before 
making definitive statements. There were key aspects of the subset of 
cases that have quantitative data on PLC or TCE similar to the overall data 
set, such as the reasonably equivalent win rates,
227
 the variation in the pool 
of arbitrators,
228
 and the similarity in the development background of the 
investors
229
 and the respondent state.
230
 There were, however, a few facial 
differences in the subset, including (1) underlying IIAs tended to involve 
the United States and/or European states, particularly states from Eastern 
Europe;
231
 (2) awards tended not to be rendered by ICSID tribunals;
232
 (3) 
 
 
data points, in total there were twenty-one awards (out of a total of 102 in the data set, fifty-two of 
which were final awards). There were, however, fifty awards that provided information about the 
percentages of allocating TCE among the investor and state. Eureko v. Poland only contained 
information about the degree of PLC shift. CME v. Czech Republic also contained two different cost 
awards. 
 226. This included data on: (1) percent of PLC shift, (2) amount of PLC shifted, (3) percent of 
TCE allocation for claimant and respondent, and (4) amount of TCE allocation. But see supra note 202 
(describing the broader scope of ITA cost data in the data set). 
 227. The set of final awards has thirty respondent wins (57.7%), twenty claimant wins (38.5%), 
and two settlement agreements (3.8%). Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 49–51, 84. The 
subset of costs had seven respondent wins (33.3%), twelve claimant wins (57.7%), and two awards 
with system-missing data (9.5%). 
 228. For final awards, most wing-arbitrators had a single appointment, whereas a small group had 
two, three, or—in the case of one chair—five appointments. See Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra 
note 1, at 77–79 (discussing arbitrator pool). In the subset of costs awards, for the first arbitrator, only 
one arbitrator had two appointments in multiple awards (Schwebel: CME v. Czech Republic and 
Eureko v. Poland); the remaining arbitrators had one appointment. For the second arbitrator, only one 
(Ivan Zykin: CME v. Czech Republic) appeared in two awards, and those two awards involved one 
case. All the remaining wing-arbitrators had a single appointment. The situation of the Chair was the 
same (i.e., Wolfgang Kühn: chair in CME v. Czech Republic). 
 229. For final awards, forty-six (88.5%) of the claimants were from OECD countries, and six 
(11.5%) were from non-OECD countries. In the subset, twenty (95.2%) were OECD claimants and six 
(4.8%) were not. 
 230. For final awards, nineteen (36.5%) respondents were OECD countries and thirty-three 
(63.5%) were not. In the subset, there were nine (42.9%) OECD respondents and 12 (57.1%) non-
OECD states. 
 231. NAFTA forms the basis of awards in final (n=13; 25%) and costs (n=4; 19%) awards. The 
ECT was involved in final (n=2; 3.8%) and costs (n=2; 9.5%) awards. In the final awards, the 
remaining awards exhibited broad geographical scope. The subset has a heavy focus (n=10; 47.5%) on 
treaties between the United States, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe (i.e., Czech Republic, 
Germany, Latvia, Moldova, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, United States, and United Kingdom); and 
only five awards (24%) involve treaties with states from Latin America, Egypt, Sri Lanka, or the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 232. In the final awards, there were thirteen ad hoc (25%), thirty-four ICSID (65.4%), and five 
SCC (9.6%) awards. Ad hoc and SCC arbitrations represented the majority of awards in the subset (ad 
hoc=12 (57.1%); ICSID=5 (23.8%); SCC=4 (19%)), which suggests that in the subset of twenty-one 
awards, non-ICSID awards were more heavily represented than the general data set of final awards.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
816 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:769 
 
 
 
 
certain industries, such as telecommunications, had a higher proportion of 
cases;
233
 and (4) awards contained a larger proportion of separate 
opinions.
234
 These differences may not generally prove troubling, but, 
given the prevalence of publicly available ICSID awards in the overall 
data set, it is noteworthy that ICSID awards were underrepresented in 
terms of awards expressly quantifying the dollar values and/or percentages 
of cost decisions. This creates challenges for uniform policy reform as it is 
prudent to suggest reforms that have a requisite nexus between the data 
and the legal architecture. While implementing structural safeguards may 
prove useful for SCC and ad hoc proceedings (given that the express 
quantifications of cost primarily originate from those institutions), it is 
more challenging to suggest that equivalent solutions be implemented at 
ICSID when it is uncertain whether ICSID cost awards were equivalent or 
systematically different. Further research should therefore gather data on 
ICSID ITA disputes, particularly as regards quantitative information 
related to parties‘ legal fees and the tribunal/administrative costs, the 
shifted amounts, and percentages shifted. This will promote a more 
considered assessment of cost implications for ICSID ITA disputes.  
D. Hypothesis 2: Legal Justification for Costs Decisions 
ITA involves states, public resources, and adjudicative processes that 
can demonstrate the rule of law in an international context. A key 
normative aspiration is that arbitrators should explain decisions related to 
international legal obligations with financial implications. The research 
hypothesis (and normative hope) was that tribunals would rationalize their 
decisions and provide consistent legal authorities and rationale.  
Commentators suggest that arbitration awards lack justification. Nurick 
suggests arbitrators ―rarely discuss in detail the reasons for their decisions 
on costs.‖235 Schill asserts that ―reasons for adopting a certain cost 
decision are rarely given‖ as awards do not make ―reference to specific 
 
 
 233. For final awards, there were fifteen sectors represented, including top categories such as 
Energy (n=9; 17.3%); Food and Beverage (n=6; 11.5%); Waste Management (n=6; 11.5%); Real 
Estate (n=5; 9.6%); Chemical-Mining (n=4; 7.7%); Financial Services (n=4; 7.7%); Industrial Supplies 
(n=4; 7.7%); and Telecommunications (n=4-7.7%). In the twenty-one award cost subset, there were 
thirteen industries, including: Energy (n=3; 14.3%); Real Estate (n=3; 14.3%); Industrial Supplies 
(n=2; 9.5%); and Telecommunications (n=4; 19%). 
 234. For final awards, there were twelve awards (23%) with separate opinions and forty (77%) 
without. In the subset, there were ten awards (52.4%) with separate opinions and eleven awards 
(57.6%) with no separate opinion. 
 235. Nurick, supra note 32, at 57; see also Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30 (―[Costs] give 
rise to significant difficulties at the end of a case . . . .‖).  
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policy considerations.‖236 This leads to the descriptive inquiry: how often 
do tribunals justify their cost decisions, if at all? The related question is: 
presuming there is some justification, is there any regularity to the 
rationale?  
Some argue that there is no general approach to ITA costs. Finding ―no 
uniform pattern,‖237 they assert cost awards are ―often arbitrary and 
inconsistent.‖238 Three other groups suggest that there is a pattern, but 
disagree on its shape.
239
 One group—following a ―pay-your-own-way‖ 
approach—argues for regularity and asserts that there is a ―traditional 
rule‖ about equal allocation of costs240 where (1) parties pay their own 
way, and (2) tribunals otherwise divide costs equally between the two 
parties.
241
 The ―loser-pays‖ advocates posit that approach is increasingly 
the normative benchmark for costs.
242
 Similarly, relying on analysis that 
 
 
 236. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 659; see also Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 30 
(noting that ―although arbitrators have applied careful and thoughtful reasoning to resolution of such 
matters as jurisdiction, standing and the application of international law, they do not seem to have 
applied the same kind of rigorous analysis to the factual and legal bases on which they have assessed 
costs‖); Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 261 (expressing concern that, despite how critical costs are, 
they have received little scrutiny). 
 237. Nurick, supra note 32, at 58; see also Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2–4 
(suggesting in international commercial arbitration, awards ―have no uniform approach for awarding,‖ 
and this unpredictability makes disputes more difficult to settle and ―undermines the legitimacy of the 
arbitral process‖); Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 (stating that ―no general cost-
shifting rule appears to have emerged for investment arbitration‖); Schreuer, supra note 152, at 1225 
(―The practice of ICSID tribunals in apportioning costs is neither clear nor uniform.‖). 
 238. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2; see also Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 2 
(finding treaty ―awards of costs and fees are arbitrary and unpredictable‖).  
 239. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 21–23 (describing various approaches).  
 240. See, e.g., Steven Smith et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT‘L LAW. 
363, 393 (2008) (―Parties to investor-state arbitrations have traditionally borne their own attorneys‘ 
fees and costs. . . . [T]ribunals still tend to favor an equal division of costs in the absence of 
‗exceptional circumstances,‘ [and] several awards in 2007 reflected an apportionment more explicitly 
tied to the merits of the arbitration.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also SCHREUER, supra note 152, at 1231–
32 (suggesting that awards generally split costs and parties pay their own expenses); Kevin Tuininga, 
International Commercial Arbitration in Cuba, 22 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 571, 617 n.385 (2008) 
(―[E]qual division of legal costs appears to be standard in arbitration awards.‖). 
 241. See REED ET AL., supra note 153, at 91–93 (suggesting that parties bear their own PLC but 
equally split TCE); Nurick, supra note 32, at 58 (stating that ―costs are usually shared equally‖); 
Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 (―[M]ore often than not [tribunals] divid[e] the 
arbitration costs equally between the parties, and, more frequently yet, order[] each party to bear its 
own legal fees. In particular, awards of costs or legal fees against unsuccessful claimants in investment 
arbitration cases appear to be exceedingly rare.‖). 
 242. See UNCTAD, 2009 IIA MONITOR, supra note 1, at 10 (observing that some ―losers‖ paid 
higher costs but acknowledging that other cases ―seem to adopt the traditional approach‖); Goldstein, 
supra note 126, at 10 nn.21–25 (―[T]here is an overall sense that law and practice are moving in the 
direction of more generous awards of legal costs to deserving prevailing parties. . . .‖); Smith, supra 
note 240, at 393 (―Recently, however, tribunals have been increasingly inclined to consider the so-
called ―loser-pays‖ principle.‖); see also SCHREUER, supra note 152, at 1231–32 (suggesting that if 
one party has overwhelmingly prevailed on the merits, a losing party may have to bear the majority of 
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has arguable methodological shortcomings,
243
 Schill describes an 
―emerging pattern‖ where losing investors do not pay costs, but losing 
respondents do.
244
  
Recognizing the possibility of variation, ―factor-dependent‖ advocates 
identify different variables impacting cost decisions. First, they consider 
party behavior during the arbitration process. In its common, negative 
variation, commentators focus on whether parties have ―acted frivolously, 
in bad faith or otherwise irresponsibly.‖245 Taking a more positive tack, 
commentators also suggest tribunals consider parties‘ cooperativeness and 
efficiency.
246
 Second, tribunals can focus on economic efficiencies,
247
 
 
 
arbitration costs and part or all of the winner‘s expenses); Rowe, supra note 130, at 653–59 
(articulating the need to provide fair compensation and indemnity to successful parties). 
 243. The article cites a dissent that ―extensively document[s]‖ a particular position, namely, that 
―tribunals in general do not shift costs incurred by the respondent government to the losing investor.‖ 
Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 660; see also Int‘l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, 
Separate Opinion of Prof. Thomas Wälde, ¶¶ 126–39, Annex (NAFTA Ch. 11 Consolidation Trib.) 
(citing Ben Hamida, supra note 20), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Thunderbird 
SeparateOpinion.pdf. The opinion and article rely on a ―synthetic table‖ critiqued earlier. Supra notes 
192, 195. 
 244. See Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 660 (―In case the investor‘s claim is dismissed, 
arbitral tribunals in general do not shift costs incurred by the respondent government to the losing 
investor.‖); see also id. at 672 (―[T]he practice of allocating costs by investment tribunals can be 
described as a one-way, pro-investor cost-shifting approach.‖); Smith, Shifting Sands, supra note 211 
at 756 (providing some data in support of Schill‘s claims during the 2008–2009 time frame of 
investment arbitration awards). But see Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 657 (making an 
exception for frivolous claims). 
 245. Nurick, supra note 32, at 58; see also RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 818–19 
(indicating that party behavior, like no grounds for bringing the claim or frivolous or vexatious 
conduct, is a reason to shift costs); Paul D. Friedland & Lucy Martinez, The UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules: A Commentary, 101 AM. J. INT‘L L. 519, 523 (2007) (book review) (suggesting cost shifting, 
―particularly where the unsuccessful party has presented its case in an inefficient or obstructive 
manner.‖); Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 673 (discussing how ―spurious‖ or ―frivolous‖ 
behavior affects cost shifts). Such conduct might involve: (a) gross exaggeration of claim, (b) 
unsatisfactory party conduct, (c) unreasonable or obstructive conduct that protracts proceedings or 
increased costs, or (d) extravagance in the conduct of the hearing. Wetter & Preim, supra note 67, at 
327; see also Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 660–61 (articulating a punitive rationale to deter 
aggravated misconduct including ―raising baseless claims and defenses generally and in the use of 
unjustified tactics‖); Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 (indicating a need to punish 
―dilatory or otherwise uncooperative behavior[,] . . . obstruction of discovery, delay of proceedings, 
raising frivolous claims and defenses, and other apparent bad-faith behavior‖). 
 246. REED ET AL., supra note 153, at 93 (suggesting that ―arbitrators‘ perception of the 
reasonableness with which the parties pursued their claims and defenses [and] the parties‘ general 
cooperativeness in achieving cost-effective results‖ affect cost decisions); see also FOUCHARD, 
GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 68, at 686 
(suggesting, without explaining the basis for the assertion, that it is ―increasingly common‖ for 
tribunals to shift costs to the party that loses on the merits and observing that the arbitrators ―may take 
into account the attitude of the parties during the arbitral proceedings‖ in making their determinations).  
 247. See Salacuse, supra note 59, at 142 (―[C]osts will vary depending on the complexity of the 
case, the amount in controversy, and the extent of time needed to resolve it.‖).  
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parties‘ relative success248 in the overall dispute, individual claims or 
defenses, procedural motions, or other matters.
249
 Considerations of 
relative success in cost shifting are designed to allocate costs in proportion 
to relative success to encourage both parties to make their claims as 
realistic as possible and to facilitate settlement.
250
 Third, reasonable offers 
of settlement might result in economic efficiencies that could influence 
cost-shifting decisions.
251
  
Another group of factors relates to access to justice. Fee shifting can be 
based upon the public interest. Like a private attorney general, costs 
should create incentives for dispute resolution that further the public 
interest or a private interest with implications for multiple stakeholders.
252
 
This rationale might be critical in cases with special social importance or 
where government resources do not assure adequate public enforcement.
253
 
Similarly, novel claims or good-faith arguments for modification of 
existing law—whehther as regards claims or defenses—might affect a 
tribunal‘s willingness to shift costs or to maintain the status quo. To the 
extent that claims are new, the scope of liability is uncertain or defenses 
are being scrutinized in a unique manner, this factor permits tribunals to 
take into consideration the parties‘ arguable good faith in bringing a claim 
or defense.
254
 Another factor might involve the relative strength of the 
parties involved in the claim (including their relative fiscal, economic, or 
political advantage) and the need for equality of arms
255
 in the dispute 
resolution process. This may occur when one side of the arbitration—
 
 
 248. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 819 (suggesting that improperly inflating claims 
affects costs).  
 249. See Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 (focusing on the proportion of success 
―including the percentage of damages requested that were actually awarded, as well as recognition of 
the validity of particular defenses or objections‖); Wetter & Preim, supra note 67, at 327 (focusing on 
factors including outcome of legal claims, disputed factual and other issues, and the relative prima 
facie strength of the parties‘ cases). 
 250. See supra note 123. 
 251. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 815 (―[A] good reason not to award the costs 
to the winning party may be due to the defendant having offered to pay to the claimant the amount 
which in the end was awarded to it or an amount in that range.‖); Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 665–
66, 670 (suggesting a need for economically efficient dispute settlement). 
 252. Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 662–63. 
 253. Id. at 653, 662–63. 
 254. REED ET AL., supra note 153, at 93; see also Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 
126 (suggesting that confusion is ―reasonable or understandable, given that little or no legal guidance 
as to the interpretation of treaties and customary international law was available‖). 
 255. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-
Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 667, 676–79 (2010) (discussing equality of arms and 
relative procedural strengths in international criminal law); Franck, Bright Future, supra note 90, at 86 
n.149 (discussing equality of arms and the value of a balanced dispute resolution process). 
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whether the state or the investor—has superior resources.256 Tribunals 
might also rely upon basic notions of justice related to the equities of the 
situation or the reasonableness of the costs assessed.
257
 Other elements 
may involve concerns for fundamental justice and the breadth of tribunal 
discretion to effectuate its arbitral mandate.
258
 Another factor might 
involve a substantive concern, perhaps about the purported gravity or 
seriousness of the alleged conduct.
259
  
To assess the literature‘s descriptive accuracy, this research analyzes 
PLC and TCE decisions to explore tribunals‘ rationalization of cost 
decisions. It first assesses how many awards referenced cost decisions. It 
then considers, for both PLC and TCE, whether awards cited legal 
authority to justify the decision. Finally, it examines what legal rationales 
tribunals offered to justify cost decisions. Further research (presumably 
with more data on the fiscal aspects of costs) should explore this conflux 
to consider which variables are reliably associated with specific 
quantitative cost outcomes. 
1. The Pre-2007 Data Set: Overall and as a Function of Finality 
Using the total data set of 102 awards from the pre-2007 population,
260
 
there were stark findings about tribunals‘ rationalization of cost decisions, 
namely the lack of (1) legal authority or (2) rationale. Overall, for PLC
261
 
and TCE,
262
 tribunals failed to offer legal authority for costs in nearly 75% 
 
 
 256. Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 663–65. 
 257. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 24–25; Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 
28, at 128–29 (―Considerations of justice and equity may play some role in the cost allocation process, 
particularly when the losing party is not ordered to pay the winner‘s expenses.‖). 
 258. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 24–25. 
 259. Id. at 42–43 (suggesting costs are shifted when there are special reasons); Rubins, Allocation 
of Costs, supra note 28, at 128–29 (―[T]he seriousness of the respondent‘s illegal conduct towards the 
successful claimant . . . where a host state has behaved with particular malice towards the claimant 
[means] the arbitrators may be more likely to order the respondent to cover a larger proportion of costs 
and legal fees.‖). 
 260. This amount includes both final and nonfinal arbitration awards; it also means that the data 
includes the seventeen disputes that spawned multiple awards. See Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 
10; see also Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 24 (―The 102 awards came from eighty-two 
separate cases. Seventeen cases spawned multiple awards. There were sixty-five cases with one award, 
fifteen cases with two awards, and one case with three awards. Only one case—Pope & Talbot v. 
Canada—had four awards separately addressing jurisdiction, merits, damages, and costs.‖). 
 261. For PLC, 76.5% of the data set (n=78) lacked any reference to legal authority. Only 53.9% 
provided a rationale (n=55) for the PLC decision. 
 262. For TCE, nearly three-quarters of the data set (n=75) failed to provide any reference to legal 
authority. Only 26.5% of awards (n=27) cited legal authority. Tribunals also failed to cite to rationale 
nearly 50% of the time. 
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of the awards, even when such authority was readily available in 
arbitration rules.  
Although costs can be assessed at various stages, as a practical matter, 
they were most likely to be fixed definitively in the final award. It is 
perhaps, therefore, not surprising that there were statistically significant 
differences in how tribunals addressed both PLC and TCE in nonfinal and 
final awards.
263
 It is therefore prudent to assess failure to cite to authority 
and rationale in awards through the lens of finality. The overall picture 
was of a lack of rationalization generally, but the problem was noticeably 
prevalent in nonfinal awards. 
Another theme was that tribunals appeared to rely upon legal rationale 
more often than they provided legal authority. Nevertheless, tribunals 
failed to offer rationale for costs in nearly half the awards—even when it 
was as simple as saying that costs could be made in the future or on the 
basis of tribunal discretion. The lack of a thorough explanation casts doubt 
on the credibility of tribunals making decisions with crucial implications 
on the efficacy of arbitration. It is, however, theoretically possible that 
tribunals may ―hold in their mind‖ the basis of their legal authority and 
their rationale for cost decisions yet refrain from putting the proverbial pen 
to paper.
264
 Nevertheless, given critiques related to legitimacy, an evolving 
need for transparency in international ajudication, and the increasing value 
of coherent results, it is prudent for tribunals to provide clear justifications 
and to offer explanations that promote coherent and predictable outcomes. 
This should be a relatively straightforward exercise for costs, particularly 
as the issue is largely depoliticized. This section therefore explores, both 
for PLC and TCE, the rationalizations tribunals offered (if any) for their 
cost decisions. 
2. PLC Justifications: Legal Authority and Rationale 
For PLC, lack of legal authority was problematic. For the final fifty-
two awards, less than half (n=21) contained reliance on legal authority, 
 
 
 263. See infra notes 265, 266, 296, 297 and accompanying text (analyzing differences between 
final and nonfinal awards). 
 264. This may be equivalent to tribunals relying on ―unobservable forms of precedent.‖ See 
Weidemaier, supra note 11, at 1901 (―We might therefore describe the arbitration system as 
‗precedential‘ even if it produces awards that obscure the operation of precedent and even if the 
disputants themselves are unaware that precedent exists.‖). It is also possible (but not analyzed in this 
Article) that tribunals use cost determinations to control the net result and ultimately use costs 
discretion to prevent compromises in the substantive determinations from being apparent. See infra 
note 93 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
822 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:769 
 
 
 
 
and only 6% (n=3) of the fifty nonfinal awards relied upon authority.
265
 
The rationale of a tribunal‘s PLC decision was slightly better. For final 
awards, 81% (n=40) of awards provide a rationale; whereas, only 30% 
(n=15) of nonfinal awards provide a rationale.
266
 See Table 4. 
Remembering that each award could cite multiple authorities, it is 
interesting that the maximum number of authorities cited in a single award 
was four, while the mean number of authorities cited was .65 (SD=.99)—
less than a single citation to authority for the mean award.
267
 
TABLE 4: PRESENCE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY AND RATIONALE FOR PLC 
DECISIONS AS A FUNCTION OF AWARD FINALITY  
Tribunal References 
PLC Justification Present Not Present Total 
Treaty Claim Not Final 
Reliance on Legal Authority 
Rationale Explained 
 
 
 3 
15 
47 
35 
50 
50 
Treaty Claim Final  
  
Reliance on Legal Authority 21 31 52 
Rationale Explained 40 12 52 
 
Given the gaps and lack of regular citation to authority, it is useful to 
consider—where tribunals did bother to provide a justification—what the 
authority was. For legal authority, the most heavily cited source was the 
1976 UNCITRAL Rules, followed closely by the ICSID Convention, 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, the applicable investment treaty, and decisions 
of other tribunals. Only about 25% (n=6) of ICSID Convention cases cited 
to the Convention; not quite 10% (n=1) of ICSID Additional Facility 
awards cited to those rules; and 20% (n=1) of the SCC cases cited SCC 
 
 
 265. There was a statistically significant difference in citation to legal authority for PLC at a final 
and nonfinal stage of the proceedings, where there was more of a reliance on authority in a final 
award. [χ2(1)=16.749; p<.01; n=102]. The effect size was r=.405, suggesting a large effect of award 
finality on a tribunal‘s willingness to cite legal authority. See Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 
457–58 (explaining that an effect size greater than r=.30 is ―medium‖ and anything over r=.50 is 
considered ―large‖). 
 266. These differences were statistically significant. The pattern of the relationship was that more 
nonfinal awards than final awards failed to provide a PLC rationale [χ2(1)=22.588; p<.01; n=102]. The 
effect size was large [r=.471]. 
 267. For nonfinal awards, the maximum number of authorities cited in an award was 1.0 and the 
mean was .06 (SD=.24; n=50). For the subset of twenty-one final awards that did cite to any legal 
authority, the mean number of citations was 1.62 (SD=.92; n=21).  
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rules. In contrast, 91% (n=10) of cases using the 1976 UNCITRAL rules 
offered those as authority. See Table 5.  
TABLE 5: LEGAL AUTHORITY RELIED UPON BY  
TRIBUNALS FOR PLC DECISIONS IN FINAL AWARDS   
(MORE THAN ONE AUTHORITY POSSIBLE FOR EACH AWARD) 
Tribunal References 
PLC Justification Present Not Present Total 
 
ICSID Convention  6 46 52 
ICSID Arbitration Rules
268
  3 49 52 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules
269
  1 51 52 
SCC Rules
270
  1 51 52 
1976 UNCITRAL Rules
271
 10 42 52 
Investment Treaty  4 48 52 
Investment Treaty Awards  4 48 52 
International Tribunals  2 50 52 
National Courts  0 52 52 
Other  3 49 52 
    
         
It is somewhat unfortunate that—even though available to explain and 
analyze cost-shifting determinations—tribunals did not cite or use 
arbitration rules and other sources of legal doctrine to rationalize cost 
decisions.
272
 This finding is striking when compared to empirical studies 
that observe the use of, and arguably meaningful increase in reliance on, 
arbitral precedent.
273
 The gap in reliance on authority for cost issues is 
 
 
 268. Twenty-four awards arose under the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules. 
 269. Eleven awards arose under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 
 270. Five awards arose under the SCC Arbitration Rules. 
 271. Eleven awards arose under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
 272. Even in the subset of fifty nonfinal awards, only three contained references to legal authority 
for PLC decisions (whether to shift costs or defer the matter). All three awards cited the 1976 
UNCITRAL Rules. Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 510 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saluka-Partialaward Final.pdf; Methanex Corp. v. 
United States, Partial Award, ¶ 170 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://ita.law.uvicca 
/documents/Methanex-1stPartial.pdf; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 
¶ 619 (Sept. 13, 2001), reprinted in 9 ICSID REP. 121 (2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ 
documents/CME-2001Partial Award.pdf.  
 273. See Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 24 J. INT‘L ARB. 
129, 149 (2007) (analyzing decisions, awards, and orders rendered by ICSID and finding mean 
citations of .33 in 1990, 2.55 in 2001, and between 7 and 11.25 in 2006); Ole Kristian Fauchald, The 
Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 301, 304, 310, 312, 
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troubling given what is potentially at stake; namely, absorbing the costs of 
one party‘s legal costs and possibly even two sets of lawyers‘ fees from 
both domestic and multinational law firms over the course of several 
years.  
In contrast to the citation of less than one type of legal authority, 
tribunals were nearly twice as likely to offer a legal rationale for a 
decision.
274
 It is helpful to assess what tribunals did offer to justify cost 
determinations. For final awards, the most common rationales influencing 
PLC decisions
275
 were: (1) parties‘ relative success or failure related to the 
claim (n=19),
276
 (2) considerations of equity and reasonableness (n=17),
277
 
(3) efforts to encourage appropriate behavior (n=12),
278
 (4) substantive 
reasons underlying the claim (n=11),
279
 and (5) the discretion of the 
tribunal (n=10).
280
 At the other end of the spectrum, no tribunal referenced 
the need to make an informed decision;
281
 and only a few referenced 
 
 
314, 335 (2008) (analyzing ninety-eight decisions by ICSID tribunals between 1998 and 2006 and 
finding they used case law (n=92), the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n=35), customary 
international law (n=34), and general principles of law (n=8)). But see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 
Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT‘L 357, 362 (2007) (describing 
literature in international commercial arbitration that (1) out of a set of 100 awards involving the 
Vienna Sales Convention, only six referred to past awards, and (2) and out of 190 International 
Chamber of Commerce awards, about 15% cited other awards). 
 274. See supra table 3 (legal authority (n=21) and rationale (n=40) in the fifty-two final awards).  
 275. Mentioning a factor was not defined as ―influencing‖ the decision. Factors were only coded 
as being present where the factor affected the tribunal‘s ultimate determination about how it addressed 
the PLC by itself or in conjunction with the TCE decision.  
 276. The Codebook operationalized the ―Welamson‖ variable to reflect parties‘ relative success 
(i.e., they might have won some arguments but lost others) where the tribunal determined that ―costs 
should be allocated inter partes on a sliding scale proportionate to the assessment by the [tribunal] of 
the claims made by the parties.‖ Codebook at 18, 24 nn.40, 56 (citing Wetter & Preim, supra note 67, 
at 274). 
 277. The Codebook operationalized ―equity‖ as expressing a desire to be based upon principles of 
fairness, justice, equity, appropriateness or reasonableness. For PLC, ―reasonableness‖ also related to 
the PLC amount charged. Codebook at 19, 25 nn.49, 65. 
 278. The Codebook defined encouraging appropriate behavior as expressing a desire to praise or 
reward appropriate behavior, including (1) professionalism of parties and their attorneys, (2) 
constructive nature of parties‘ pleadings or proof, (3) efficiency in making arguments, (4) efficiency in 
the administration of the arbitration, and (5) the absence of inappropriate behavior. Id. at 18, 24 nn.42, 
58. 
 279. The Codebook defined the ―substantive‖ variable as the tribunal expressing concern with 
party conduct related to underlying substantive disputes including a concern that parties won or lost 
based upon procedural issues (i.e., burdens of proof or evidentiary rules) or there was an issue 
regarding the inappropriate nature of a party‘s substantive conduct. Id. at 18, 25 nn.42, 64.  
 280. The Codebook defined a decision based upon ―discretion‖ as ―more than a mere reference to 
a rule that references the possibility of a tribunal exercising discretion; rather the award must 
demonstrate that the tribunal was exercising that discretion.‖ Id. at 19, 25 nn.50, 66. 
 281. The Codebook defined the need for ―Informed Decisions‖ as indicating ―a desire to make a 
full and informed decision on costs or asks for information about costs.‖ Id. at 19, 25. 
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considerations such as equality of arms (n=1),
282
 stare decisis (n=3),
283
 
public interest (n=3),
284
 or party settlement efforts (n=3).
285
 Meanwhile, a 
handful (i.e., between 12–18% of tribunals) referenced factors like novelty 
of a claim (n=9),
286
 deterring inappropriate behavior (n=9),
287
 rewarding 
the winner (n=6),
288
 or making the loser pay (n=5).
289
 See Table 6.
290
 The 
maximum number of rationales cited in a single case was seven, but the 
mean number of rationales cited was 2.12 (SD=1.99).
291
 This means that, 
while the average number of reasons relied upon for PLC decisions was 
small, as a facial matter, it appeared marginally better than citation to PLC 
authority. 
 
 
 282. The Codebook operationalized equality of arms as ―inequalities between the parties, whether 
based upon power, size or finances.‖ Id. at 19, 25. 
 283. ―Stare decisis‖ was defined as an effort ―to adhere to previous cases‖ and, beyond mere 
citation to other materials, involved ―an interest in adhering to established precedent and principles of 
stare decisis (i.e., treating like cases alike), or analyzes the application of or distinctions from previous 
investment treaty awards.‖ Id. at 19, 24 nn.46, 62. 
 284. Public interest was a concern that ―the public, issues of policy, or matters of public 
importance are implicated by the claim and/or the issues raised in the arbitration.‖ Id. at 18, 24, nn.45, 
61. 
 285. The Codebook operationalized settlement efforts influencing cost decisions as ―(1) references 
that parties have made settlement efforts whether through mediation, negotiation or some other 
facilitative process or (2) the parties‘ recorded settlement agreement.‖ Id. at 18, 24 nn.43, 59. 
 286. ―Novelty‖ rationale was present when the ―claim or argument made is novel and/or is 
challenging to establish.‖ Id. at 18, 24 nn.44, 60. 
 287. The Codebook defined deterring inappropriate behavior as ―prevent[ing] or sanction[ing] 
inappropriate behavior including: (1) bad faith conduct in adjudicating the proceedings, (2) poor 
pleadings or proof, (3) delays in making arguments, (4) inefficient administration of the arbitration, (5) 
repetitive or unfounded conduct, (6) unwillingness to produce documents, (7) reliance on annulled 
cases, or (8) lack of cooperation with the tribunal.‖ Id. at 18, 24 nn.41, 57.  
 288. The Codebook operationalized rewarding the winner for ―making winning arguments and/or 
compensat[ing] the winner and making them whole for either: (1) needing to expend legal fees to fully 
compensate their losses, or (2) put[ting] the party in the position they would have been but for the need 
to bring the claim.‖ Id. at 18, 23 nn.39, 55. 
 289. The Codebook defined the ―loser-pays‖ rationale as expressing ―a desire to have the loser 
pay for making losing arguments.‖ Id. at 17, 23 nn.38, 54. 
 290. Nonfinal awards (n=50) exhibited similar patterns with one exception. Nine tribunals that 
addressed PLC (whether in terms of an affirmative decision or reservation of the issue) cited a desire 
to make an informed decision. Otherwise, there were minimal considerations of equity (n=4), 
encouraging appropriate behavior (n=3), and deterring inappropriate behavior (n=2). Other rationale 
(Welamson‘s relative success approach, loser-pays, rewarding the winner, and claim novelty) were 
cited once each. 
 291. The minimum number of rationales cited in final awards was zero. For the subset of forty 
final awards that contained any kind of PLC rationale, the mean number of rationales provided was 
2.75 (SD=1.836). For nonfinal awards, the maximum PLC rationale was four and the mean was .44 
(n=50; SD=.88). 
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TABLE 6: FOR ALL FINAL AWARDS, TYPE OF RATIONALE  
RELIED UPON BY TRIBUNALS FOR PLC DETERMINATIONS  
(A SINGLE AWARD CAN CITE TO MULTIPLE RATIONALES) 
Tribunal References 
PLC Justification Present Not Present Total 
    
Loser Pays  5 47 52 
Rewarding Winner  6 46 52 
Welamson (Relative Success/Failure) 19 33 52 
Deter Inappropriate Behavior  9 43 52 
Encourage Appropriate Behavior 12 40 52 
Party Settlement Efforts  3 49 52 
Novelty of Claim or Defense  9 43 52 
Public Interest Considerations  3 49 52 
Stare Decisis  3 49 52 
Party Equality of Arms  1 51 52 
Substantive Reasons 11 41 52 
Equity Considerations 17 35 52 
Discretion of Tribunal 10 42 52 
Making Informed Decisions  0 52 52 
Other  2 50 52 
    
 
Although previous commentators did not distinguish clearly between 
how these rationales could—or should—apply differently to issues related 
to the parties‘ versus tribunals‘ costs, one thing was clear: those sources 
that commentators have used to justify cost decisions were not those most 
commonly relied upon in this research. While there was reliance on factors 
such as ―loser-pays‖292 and punishing negative behavior,293 tribunals used 
a plethora of other rationales more frequently.  
On that basis, it is perhaps unsurprising that, for final awards and 
excluding pairwise cases when a value was missing, there was no reliable 
statistical relationship between the ultimate winner of ITA and the party 
responsible for making a PLC contribution (r=-.13; p=.38; n=49).
294
 This 
 
 
 292. See supra notes 242–44. 
 293. See supra notes 245–46. 
 294. The bivariate correlation analyzed the ultimate winner of ITA (―UltimateWin‖) and the PLC 
contributor (plcN). ―UltimateWin‖ was defined as: 1=Respondent win where Claimant was awarded 
US$0 or Respondent was awarded any amount; 2=Investor win where Claimant was awarded more 
than US$0; 3=Settlement Agreement. ―plcN‖ was defined as: 1=No shift of PLC, 2=Respondent is the 
Contributing Party and makes a contribution to the Claimant‘s PLC; 3=Claimant is the Contributing 
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finding, namely, the lack of a reliable relationship between the ultimate 
winner and PLC, also undercuts the idea that ―loser-pays‖ has been the 
normative baseline for ITA. 
These results begin to suggest that advocates of a ―factor-based‖ 
approach to cost shifting
 295
 were descriptively accurate about the state of 
play. Yet, there was a lack of focus on factors such as equality of arms, 
stare decisis, public interest, and settlement efforts as a descriptive matter. 
That lack of focus may be undesirable as a normative matter, particularly 
given the focus on the public interest in ITA, the desire to encourage 
settlements, and the value of promoting efficient dispute resolution. One 
might imagine that tribunals‘ failure to focus on those factors is linked to 
the parties‘ approach to dispute resolution and perhaps inhibits parties 
from actively considering the use of alternative modalities, such as 
mediation or negotiation, as part of their viable dispute resolution options. 
3. TCE Justifications: Legal Authority and Rationale 
For TCE, much like PLC, there was a general lack of reliance on legal 
authority, but the gap was more pronounced in nonfinal awards. For 
nonfinal awards, 94% (n=47) lacked a reference to authority for possible 
or actual cost-shifting decisions. In final awards, more than 50% of the 
awards (n=28) failed to cite to legal authority for their conclusions.
296
 In 
contrast to legal authority, there was a greater reliance on rationale. For 
nonfinal awards, 74% (n=37) contained no rationale; whereas for final 
awards, 22% (n=11) did provide some explanation for the tribunal‘s 
 
 
Party and makes a contribution to the Respondent‘s PLC. Using a power table to conduct a post hoc 
power analysis indicates that the power of that bivariate relationship (r=.13; n=49) is around .20, 
which suggests an 80% possibility of a Type II statistical error and the need for replication of the 
research with expanded data. Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 461 n.132; see also JACOB 
COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 3–6 (2d ed. 1988). 
Analyzing the relationship of pure respondent wins (Rwins=1) versus claimant wins and settlement 
agreements (Rwins=0) and excluding cases pairwise where a data point was missing, there was 
likewise no significant relationship between PLC allocation (plcN) and respondent wins (r=.09; p=.54; 
n=47). A Chi-Square analysis comparing ―UltimateWin‖ and the existence of any PLC shift (i.e., 
combining respondent and claimant contributions) failed to reveal a statistically significant pattern of 
relationship [χ2(2)=.832; p<.66; r=.13; n=49]. Given the effect sizes and size of the last two tests, a 
post-power analysis would also suggest that the power of those analyses is .20 or less, suggesting there 
is a .80 statistical likelihood of having committed a Type II Error.  
 295. See supra notes 245–59. 
 296. Twenty-four (46.2%) final awards relied on legal authority, whereas only twenty-eight 
(53.8%) final awards lacked authority for TCE. When compared to nonfinal awards, the pattern of 
relationship between citation to legal authority for TCE decisions was significantly different; tribunals 
were more likely to cite legal authority in final awards and less likely to cite authority in nonfinal 
awards [χ2(1)=21.116; p<.01; r=.46; n=102]. 
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approach to allocating its own expenses.
297
 See Table 7. For final 
awards,
298
 the mean number of citations to TCE legal authority was .67 
(SD=.92; n=52),
299
 with a maximum of four legal authorities cited in a 
single award and a minimum of zero.
300
  
TABLE 7: PRESENCE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY AND RATIONALE FOR TCE 
DECISIONS AS A FUNCTION OF AWARD FINALITY 
Tribunal References 
TCE Justification Present Not Present Total 
Treaty Claim Not Final 
Reliance on Legal Authority 
Rationale Explained 
 
 
 3 
13 
47 
37 
50 
50 
Treaty Claim Final  
  
Reliance on Legal Authority 24 28 52 
Rationale Explained 41 11 52 
    
 
As tribunals considering TCE decisions were (much like their PLC 
counterparts) nearly twice as likely
301
 to cite a rationale rather than 
authority,
302
 understanding which rationales were used is vital to 
 
 
 297. These differences were statistically significant. Nonfinal awards were likely to lack a 
reference to rationale, whereas final awards were more likely to provide a rationale for TCE decisions 
[χ2(1)=28.574; p<.01; r=.53; n=102].  
 298. The situation for nonfinal awards and legal authority was more dire, with a maximum 
number of citations at 1 and a mean of .06 (SD=.24; n=50). 
 299. When considering the subset of twenty-four final awards that include some citation to legal 
authority for TCE decisions, the mean was 1.46 (SD=.83; n=24). 
 300. For final awards, the facially equivalent mean citation for PLC (.65) and TCE (.67) suggests 
reasonable parity in terms of authority provided for cost issues generally. 
 301. See supra table 5 (legal authority (n=24) and rationale (n=41) for final awards). 
 302. The legal authority cited by tribunals in final awards (n=52) for TCE decisions was 
reasonably equivalent to the authorities cited for PLC decisions in Table 5. In particular: (1) for the 
twenty-four ICSID Convention awards, six cited to the ICSID Convention (25% of total ICSID 
Convention awards); (2) three cited to the ICSID Arbitration Rules (12.5% of the total ICSID 
Convention awards); (3) for the eleven ICSID-Additional Facility awards, one cited to the ICSID 
Additional Facility rules (9.1% of the Additional Facility awards); (4) for the five SCC cases, four 
cited to the SCC rules (80% of the SCC awards); (5) for the eleven awards under the 1976 
UNCITRAL rules, ten cited to the UNCITRAL Rules (91% of the UNCITRAL awards); (6) four cited 
to the IIA; (7) three cited to investment treaty awards; (8) one cited to an international tribunal; (9) 
none cited to national court decisions; and (10) three cited to other forms of authority, such as a law 
review article.  
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understanding what affects decisions about TCE allocation. For final 
awards, the most common rationales for TCE decisions were: (1) parties‘ 
relative success or failure related to the claim (n=18), (2) considerations of 
equity and reasonableness (n=13), (3) substantive reasons underlying the 
claim (n=12), (4) efforts to encourage appropriate behavior (n=9), (5) 
efforts to discourage inappropriate behavior (n=9), (6) the discretion of the 
tribunal (n=9), and (7) the novelty of the claim or defense (n=7). At the 
other end of the spectrum, less than 10% of final awards relied upon 
―loser-pays‖ (n=5), rewarding the winner (n=5), party settlement efforts 
(n=4), stare decisis (n=2), public interest (n=2), or equality of arms (n=1). 
No tribunals relied upon the need to make informed decisions. See Table 
8.
303
 The maximum number of rationales cited in a single case was six, and 
the mean was 1.88 (SD=1.70).
304
 This means that, while the average 
number of citations to legal rationale for final TCE decisions was still 
small, it appeared marginally better than citation to TCE authority. But, 
comparatively, they may still be statistically equivalent.
305
 
 
 
 303. Like the counterpart for nonfinal PLC awards, the most frequent rationale mentioned in 
nonfinal awards (n=50) for TCE decisions was the intent to make an informed decision (n=9). 
Otherwise, nonfinal TCE awards cited similar rationale to TCE final awards: equity (n=3), 
encouraging appropriate behavior (n=2), deterring inappropriate behavior (n=2), rewarding winner 
(n=1), loser-pays (n=1), and novelty (n=1). There were no references to relative success or failure in 
those awards. 
 304. The minimum number of rationale cited was zero. For those forty-one awards that did rely on 
some rationale for the cost decision, the mean was 2.39 (SD=1.563). 
 305. For nonfinal awards (n=50), the maximum rationales cited was four, and the mean was .38 
(SD=.81). For the final awards (n=52), the facially equivalent mean citation for PLC (2.12) and TCE 
(1.88) suggests parity for rationale provided for cost issues generally. 
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TABLE 8: FOR FINAL TREATY CLAIMS RELYING ON SOME RATIONALE, TYPE 
OF RATIONALE RELIED ON BY TRIBUNALS FOR TCE DETERMINATION 
 (A SINGLE AWARD CAN CITE TO MULTIPLE RATIONALES)  
Tribunal References 
TCE Justification Present Not Present Total 
    
Loser-Pays  5 47 52 
Rewarding Winner  5 47 52 
Welamson (Relative Success/Failure) 18 34 52 
Deter Inappropriate Behavior  9 43 52 
Encourage Appropriate Behavior  9 43 52 
Party Settlement Efforts  4 48 52 
Novelty of Claim or Defense  7 45 52 
Public Interest Considerations  2 50 52 
Stare Decisis  2 50 52 
Party Equality of Arms  1 51 52 
Substantive Reasons 12 40 52 
Equity Considerations 13 39 52 
Discretion of Tribunal  9 43 52 
Making Informed Decisions  0 52 52 
Other  2 50 52 
    
 
The implications for TCE were similar to its PLC counterpart. For the 
tribunal costs, there was a gap in the tribunal‘s citation to legal authority. 
This gap is not without critical implications. One need only recall Eureko 
v. Poland
306
 and the lack of citation to legal authority that facilitated an 
outcome prohibited by the treaty. Failure to confirm legal authority can 
lead to legal error, and although it may be correctable by the tribunal itself 
in subsequent awards,
307
 appeal or annulment for legal error is not 
presently a doctrinal feature of ITA.
308
  
 
 
 306. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005), 
reprinted in 12 ICSID REP. 335 (2007).  
 307. The tribunal issued a supplementary award retracting its decision on cost. Press Release, 
Ministry of Treasury of the Republic of Pol., Information Concerning the Decision Made by the 
Arbitration Tribunal on Introduction of a Correction to the Partial Ruling it Had Issued (Oct. 3, 2005), 
available at http://www.msp.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=en&dzial=16&id=311&search=8216.  
 308. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT‘L L. 283, 299 (2010); 
Noemi Gal-Or, The Concept of Appeal in International Dispute Settlement, 19 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 43, 52–
53 (2008); see also Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1547–55 (discussing means for 
reviewing arbitration awards).  
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Legal authorities—including rules, conventions, and treaties—are 
available for free on the Internet and can be quickly inserted into an award 
where applicable. One wonders why activity that involves such minimal 
cost—but provides the profound benefit of preventing errors and 
enhancing perceived legitimacy—is nevertheless ignored by some 
tribunals. If first-year law students can find, cite, and use authority to 
analyze legal questions with critical financial implications, why should 
international law specialists be exempt from engaging in a similar, basic 
analysis when the stakes are higher and they are paid for their services? 
The lack of a cogent answer creates an area of potential concern. As Lord 
Denning observed,  
It is of course true that [an adjudicator‘s] decision may be correct 
even though he should give no reason for it or even give a wrong 
reason: but, in order that a trial be fair, it is necessary, not only that 
a correct decision should be reached, but also that it should be seen 
to be based on reason; and that can only be seen, if the judge 
himself states his reasons.
309
  
This citation to legal authority should be contrasted with the legal rationale 
provided for TCE decisions. The number of awards offering some form of 
rationale was higher, and the scope of rationales offered was also greater. 
Nevertheless, there was still little reasoning offered in support of cost 
decisions, which might have a critical financial impact and the potential to 
affect parties‘ overall dispute resolution strategy. Similar to the use of 
rationale for PLC decisions, there were a set of legal rationales that 
tribunals did not use, such as equality of arms, stare decisis, public 
interest, and settlement efforts. To the extent that parties wish to 
understand factors guiding tribunals‘ decisions, the current data 
demonstrated that tribunals appeared more influenced by factors such as 
the parties‘ relative success, substantive concerns related to the claim, and 
equity. Unlike the arguments presented by previous commentators, 
considerations of ―loser-pays‖310 or punishing poor conduct311 did not 
appear to be the key motivators. They were, however, part of an overall 
mix.  
For final awards, there was also no reliable statistical relationship 
between the ultimate winner of ITA and which party was responsible for 
 
 
 309. SIR ALFRED DENNING, THE ROAD TO JUSTICE 29 (1955). 
 310. See supra notes 242–44. 
 311. See supra notes 245–46. 
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paying more than 50% of TCE (r=-.20; p=.17; n=48).
312
 This finding, 
namely, the lack of a reliable relationship between the ultimate winner and 
a shift of TCE, undercuts the suggestion that the ―loser-pays‖ approach 
was the normative baseline. It also creates initial evidence that ―factor-
based‖ approaches to cost-shifting decisions313 are worthy of expanded 
research. Additionally, there could be value in isolating variables or 
variable combinations that are reliably linked to cost decisions. Future 
research in this area might usefully explore those aspects. 
E. Hypothesis 3: Relationships Among Costs and Other Variables 
Based on the foregoing, one might begin to imagine a scenario where a 
lack of guidance on legal authority and rationale combined with a variety 
of substantive approaches creates confusion. This narrative finds some 
support in the data that reflected the existence of various cost outcomes, 
minimal citation to legal authority for cost decisions, and a broad spectrum 
of different rationales. Nevertheless, as the data suggested, the 
predominant approach of tribunals reflected a ―pay-as-you-go‖ approach, 
and there is a plausible counternarrative about pockets of potential 
coherence and reliability in cost awards. This next section explores three 
areas of arguable rationality: (1) the intertwined relationship of PLC and 
TCE decisions, (2) the relationship between TCE and amounts claimed 
(versus amounts awarded), and (3) uncertainty begetting a form of 
certainty.  
1. Relationship Between PLC and TCE  
PLC and TCE are doctrinally different types of arbitration costs—the 
costs of parties‘ attorneys versus the cost of adjudicators and associated 
administration. It is possible that tribunals might wish to use different cost 
aspects to signal different things to parties. Tribunals could, for example, 
 
 
 312. The bivariate correlation considered the variables ―UltimateWin‖ and the TCE contribution. 
―UltimateWin‖ was defined previously. See supra note 294. TCE contribution (TCEcontribN) was 
defined as: 1=No TCE shift, each party bears 50% of tribunal costs; 2=Respondent contributes more 
than 50% to tribunal costs; 3=Claimant contributes more than 50% to tribunal costs). Using a power 
table to conduct a post-hoc power analysis indicates that the power of that bivariate relationship (r=-
.20; n=48) is approximately .30, which suggests a 70% possibility of a statistical error and the need for 
future replication of the research. Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 461 n.132; see also COHEN, 
supra note 294, at 3–6. In any event, a Chi-Square analysis comparing ―UltimateWin‖ and existence of 
a TCE shift was also not statistically significant [χ2(2)=.880; p<.64; n=48]. There was likewise no 
bivariate relationship comparing respondent wins versus claimant wins plus settlements (―Rwins‖) and 
TCE contribution (r=.16; p=.29; n=46).  
 313. See supra notes 245–59. 
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allocate TCE equally in an effort to make arbitration follow a ―pay-as-you-
go‖ approach that prevents imbalance in the cost of adjudicators. 
Similarly, to promote a ―factor-dependent‖ approach that retains tribunal 
discretion to provide strategic incentives for prudent or inappropriate 
behavior, they could be more aggressive with a PLC shift. Given this 
theoretical distinction and the utility in signaling a specific payoff matrix 
for the parties, the research hypothesis was that there would not be a 
reliable link between the PLC and TCE decisions. 
In contrast to the research hypothesis, however, there was a reliable 
relationship between PLC and TCE decisions. As indicated previously, 
there was some parity in the number and type of rationales offered for both 
PLC and TCE.
314
 But the relationship was more substantial. A bivariate 
correlation between the party making a contribution to PLC was linked to 
the party responsible for paying more than 50% of TCE, and the effect 
was statistically large (r=.74; p<.01; n=48).
315
 In other words, if the 
respondent paid a portion of PLC, the respondent was likely to be 
responsible for more than 50% of the TCE. Likewise, if the claimant was 
responsible for a portion of the respondent‘s PLC, there was a statistically 
significant likelihood of being responsible for paying more than 50% of 
TCE. Yet as PLC and TCE measure aspects of the same construct—
namely, arbitration costs—even with the doctrinal distinction, the co-
linearity is perhaps unsurprising.  
The lesson is, on the basis of the existing data, that where tribunals are 
in for a penny, they are in for a pound. Shifts (or lack thereof) of the 
parties‘ legal expenses and the tribunal‘s costs generally occur together, 
and a treatment of one cost variable may be a useful predictor for other 
aspects of a tribunal‘s treatment of the other cost variable.316 Although it is 
theoretically useful (and perhaps required in some circumstances) to 
consider cost variables separately given their different doctrinal bases, the 
reliable link suggests that it would be prudent for parties to consider the 
risk factors for the two distinct costs concurrently. The data did not 
 
 
 314. See supra notes 267, 291, 298, 303, 305.  
 315. See supra note 265; Cohen, supra note 294 at 113–16.  This bivariate correlation included 
final awards but excluded pairwise cases if there was a missing value (i.e., either PLC or TCE was 
unavailable). The variables analyzed were plcN and TCE contribution, defined in supra notes 294 and 
312. The bivariate correlation for those two variables using nonfinal and final awards, which excluded 
pairwise cases where there was a missing value, was similar (r=.77; p<.01; n=51). 
 316. The test of a bivariate relationship is not, however, a predictive or causal model. Rather, it is 
a test of association looking for reliable relationships. MILDRED L. PATTEN, UNDERSTANDING 
RESEARCH METHODS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ESSENTIALS 9 (7th ed. 2009) (articulating the difference 
between causal and correlation research). 
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support the hypothesis that tribunals would use distinct cost aspects to 
differentiate strategically in an effort to create incentives to promote 
different norms or party behavior.  
2. Relationship with TCE, Amount Claimed, and Damage Awards 
There is also value in considering what cost-related variables might be 
reliably linked with the ultimate fiscal cost of ITA. For that reason, the 
next section considers the link between certain other fiscal data—namely, 
amounts claimed and amounts awarded—in an effort to identify potential 
reliable relationships. The objective would be, in the first instance, to 
create a descriptive model to consider those variables linked with net costs 
for ITA with the hope being that, in the future, a predictive model might 
permit parties to begin to estimate the fiscal cost of ITA. While such an 
approach might not be able to address the more generalized ―cost‖ related 
considerations addressed earlier,
317
 it may preliminarily begin to identify 
tangible fiscal costs.  
The next two research hypotheses focused exclusively on the 
relationship of TCE and other fiscal variables for key reasons. First, as 
coded on the basis of the available data, PLC was a partial variable that 
only addressed the amount of the shift of legal fees. PLC was not the total 
scope of a single party‘s own lawyer‘s fees, let alone the lawyer‘s fees for 
both parties, which necessarily means that the scope of fiscal risk 
measured is limited. Second, there were more awards that provided 
quantitative data on TCE totals, and on the amounts paid by both the 
investor and the state. This means that the TCE variable is a more 
complete measure of the scope of financial risk associated with arbitration 
costs. Particularly, as some anecdotal evidence suggests that the scope of 
actual risk for parties‘ attorneys‘ fees is substantially larger than TCE 
alone,
318
 future research can and should usefully isolate the full scope of 
the parties‘ legal costs (for both investors and states). In the interim, it is 
useful to consider the relationship that TCE has with both the amounts 
claimed and the amounts awarded.  
 
 
 317. See supra notes 59–65 (considering social, political, and economic costs). 
 318. UNCTAD, ADR I, supra note 34, at 16–17 (explaining that ―costs for conducting arbitration 
procedures are extremely high, with legal fees amounting to an average of 60 per cent of the total costs 
of the case‖). 
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The first analysis examined the bivariate relationship between amounts 
investors‘ claimed and total TCE costs. The test reflected that there was a 
significant, positive relationship between the amount claimed and TCE 
totals.
319
 On the theory that large infrastructure energy projects might have 
large values and skew the results, a partial correlation was run to control 
for the effect of awards related to the energy sector. Even controlling for 
the effect of energy disputes, there was still a significant and positive 
relationship between the amounts claimed and TCE totals.
320
 In other 
words, as the amount investors claimed increased, so did total TCE. See 
Chart 1.  
 
 
 319. Recognizing that the amounts claimed incorporated some partially and fully quantified 
amounts claimed, this was true irrespective of whether amounts claimed by investors were analyzed 
using raw data [r(11)=.88; p<.01; n=13], winsorized data to eliminate the effect of outliers [r(11)=.83; 
p<.01; n=13], or even data that was transformed using log transformations to minimize the positive 
skewing data [r(11)=.93; p<.01; n=13]. The original skewness of the claimed damages was 6.792, 
which was large. After winsorizing, the skewness for claimed amounts was -1.034; after log 
transformations the skewness was .088. Reliance on the log transformation is likely most appropriate 
as it reduces the skewness and promotes the analysis of data that most closely conforms to the 
underlying assumption of the statistical tests (i.e., normally distributed data) and enhances statistical 
conclusion validity. The TCE Total variable did not require transformation as skewness was .753 (i.e., 
under +/- .80) and there were no outliers in the upper or lower bands. In essence, the raw TCE totals 
were reasonably approximate to the normal curve. 
 320. This was again true for: (1) the raw data [r(10)=.87; p<.01] that included statistical outliers 
on claimed damages, (2) winsorized data [r(10)=.84; p<.01] that eliminated outliers, and (3) data 
subject to log transformations [r(10)=.93; p<.01] to minimize positive skewing. 
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CHART 1: SCATTERPLOT OF TOTAL TCE COSTS (U.S. DOLLARS)  
AND TRANSFORMED DAMAGES CLAIMED 
 
 
This relationship has potential implications when one considers that, as 
a doctrinal matter, only investors have the initial capacity to estimate, and 
to articulate, their claims of damages.
321
 There is a vast difference between 
suggesting that a reliable link exists between variables and demonstrating 
that one variable causes a particular result. Further analyses are necessary 
both to replicate this existence of the bivariate relationship and to explore 
whether the variance persists in a more complex multivariate model that 
controls for potentially co-linear variance, such as the length of the case, 
presence of electronic discovery, scope of motion practice, challenges to 
arbitrators, and the type of law firms involved.
322
 
 
 
 321. Under the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, for example, the notice of arbitration must include a 
―general nature of the claim and an indication of the amount involved.‖ 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, supra note 71, art. 3.3(e). Respondents can dispute the amount claimed and scope of damage 
thereafter. IIAs do not, however, typically grant an independent set of substantive rights (or a claim for 
damages related to breach) to states; rather, IIAs grant rights to investors and investments. See 
UNCTAD, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON 
INVESTMENT RULEMAKING 7–30 (2007) (explaining who is entitled to bring claims under IIAs), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf.  
 322. These are, for example, variables that are linked to increased litigation costs in quantitative 
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The reliable relationship between amounts claimed and TCE totals 
takes on particular salience when compared to another critical variable—
the amount awarded by the tribunal. Using data that conformed to the 
underlying assumptions of the statistical tests, bivariate analyses between 
awarded amounts and TCE totals failed to reveal a reliable statistical 
relationship between those two variables.
323
 Even for partial correlations 
controlling for disputes in the energy sector, there was still no reliable 
relationship between TCE and the damages tribunals awarded.
324
 See 
Chart 2. 
CHART 2: SCATTERPLOT OF TOTAL TCE COSTS (U.S. DOLLARS) 
AND TRANSFORMED DAMAGES AWARDED 
 
 
 
research in the U.S. federal courts. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 44. 
 323. TCE Total was normally distributed. See supra note 319. The raw data of awarded damages 
was positively skewed (5.311); after winsorizing the data, the skewing was still 1.414, and an inverse 
log transformation resulted in skewing of -.40. Transformed data best adheres to the statistical 
parameters underlying the test. Transformed data did not reveal a reliable statistical relationship 
[r(12)=.35; p=.22; n=14]; winsorized data also did not reveal any statistically significant association 
[r(12)=.14; p=.63; n=14]. There was a slight difference in the raw data, which did suggest the 
existence of a reliable statistical relationship [r(12)=.568; p=.03; n=14]. But as that data exhibited 
skewing and contained outliers, inferences drawn from it must be done with extreme caution—
particularly given the small nature of the subset of data. In any event, the arguable concerns about 
statistical power (.20 or less) can and should be addressed by replicating this research in the future.  
 324. There was no reliable relationship using transformed [r(11)=.35; p=.24] or winsorized 
[r(11)=.15; p=.64] data for amount claimed. Raw data, which failed to comport with assumed 
statistical normality, exhibited a correlation but is suspect [r(11)=.568; p=.04].  
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This lack of a relationship is not per se troubling and offers an 
interesting perspective on the arguable integrity of the arbitration process. 
There was no reliable statistical relationship between the amounts awarded 
and the amounts paid to the tribunal for their services, which provides 
some initial evidence to suggest that arbitrators were not ―self-dealing.‖ 
The lack of a relationship means that, based upon the limitations of the 
data, measures, and models, the amount awarded appeared to operate 
independently from remuneration received. While in need of replication 
with a larger size beyond the pre-2007 population and a more complex 
model to assess potential moderating variables, the findings offer initial 
evidence supporting a narrative that arbitrators made awards based upon 
something other than a desire for a large personal pay day—and that 
perhaps the cause of a substantive award was due to other factors, possibly 
even including the actual or relative merits of claims and defenses. 
Particularly when compared with the statistical significance of amounts 
claimed—a variable entirely in the hands of claimants—the difference in 
the relationship between TCE and amounts awarded was pronounced and 
is worthy of further study. 
3. The Certainty of Uncertainty  
Although the data offered some evidence of areas of predictability and 
even a primary reliance on the ―pay-your-own-way‖ model, there is still 
much that is unknown regarding costs. The existence of pockets of 
uncertainty in how and on what basis tribunals will decide costs, in some 
respects, begins to suggest that there will be wide variance on cost-related 
issues. The question, however, is whether in light of the current data, the 
existing degree of uncertainty is normatively desirable. Historically, there 
may have been a sense that the time was not ―ripe for laying down clear 
guidelines for the treatment of costs.‖325 Yet this has implications—
namely, at the price of predictability, determinacy, coherence, and 
consistency—particularly where arbitrators, parties, and their lawyers may 
come from different legal backgrounds and have different expectations.
326
 
This lays the seeds for a clash of cultures, a clash of law, a clash of 
expectations, and an ambiguity of result that—in an area of significant 
public international importance—is a lurking problem that can serve as the 
basis for discontent. The question we now face is whether we wish to 
 
 
 325. Bühler, supra note 68, at 253. 
 326. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/1
  
 
 
 
 
2011] RATIONALIZING COSTS 839 
 
 
 
 
change our practice going forward in light of normative objectives or if we 
are content with the status quo. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Full rationalization of costs in ITA is not yet possible. Nevertheless, we 
can and should begin the process of systematic analysis while 
understanding the implicit limitations of both the data and the evolution of 
the ITA system. This section, therefore, addresses the limitations of the 
data before discussing, within that context, where we might consider 
heading in light of certain normative objectives.  
The current data and associated analyses were necessarily limited. 
Replication and convergence of research with more data and enhanced 
modeling is both necessary and appropriate. As suggested in previous 
research using the current database, recognizing the limitations is 
fundamental to understanding the scope of reasonable inferences that can 
and should be drawn from the data;
327
 they inevitably have implications 
for the integrity of potential normative reforms.
328
 First, there are issues of 
case selection bias in the study of publicly available awards that may 
mean, for example, that private awards might vary on critical issues 
pertaining to cost outcomes and justification. Second, particularly as 
regards the quantification of PLC and TCE data, there are pockets of 
missing data where tribunals failed to provide any quantitative information 
about the actual dollar values involved. This necessarily raises the 
question of whether the tribunals that did provide data offered adequate 
information or suffered from systemic bias. Although preliminary analysis 
in this research suggests there were some key similarities to the larger data 
set,
329
 given the potential underrepresentation of ICSID cases, replication 
with expanded data would be particularly prudent to reassess these 
preliminary results. Third, there are issues as the data comes from the 
then-known population of awards from before June 1, 2006. There is a 
possibility that the data has a temporal limitation (i.e., an issue related to 
external validity and generalizability to the current and future population). 
Supplemental data may (or may not) conform to the initial baselines 
identified in this research. In the interim, the research provides a useful 
 
 
 327. Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 440, 459 n.129, 472, 474–76, 478 n.187; Franck, 
Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 17, 24 n.109, 39 n.170, 62, 68, 73, 83. 
 328. Franck, Empiricism, supra note 8, at 811–12. 
 329. See supra notes 225–34. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
840 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:769 
 
 
 
 
baseline for future evaluation.
330
 Finally, the strength of the statistical 
inferences is limited, may not reflect population parameters, and may, 
theoretically, be the result of variation that is due to chance alone. While 
the overall data set is arguably limited—in the sense that it is not a study 
with, for example, over 1,500 cases
331—this does not mean that the data 
set itself is unworthy of quantitative study. To the extent that ITA is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in international law, there were simply no 
awards available in the past to analyze;
332
 but particularly as there are now 
awards and more disputes in the pipeline, some sense of where the data are 
now is vital to create baselines for future consideration.  
Nevertheless, it is always critical to remember that (1) systematic 
analysis must describe its methodology to promote the reliability of data 
collection, reliability of coded measures, validity of statistical modelling, 
and integrity of related statistical inferences; (2) research must be subject 
to replication in the future; and (3) expanded analysis with more 
sophisticated models and statistical control is prudent. While no 
quantitative research is perfect, provided it is methodologically sound ex 
ante, it is normatively preferable to no research at all or to the substitution 
of personal opinion or political power that is not grounded in a tested 
academic approach.
333
  
Even with these limitations, some preliminary rationalization of the 
existing data may be helpful if, for nothing else, to provide insights for 
future research. The data suggested that while there were small pockets of 
convergence and reliable relationships, the overall picture was of 
variability.  
 
 
 330. It is for this reason that the author is in the process of expanding the data set to include data 
for the time period before June 1, 2009. Research on final arbitration awards from 2008–2009 also 
appears to confirm the default baseline that most awards did not shift costs. See Smith, Shifting Sands, 
supra note 211 at 767 (―Of the thirty-one decisions in the sample, the majority (58.1%) do not shift 
costs.‖).  
 331. See Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 461 n.132 (suggesting that, given the nature of 
the effect in a particular model, a sample of 1,562 investment treaty disputes would be required to 
definitively accept or reject a research hypothesis for the evovolved population that would permit 
conclusive statements for all small, medium, and large effects). 
 332. Small numbers of investment treaty disputes is perhaps not surprising. The population of 
treaty disputes was small in the first place given that ITA is a recent international law phenomena.  
Moreover, empirical evidence for a related area—namely, international trade law disputes at the 
WTO—suggests that, under the GATT era, there were approximately nine cases a year but there are 
now approximately thirty to thirty-five per year. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 15–16 
(1999); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence and International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 46 (2005). 
 333. Franck, Empiricism, supra note 8, at 784–90. 
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On the side of divergence, the data suggested ITA costs were marked 
by a degree of unpredictability and a gap between what tribunals were 
anticipated to do as a matter of normative policy and what they did do as a 
matter of descriptive reality. Although there was a preference for the ―pay-
as-you-go‖ approach, various approaches to cost shifting in a variety of 
permutations were utilized. Similarly, the data did not reveal any reliable 
relationship between a shift of costs (either for parties‘ legal fees or 
tribunal/administrative costs) and the ultimate case outcome. Moreover, in 
some instances, there was wholesale abandonment or scant justification 
for decisions that involve key financial risks and implicate institutional 
legitimacy. The wide variation in types of rationale cited was also 
noteworthy. 
There was, however, partial rationalization and pockets of coherence. 
These data points refute the blanket claim that ―awards of costs and fees 
are arbitrary and unpredictable‖ for ITA.334 Data showed that (1) tribunals 
could have made cost decisions at early stages of the dispute, although 
they often did not; (2) tribunals exhibited reasonable parity between cost 
allocations between investors and states; (3) tribunals were twice as likely 
to provide reasons than to cite to authority; (4) PLC and TCE decisions 
tended to occur together and in the same direction; and (5) there was a 
relationship between the amounts claimed and tribunal costs. The 
remainder of this section synthesizes the data, analyzes the implications, 
and offers normative recommendations to integrate norms of efficiency 
and fairness. 
A. Costs Matter, Need Early Consideration, and Require Additional Data 
It was concerning that most of the cost-shifting decisions occurred in 
final awards. This was a missed opportunity. As it is doctrinally permitted 
to render cost decisions prior to the final award, tribunals did not capitalize 
on an opportunity to influence party behavior by incentivizing or 
―nudging‖ desired behavior.335 Recognizing that, in the past, tribunals 
have awarded costs prior to final awards, tribunals should look for 
strategic opportunities to award costs, such as at jurisdiction or during 
preliminary challenges to the merits of a claim.
336
 The failure to make such 
 
 
 334. Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 2. 
 335. See generally ARIELY, supra note 33; RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 336. Various treaties and rules permit states to bring a preliminary challenge to arbitration claims. 
See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 154, art. 41; 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 147, art. 28(4); 
see also infra Part VI.B–C (discussing possible reforms). 
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costs awards means that parties lack information about the potential costs 
of ITA that could facilitate full consideration of the costs and benefits of a 
dispute resolution strategy.
337
 If parties act rationally to assess the costs 
and benefits of pursuing ITA, possible settlement opportunities are 
arguably lost.
338
 Given the increased attention to settlement and alternative 
modes of resolving treaty disputes, this is concerning.
339
  
The data also help contextualize claims that the costs of ITA were 
relatively high.
340
 The average cost of a tribunal was more than 
US$600,000. That is not insignificant—but it must also be remembered 
that the fiscal data comes from a limited data set that requires expansion 
and replication of the research. Likewise, the availability of data on PLC, 
suggesting that average shifts were also in the order of US$600,000, 
suggests that the costs could be critical, namely, (1) paying 100% of 
US$600,000 for a PLC shift, (2) paying 100% of the US$600,000 TCE, 
and (3) any lawyer‘s fees the losing party also experiences. This suggests 
three things. First, it is difficult to ascertain ―full‖ costs without expanded 
data on both parties‘ legal costs. Indeed, presuming that parties briefed 
tribunals on cost issues, it is curious that tribunals, more often than not, 
failed to provide a full explanation of claimed and awarded costs.
341
 
 
 
 337. Resources matter particularly for the developing countries, which are the majority of 
respondents. See Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 446–47. Defending claims may require 
advance budgeting to allocate specific line items for conflict management. Without understanding the 
scope of arbitration risk, governments may not be in a position to make fully informed decisions about 
the value of IIAs.  
 338. In international commercial arbitration, the inability ―to predict with any degree of certainty 
the outcome of a claim for costs . . . impairs the ability of parties to fully evaluate the case and 
consequently settle the dispute.‖ Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 38; see also Michael 
Bühler, Costs in ICC Arbitration: A Practitioner’s View, 3 AM. REV. 116, 117 (1992) (―[I]t must be a 
prerequisite to any international arbitration that the parties know well in advance what to budget for 
costs, and that the cost system of the administering institution is fully transparent from the outset, so 
that clients and their counsel know how their money will be spent, and if they can expect to recoup it 
fully or in part.‖). 
 339. See UNCTAD, ADR I, supra note 34; UNCTAD, ADR II, supra note 34; Washington & Lee 
University School of Law & UNCTAD, Joint Conference on International Investment and ADR, 
WASHINGTON & LEE (Mar. 29, 2010), http://investmentadr.wlu.edu; Investor-state mediation: when is 
mediation suitable and should the legal framework for settling, investment disputes be strengthened to 
include procedures supporting the mediation of such disputes?, MEDIATION NEWS (Int‘l Bar Ass‘n, 
London), Oct. 2009, at 8; see also Salacuse, supra note 59, at 153 (―If, on the other hand, host 
countries and international investors can find and develop effective alternatives to international 
investor-State arbitration for the settlement of treaty-based investment disputes, the costs of investment 
dispute settlement for both states and investors may decline while working relationships between 
investors and host governments may improve.‖). But see Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 692 
(suggesting that the purpose of IIAs is not to facilitate bargaining but to create a predictable legal 
regime). 
 340. See supra notes 212–16. 
 341. Based upon data in the publicly available awards, it is unclear whether the tribunals were 
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Second, this can create difficulties in accessing justice and fully pursuing 
claims and defenses if parties are unable to pay their lawyers, unable to 
pay the tribunal, or the fiscal cost of pursuing arbitration substantially 
outweighs the amount in dispute. This suggests that investment treaty 
conflict may be lurking beneath the surface, but it may simply be 
unaddressed given that the fiscal reality of ITA may inhibit access to 
justice. This may prove particularly troubling for investors or states with 
limited budgets to pursue adjudication. Third, uncertainty about cost 
allocation can prevent parties from fully appreciating the scope of their 
arbitration risk. All of these concerns suggest the need for doctrinal shifts, 
particularly in terms of encouraging tribunals to provide more complete 
data and to address cost issues at early stages of the dispute.
342
 More 
information at an earlier stage holds the potential to manage stakeholder 
expectations (and presumably party resources) more effectively and to 
offer more complete empirical data for the future. 
B. Signs of Balance Even Without a ―Universal‖ Approach to Costs 
Current data suggests that there was a relative degree of parity between 
investors and states regarding costs. Most typically, the parties equally 
shared TCE and there was no shift of PLC. Meanwhile, there were an 
equivalent number of states and investors that experienced both a shift of 
PLC and a payment of more than 50%. As regards the actual dollar values 
of cost decisions, there was parity among investors and states for the 
payment of TCE; but there was less equilibrium on PLC shifts, which was 
arguably due to the small number of awards reporting dollar values for 
PLC shifts. Percentages of PLC shifts exhibited broad divergence; and 
although the largest proportion of TCE allocations were 50%/50%, there 
were various approaches to cost decisions.  
Overall, while there was a degree of parity among investors and states, 
there was nevertheless variability in the fiscal outcome of cost decisions 
that refutes the supposition that there is a ―universal‖ or ―loser-pays‖ 
 
 
fully briefed on costs. Tribunals should include information on PLC and TCE in the award to aid in the 
assessment of this data and provide a more nuanced picture of ITA costs. See supra notes 224–26 
(discussing the missing data related to costs). 
 342. See Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30 (―[A]rbitrators and parties should consider costs at 
the beginning of an arbitration. Arbitrators should make it clear from the outset that the parties‘ 
conduct throughout the proceedings will be [considered] . . . . Parties should clarify the basis on which 
costs will be awarded and assessed, and the procedure to be used.‖); Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 
32 (The ―arbitrator may wish to address the ambit of costs authority at a preliminary hearing. This 
would avoid any dispute as to the extent of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to award costs at the end of 
the day.‖). 
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approach to costs.
343
 There was no reliable statistical relationship between 
(1) losing and PLC shifts, and (2) losing and TCE allocation. Although a 
―loser-pays‖ approach is doctrinally permissible and possibly a ―trend‖ for 
analysis with a historical lens, data did not demonstrate a reliable—let 
alone causal—link between losing and cost outcomes. This suggests that it 
is inappropriate for parties to assess cost risk on the ―loser-pays‖ variable 
in complete isolation; rather, the data seemed to suggest that a ―factor-
dependent‖ or ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach was descriptively dominant. 
While more data and developed modeling may offer additional insight in 
the future, as a normative matter, stakeholders should recognize the degree 
of variability and consider what this could mean for their dispute 
resolution choices. Policy makers should likewise assess whether this 
unpredictability is normatively desirable and consider shaping their policy 
choices related to IIAs and their legal options for dispute resolution 
accordingly. 
C. Gaps in Legal Authority and Rationale Suggest Need for 
Rationalization 
There is a plethora of legal authority from which tribunals could draw 
to justify cost decisions.
344
 It is troubling that even when sources are easy 
to locate (and arguably readily known), tribunals fail to provide authority 
for cost decisions. Although this gap was most prominent in nonfinal 
awards (and perhaps not unexpected), even final awards exhibited the 
failure to offer authority (i.e., less than one authority on average). Such an 
approach is troubling if ITA is a rule-of-law demonstration project. If IIAs 
provide incentives for investors and states to engage in rules-based 
decision making, then arbitrators should adhere to the same credo. Simply 
presuming authority is inappropriate. It can lead to legal errors, such as 
Eureko, which must then be corrected (provided that is even doctrinally 
permissible). Particularly when references are straightforward, easy to 
include, and guide decisions, a citation gap creates challenges for 
perceived legitimacy and procedural justice.
345
 For those cases citing 
 
 
 343. See supra notes 125–26. 
 344. See supra Part II.A, II.C. 
 345. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in 
Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 473, 476, 477 (2008) (describing how disclosure of information can facilitate value creation 
and explaining how, irrespective of the outcome in terms of distributive justice, stakeholders ―care, 
independently, about the fairness of the process by which those outcomes were obtained‖); Tom R. 
Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of 
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authority, it was unfortunate that institutional tribunals, particularly 
ICSID, failed to cite their own rules. Nevertheless, there is a degree of 
good news that, for ad hoc arbitrations, tribunals regularly cited 1976 
UNCITRAL Rules. This is a step in the right direction for promoting the 
legitimacy of ITA. Future tribunals should follow that example and cite 
legal authority, particularly from the governing law.  
Another step in the right direction was for tribunals to offer a legal 
rationale. For both PLC and TCE, tribunals offered rationales nearly twice 
as often as authority, averaging one or two reasons per final award. For 
both PLC and TCE, the awards exhibited variation in rationale. The most 
frequently cited factors were parties‘ relative success and failure, 
considerations of equity, and underlying substantive concerns. Concerns 
about encouraging appropriate behavior and discouraging inappropriate 
behavior also held some sway. But issues related to party equality, public 
interest, and settlement efforts had little impact on cost decisions. If 
stakeholders wish to create a dispute resolution system with cost 
implications that promote fairness and efficiency, this latter finding 
requires both attention and redress.
346
  
There is irony in that commentators suggest that we need not worry 
about ―flooding investment tribunals with trivial disputes‖ largely because 
investors will make a rational assessment of ―the cost risk connected to 
investment treaty arbitration‖ prior to initiating claims.347 But how can 
investors make such an assessment if a key variable—which may entail a 
large portion of the overall commercial, economic, and political risk—is 
unknown and potentially unknowable given the lack of predictability and 
guidance? 
The lack of coherence in rationale is unsurprising in certain respects.
348
 
Treaties and arbitration rules that form the bulk of the governing law are 
 
 
Government, 28 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 809, 827 (1994) (finding ―that the use of fair decisionmaking 
procedures does enhance the legitimacy of national governmental authorities‖). 
 346. See Wetter & Preim, supra note 67, at 333 (arguing that ―a much increased awareness of the 
impact and proper allocation . . . (including the proper methods of their assessment) is desirable . . . 
[and] much greater care and time must be devoted in arbitral proceedings to the presentation of cost 
claims and to their determination‖). 
 347. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering, supra note 73, at 96; see also Salacuse, supra note 59, at 
153 (―[A] rational investor will not lightly resort to [arbitration] and will examine other options for 
redress of its grievance before doing so. The final and perhaps most important reason for increased 
recourse to investor-State arbitration may be that aggrieved investors, having undertaken that search 
for other options, have concluded that they have no more cost-effective, reliable remedy for the 
settlement of disputes than investor-State arbitration.‖).  
 348. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 659 (―The discretion conferred upon arbitral tribunals 
accounts for a considerable amount of uncertainty in the allocation of costs in investment treaty 
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often silent or fail to address costs in detail. Key institutions—like 
ICSID—are silent on cost guidelines or vaguely reference factors such as 
the ―outcome of the case‖ or ―other relevant circumstances.‖349 It is then 
little wonder that tribunals pick reasons at their leisure to justify decisions. 
One might reasonably suggest that arbitrators simply give parties what 
they requested. If stakeholders create an ITA system that fails to address 
costs clearly, stakeholders should hardly be surprised when the system 
they created—and the individuals to whom they have outsourced their 
adjudicative responsibility—do not provide clear results.350  
The broader normative question is whether clarity is desirable. In the 
context of ITA, given the overall problems related to inconsistency, 
incoherence, and gaps in determinacy, there is value in providing pockets 
of predictability and clarity. Costs are tangible, and, as a structural matter, 
the risks arguably affect investors and states in equal measure. Costs 
implicate the utility of arbitration as opposed to other dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and understanding the scope of ITA costs could aid dispute 
resolution strategy to promote (but not guarantee) greater efficiency 
overall. As cost issues should be relatively politically neutral, costs could 
be an area to begin to bring clear rules—or at least improved normative 
guidance—about how tribunals can and should exercise their discretion.  
There are different types of choice architectures for approaching ITA 
costs. First, states might articulate a clear rule that they prefer, such as a 
―loser-pays,‖ ―pay-your-own-way,‖ or ―factor-dependent‖ approach. 
Second, states could provide for cost rules in line with the original ICSID 
approach, namely, providing clear rules in advance of a dispute detailing 
how costs will be addressed (i.e., the ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach 
where parties pay their own lawyers and split the costs of arbitrators 
equally). Third, states might take a ―factor-dependent‖ approach that 
requires tribunals to use standards that are normatively desirable. For 
example, to the extent that states wish to encourage settlement in ITA, 
they may require tribunals to consider party settlement efforts. 
Particularly, as tribunals did not regularly cite settlement efforts, 
introducing this factor clearly into the normative baseline may affect 
tribunal, and possibly party, behavior. Likewise, to the extent that states 
 
 
arbitration. What makes it additionally difficult to discern a structure in the cost decisions of tribunals 
is the fact that reasons for adopting a certain cost decision are rarely given.‖). 
 349. See supra notes 157–58, 163, 167–69. 
 350. See generally William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields Lecture—Arbitration’s Protean 
Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion (The 2002 Freshfields Lecture), 19 ARB. INT‘L 
279 (2003) (discussing the costs and benefits of specific rules in international arbitration). 
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may be concerned about the inequality experienced by small investors or 
states with smaller amounts of legal capacity, expressly requiring states to 
take issues of public interest or party equality into account may encourage 
parties and arbitrators to be more proactive in addressing these issues—
and perhaps even treat different costs issues differently in an effort to 
optimize different opportunities to signal the likely pay-off matrix. While 
the choice to include a particular approach is a policy choice that reflects a 
treaty negotiation dyad, the last two options (namely, ―pay-your-own-
way‖ and ―factor-dependent‖) are most attractive.   
The first option—―loser-pays‖—is less desirable at present. Given the 
inconsistency and breadth of the case law, it may be difficult to know in 
advance which party will ―win‖ and which party will ―lose.‖ This makes a 
―loser-pays‖ approach susceptible to variance and injects an avoidable 
(and arguably unnecessary) degree of uncertainty into ITA, which creates 
greater challenges in predicting costs. Rather than engaging in a high-
stakes poker game where there are risks of both an adverse substantive 
award and a related cost decision, it is preferable to enhance determinacy 
and coherence by promulgating clearer guidelines about cost decisions. 
This is not to say that an indemnification objective is undesirable. Rather, 
the issue might be whether policy makers can create standards that direct 
tribunals on how to incorporate that factor into cost decisions.  
The value of the second option—the ―pay-your-own-way‖ approach—
is that it provides a degree of up-front certainty.
351
 Parties have advance 
warning that they will be responsible for half of TCE and be responsible 
for their own PLC. This gives parties an incentive to be ―good stewards‖ 
and manage their expenses effectively, knowing they will not be able to 
recoup their fees from the other side at the end of the case (or earlier). To 
the extent that parties can reasonably anticipate tribunal costs, know they 
will be responsible for one-half of TCE, and keep their own costs under 
control, that knowledge provides a reasonable degree of advance clarity. 
The weaknesses of the approach, however, are that if parties engage in 
deleterious behavior during the course of arbitration, that behavior cannot 
be penalized, and tribunals cannot use cost awards to encourage efficient 
arbitration conduct. It also potentially inhibits parties‘ access to justice and 
implicates fairness considerations, particularly when there is a relationship 
between the amounts an investor claims and the ultimate scope of TCE. 
Moreover, it fails to provide indemnification for a party that has been 
brought to the dispute resolution table and has expended costs to defend 
 
 
 351. Dean Gotanda favors this approach. Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 2–3. 
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the case. Using this approach inevitably creates sunk costs for dispute 
resolution. Should they wish to include treaty language to require this or 
adopt institutional rules that would support such clarity, stakeholders need 
to appreciate those drawbacks in light of the overall benefits. 
The third option—the ―factor-dependent‖ approach—may be the most 
normatively useful. This approach permits stakeholders to prioritize 
behaviors that they wish to encourage and to nudge efficient and desirable 
conduct.
352
 In other words, if states wish to caveat the scope of arbitrator 
discretion—providing more guidance to tribunals and increasing 
certainty—they can and should do so in the text of IIAs353 when they 
negotiate treaties or when there is an opportunity to renegotiate.
354
 In such 
a case, states must make a normative choice about those factors that they 
find to be most appropriate. The data suggests that the most ―naturally‖ 
occurring factors were considerations of relative success, equities of the 
situation, and concern about underlying substantive behavior. Should 
states wish to reinforce these factors and encourage the addition of other 
default rationales for arbitral decisions, they can expressly articulate these 
standards in treaties. If, however, states wish to incentivize other aspects—
such as the role of access to justice, social justice, or other fairness 
considerations—this suggests states may need to incorporate express 
requirements that tribunals consider other factors, such as public policy or 
equality of arms. Likewise, if states wish to increase settlement 
opportunities, they could require tribunals to consider the cost implications 
of meritorious arguments or the social utility of claims or defenses during 
the proceedings.  
One might imagine the text of an IIA‘s investor-state dispute settlement 
chapter that incorporates specific provisions for costs. It would 
specifically define both PLC and TCE. It would grant parties authority to 
agree about costs. It would then provide a default that, in the absence of 
 
 
 352. See, e.g., Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 666 (suggesting cost shifting can ―channel 
the behavior‖ to preserve arbitral efficiency); see also Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the 
Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 208 (1984). 
 353. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitration Decisions as Jurisprudence 
Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265 
(Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008) (―[D]ecisions regarding . . . allocation of costs play an increasingly 
important role in investment arbitrations but are also not addressed thoroughly in the treaties.‖). Other 
options may involve the revision of institutional or UNCITRAL arbitration rules to address cost 
shifting in ITA. The current reforms at UNCITRAL and ICC do not suggest this is currently likely. 
Another option, presuming it forms a part of the applicable law, includes revising national arbitration 
laws on cost, but this may be difficult.  
 354. See UNCTAD, IIA MONITOR, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2008/1, NO. 2, RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (2007–2008), at 4–5 (2008) 
(discussing the increasing number of renegotiated IIAs). 
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choice, tribunals would have authority to assess costs at any stage of the 
proceedings but, in any event, must do so in the final award. It would 
require that the tribunal provide reasons for its cost decisions and then 
require the tribunal to take certain factors into account expressly, such as: 
(1) the parties‘ relative success, (2) whether cost shifting would be 
equitable given the parties‘ behavior during the arbitration, and (3) the 
parties‘ settlement efforts. Factors could be added or eliminated depending 
upon the normative choices of the treaty partners. 
Although this ―nudging‖ approach cannot guarantee behavior or 
eliminate all forms of discretion, it can encourage stakeholders to take key 
variables into account.
355
 By establishing normatively desirable standards 
that reflect empirical knowledge about existing behavior, stakeholders can 
begin to move beyond a baseline of unbridled discretion or 
unpredictability to encourage useful behavior and generate enhanced 
certainty. Putting parties on notice about the utility of their behavior and 
the potential merits of their claim may provide parties with an incentive 
and opportunity to settle or consider other dispute resolution mechanisms. 
While tribunals must maintain their independence and impartiality, where 
they are also required to take factors into account through express treaty 
language, the guidance can create a level playing field that offers useful 
information and incentives. It will, moreover, aid the continued 
rationalization of costs in ITA and promote greater systemic legitimacy. 
While arbitrator discretion will remain,
356
 it will be directed toward 
streamlined variables that the parties can anticipate and use to plan their 
conduct.  
D. Links with Cost Variables Suggest Need for Caution and 
Rationalization 
Although the preceding discussion of gaps in legal authority and 
reasoning suggests a lack of coherence, cost variables exhibited small 
pockets of reliability that aid the rationalization of cost awards. There was 
 
 
 355. See generally ARIELY, supra note 37; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 335; Anne C. Dailey 
& Peter Siegelman, Predictions and Nudges: What Economics Has to Offer the Humanities, and Vice-
Versa, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 341, 343 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) and 
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008) and discussing the value of cognitive psychology and 
behavioral economics for socio-legal issues). 
 356. Eliminating all discretion on costs may create perverse incentives or prevent the exercise of 
judgment to make good decisions in difficult cases. There is nevertheless utility in guiding discretion 
to aid incremental advances toward improved rationalization. 
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a reliable relationship between a shift of PLC and TCE such that, if there 
was a shift in the parties‘ costs, the same party would also be likely to pay 
for more than 50% of TCE and vice versa. Similarly, where there was no 
shift in TCE, there was no shift in PLC. In other words, awards linked 
decisions related to lawyer‘s fees and tribunal costs. As both PLC and 
TCE relate to ultimate ITA costs, this seems reasonably appropriate, and 
there seems little to do except clarify that the relationship exists and advise 
clients accordingly. If, however, stakeholders wish to make a normative 
choice to parse costs differently and finely tune their policy objectives for 
different types of costs, they can do so. If, for example, there is a particular 
desire to increase access to justice and consider party equality of arms, 
perhaps stakeholders may require tribunals to address PLC early on the 
basis of equality of arms, and public interest as ongoing payment of 
lawyers‘ fees may affect party capacity to continue with protracted ITA 
claims. In such a case, TCE could perhaps be allocated on a ―pay-your-
own-way‖ basis on a different timetable. Such a choice could reflect the 
normative concerns of parties related to efficiency and fairness. 
There was also a reliable relationship between amounts claimed by 
investors and the amount of the tribunal‘s total cost. As the amount 
claimed was lower, the cost of the tribunal was lower; but as the amount 
claimed by the investor increased, so did the total tribunal cost. This—
when contrasted with the lack of a reliable relationship between amounts 
awarded and tribunal costs—has implications for how and when investors 
might uniquely influence ultimate arbitration costs. It means that when 
investors initiate arbitration—as they are often the only parties with the 
legal right to initiate claims—the amount of damages they request 
implicates the baseline of ultimate costs, fees, and expenses of the entirety 
of the ITA process. It must be remembered that a reliable statistical 
relationship does not necessarily denote cause; and it is possible that a 
high-damage claim denotes a serious case, a case that has been protracted, 
or a case where major multinational law firms are involved. In serious or 
protracted cases, arbitrators rightly take more time to decide the dispute, 
thereby resulting in increased costs.
357
  
 
 
 357. This may also be a function of institutional rules. ICSID, LCIA, and ad hoc arbitrations often 
pay arbitrators by the amount of time spent. See LCIA, SCHEDULE OF ARBITRATION COSTS (2010), 
available at http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Costs.aspx (paying 
arbitrators by the hour); see also ICSID, SCHEDULE OF FEES, art. 3 (2008), available at http://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH8actionsVal=ShowDocument&Schedu
ledFees=True&language=English (setting fees for arbitrators on the basis of a daily rate). The ICC 
pays based upon the amount in controversy. ICC Rules, supra note 169, at app. III. Given that the data 
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If there is a causal relationship—namely, that investors set the amount 
in controversy and the higher their request, the higher the ultimate cost—
that has serious implications. It suggests a need for clarity, at the outset, of 
how arbitration costs will be allocated. It suggests a need for procedural 
safeguards to minimize the harms (namely, increased costs and decreased 
settlement opportunities) that result from arguably inflated claims. Such a 
procedural safeguard might, for example, take the form of requiring 
investors to accompany their request for arbitration with a preliminary 
expert report. Particularly, as there is no equivalent of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11 sanctions in international arbitration and parties are 
free to claim any amount, there may be value in making changes to 
pleading requirements and encouraging more accurate assessments of 
damages at the outset.
358
 Changing pleading obligations or using cost-
shifting standards strategically offers incentives for party behavior that 
foster norms of efficiency and fairness. Using these process tools imposes 
a discipline that may lower the overall arbitration costs for both parties. It 
may also decrease arbitration-based buyer‘s remorse by focusing clients 
and counsel on the relative worth of arbitration.
359
 Likewise, it may 
facilitate negotiation within realistic zones of possible agreement
360
 and, 
similar to early damage assessments in asbestos litigation, aid settlement 
opportunities.
361
 Nevertheless, policy choices based upon inferences from 
this data must be done with caution in light of the size of the subset of the 
data set and variations even between the subset and the larger pre-2007 
population.
362
 
There may be opportunities to rationalize cost beyond legal solutions, 
such as (1) encouraging tribunals to address costs early, often, and with 
 
 
subset came from ICSID or ad hoc tribunals, a more complex case requiring more hours would 
increase overall TCE. 
 358. Damage assessments would be preliminary and would evolve in light of the evidence and 
arguments presented during the proceedings.  
 359. Although possibly unrepresentative, the former CEO of a company that won an award 
against Mexico suggested that the experience was ―so dissatisfying that he wished he had merely 
entrusted his company‘s fate to informal mechanisms,‖ including political options, given the lost time 
and arbitration costs. Coe, supra note 73, at 8–10. 
 360. See WATKINS & ROSEGRANT, supra note 35, at 31–33 (discussing the functioning of 
ZOPAs); see also Michael L. Moffitt, Will this Case Settle? An Exploration of Mediators’ Predictions, 
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 39, 44–52 (2000) (discussing ZOPAs and their impact on dispute 
settlement). 
 361. Asbestos litigation has benefitted from addressing damages early. See Drury Stevenson, 
Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 218 (2008) (analyzing early assessment of damages in 
asbestos litigation and concluding it ―fosters settlements; it generally yields verdicts more reflective of 
the merits of a case; and it discourages frivolous litigation‖); Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: 
Procedural Innovations and Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 374–75 (2006). 
 362. See supra text accompanying notes 199–234. 
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reasons; (2) providing enhanced clarity in the terms of treaties; or (3) 
offering further guidance in arbitration rules. Another form of 
rationalization may be to create a market for ―legal expense insurance‖ to 
help both investors and states address their costs risks in ITA.
363
 The 
challenge, however, would be making sure that actuaries had something to 
work with to assess and to predict that risk to price policies properly. As a 
result, even insurers would likely want to have data from tribunals. 
Promoting informed cost assessments and access to justice to permit 
cost-effective dispute resolution is critical. The objective should be to 
work with the pockets of coherence and balance that already exist and then 
begin to rationalize the treatment of costs to provide enhanced 
predictability and consistency on an incremental basis. Encouraging states 
(when drafting IIAs), parties (when engaging in dispute resolution), and 
arbitrators (when making cost assessments) to be clear, transparent, and 
precise (in light of the overriding policy objectives) would facilitate the 
incremental rationalization of costs in investment arbitration.  
CONCLUSION 
ITA can be a useful tool for resolving investment treaty disputes, but 
issues of cost—should they continue in their present state—will create 
challenges for using ITA in the most fair and efficient manner possible. 
More attention to matters of cost—by parties, arbitrators, policy makers, 
and scholars conducting empirical research—is a desirable outcome. 
Promoting transparency, clarity, and determinacy in the costs will enhance 
the efficacy and legitimacy of IIAs and ITA. In a time of transition in 
international investment, the normative approaches suggested in this 
Article may offer an opportunity to provide the stability and 
rationalization necessary for the creation of international economic justice 
and sustainable dispute resolution systems. 
 
 
 363. Legal expense insurance can cover risks related to bringing protracted and potentially 
expensive claims or can cover policyholders against the potential costs of legal action against them. 
See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS (2010), available at http://www. 
yourdictionary.com/business/legal-expense-insurance.  
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